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Early-onset obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is substantially less researched than adult-OCD, 
resulting in prevalent equivocation surrounding the neurocognitive profile of child-OCD. Research 
into this area is pivotal as population studies report that youths with OCD struggle significantly in 
academic settings. In the General Introduction of this thesis, I reviewed existing literature and found 
that strikingly, young patients do not show impairment on features that are considered both hallmarks 
of adult OCD and tightly linked to disorder symptomatology, such as response inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility. Among the characteristics that are thought to be present in children and 
adolescents with OCD are abnormal decision-making under uncertainty and impaired learning, and 
I decided to focus on these features as they may be driving poor academic attainment in young people 
with the disorder. In addition, I sought to investigate other cognitive processes that have not been 
well-researched in adolescent-OCD but are found to be robustly altered in adult OCD such as goal-
directed/model-based reasoning, meta-cognition, and feedback sensitivity. I aimed to delineate these 
various processes using a battery of suitably complex cognitive tasks. Moreover, I highlighted that 
majority of past studies fail to find differences between young patients and controls due to 
behavioural signatures being too subtle to be uncovered by standard statistical analyses. Hence, I 
employed computational modelling of cognitive task data to disentangle latent decision-making 
processes displayed by adolescents with OCD.  
In Chapter 2, I modelled data from the Wisconsin Card Sorting task, a frequently used paradigm of 
cognitive flexibility, and confirmed that youths with OCD show equivalent performance on the task 
to controls. Only patients on serotonergic medication showed increased response latencies and a 
tendency to make unique errors (choosing a deck associated with no rule present on the test card). 
Next, in Chapter 3, I sought to understand instrumental and Pavlovian learning, and whether 
adolescents with OCD show increased punishment sensitivity on a novel aversive Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental Transfer paradigm. Once again, patient performance was equivalent to that of controls. 
Hence, the remaining chapters were dedicated to probing behaviour on probabilistic paradigms. In 
Chapter 4, I formally investigated model-based and model-free learning using a well-validated two-
step decision-making task, and fit a reinforcement learning drift diffusion model to both choice and 
reaction time data. Patients showed increased exploration on the task as well as faster and more 
erratic decisions compared to controls. Nonetheless, model-based learning was equivalent between 
groups. In the penultimate chapter, I demonstrate on a predictive-inference task that patients with 
OCD update their choices more frequently compared to controls independent of prediction error 





sample of 50 adolescent patients and 53 matched controls. Standard analyses revealed a significant 
reversal learning deficit in patients with OCD, wherein they displayed more errors and a lower 
propensity to repeat choices following positive feedback during the post-reversal phase. Crucially, 
computational modelling revealed striking group differences where adolescents with OCD displayed 
elevated reward learning and lower punishment learning, increased exploration, and decreased 
perseveration compared to controls. In the General Discussion, I emphasise that atypical learning 
and decision-making in adolescent-OCD are more pronounced on probabilistic tasks, where task 
environments are more volatile. Results are partly discussed in the context of the uncertainty model 
of OCD, where subjective feelings of doubt experienced by patients drive compulsive behaviours 
such as checking and certainty-seeking in daily life, alongside excessive exploration on probabilistic 
tasks. I also consider various explanations for cognitive distinctions between adult- and adolescent-
OCD. More general implications of the findings are discussed for understanding OCD in the context 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 Clinical and epidemiological characteristics of paediatric OCD 
 
   Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a highly disabling psychiatric disorder affecting roughly 
2-3% of children, adolescents, and adults worldwide (Kalra & Swedo, 2009; Karno, Golding, 
Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988; Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010). Many cases of OCD seen in 
adults begin in childhood, as age of disorder onset follows a bimodal trend, peaking at approximately 
10 years of age and again in early adulthood (Geller, 2006; Geller et al., 1998). Furthermore, within 
a large ethnically diverse sample of adult patients (N = 3711), the mean age of OCD onset was in 
late adolescence (17.9 years) (Brakoulias et al., 2017). Indeed, experiences during childhood play a 
significant role in the development of OCD. Research has demonstrated that neurodevelopmental, 
behavioural, personality, environmental risk factors in childhood were strong predictors of receiving 
a diagnosis of OCD or experiencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms in adulthood (Grisham et al., 
2011). In addition, healthy children who report obsessive and compulsive behaviours are 
significantly more likely to meet diagnostic criteria for OCD in adulthood, compared to children 
without such traits (Fullana et al., 2009). Surprisingly, however, there is also contrasting research 
highlighting a lack of diagnostic continuity between OCD in childhood and in adulthood. A meta-
analysis exploring data from 16 study samples (N=521) found that the mean persistence rate for full-
OCD (severe enough to meet diagnostic criteria) from childhood to adulthood was only 41% (Stewart 
et al., 2004). Additionally, only one-third to one-half of adults with OCD report childhood-onset 
(Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992), although such self-report data may not be very reliable.  
   OCD as a whole is characterised by recurring unwanted thoughts, ideas and sensations 
(obsessions), as well as repetitive ritualised actions or thoughts that a person feels compelled to 
perform (compulsions) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). These general characteristics 
apply to both adults and children with the disorder and indeed the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-
5 (DSM-5) outlines the same diagnostic criteria for both child and adult OCD. However, research 
has uncovered critical differences between the age-groups. Among them, adult-onset OCD occurs 
more prominently in women (Karno et al., 1988; Noshirvani, Kasvikis, Marks, Tsakiris, & Monteiro, 
1991), while early-onset OCD is associated with a male preponderance (Deepthi, Sagar Kommu, 
Smitha, & Reddy, 2018; Geller et al., 2001; Mancebo et al., 2008; Taylor, 2011). Moreover, research 





Grootheest, Cath, Beekman, & Boomsma, 2005) suggesting that early-onset OCD may be a 
developmental subtype of the disorder.  
   While both paediatric and adult patients typically display compulsions related to checking, 
ordering, cleaning, and washing (Thomsen et al., 2000) (Leckman et al., 1997; Stewart et al., 2007), 
paediatric patients report decreased mental rituals compared to adults with the disorder (Mancebo et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the content of paediatric obsessions is distinct from adult obsessions, as child 
patients report higher rates of aggressive and miscellaneous intrusions (Geller et al., 2001; Mancebo 
et al., 2008). Additionally, affected children tend to have fewer and more manageable obsessions 
than affected adults (Farrell & Barrett, 2006), and 40% of children deny that obsessions drive their 
compulsive acts (Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane, & Cheslow, 1989). This could be evidence for 
compulsions developing prior to obsessions in children with the disorder. Alternatively, children with 
OCD may not yet be able to verbalise their obsessions, leading to clinicians underestimating their 
frequency of obsessions.   
   A majority of patients with OCD will present with a comorbid disorder in their lifetime (Rasmussen 
& Eisen, 1992). The most common comorbid conditions in adults with OCD include anxiety 
disorders, mood disorders, impulse control disorders, substance use disorders, and phobias (Ruscio, 
Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010; Brakoulias, Starcevic, & Belloch, 2017). Children with OCD present 
different patterns of comorbid diagnoses, with higher likelihood of developing comorbid tic disorder, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and developmental disabilities (Kalra & Swedo, 
2009; Leonard et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2011). Additionally, the most common personality disorder 
associated with paediatric OCD was found to be avoidant personality disorder while obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder was more prevalent in adult OCD patients (Thomsen & Mikkelsen, 
1993).  
   There are also reported differences in clinical presentation between older and younger children 
with OCD. Namely, those with very early-onset (below 10 years) showed higher rates of comorbid 
tics, more frequent ordering and repeating compulsions, and greater parent-reported psychosocial 
difficulties (Nakatani et al., 2011). In another study, adolescents with OCD reported more religious 
obsessions than younger patients, while younger patients showed lower insight compared to 
adolescents, and displayed more comorbid disruptive disorders and separation anxiety (Geller et al., 






   Despite being clinically divergent, treatments for paediatric- and adult-OCD are identical. OCD 
symptoms in adults and children improve following the administration of high doses of selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Abramowitz, Whiteside, & Deacon, 2005; Bloch, McGuire, 
Landeros-Weisenberger, Leckman, & Pittenger, 2010), and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
including exposure response prevention (ERP) (Abramowitz et al., 2005; Skapinakis et al., 2016; 
Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean, 2005). However, there appears to be differences in treatment 
efficacy, as OCD remission rate amongst youths is reported to be higher than in adults (Mancebo et 
al., 2014). Juveniles with OCD are also more likely to receive medication treatment at a younger age 
than adults with early onset OCD (Mancebo et al., 2008), suggesting that detection and treatment of 
the disorder in childhood could be linked to higher chances of recovery.  
   Living with OCD during the key developmental periods of childhood and adolescence can greatly 
impact a young person’s daily functioning, and it is unsurprising that children with OCD typically 
have a lower quality of life compared to healthy children (Weidle, Ivarsson, Thomsen, Lydersen, & 
Jozefiak, 2015). Adding to this, academic attainment is reported to be impeded as a result of the 
disorder. Many school-going children with OCD report difficulty concentrating on schoolwork and 
completing assignments (Piacentini, Bergman, Keller, & McCracken, 2003), and a more recent study 
found that child patients show significantly poorer mathematics ability compared to healthy children 
(Negreiros, Belschner, Selles, Lin, & Stewart, 2018). In addition, a nationwide cohort study based in 
Sweden that investigated education milestones in over 2 million participants reported that subjects 
diagnosed with OCD (15120 subjects) in childhood were less likely to finish secondary school and 
pursue postgraduate education (Pérez-Vigil et al., 2018). These trends are highly concerning and it 
is crucial that present research is devoted to determining the cognitive characteristics of childhood-
OCD to better understand why affected children are struggling academically. One such study has 
recently found that adolescent patients show marked learning impairments (Gottwald et al., 2018), 
but hitherto it is uncertain why children with OCD display these specific neuropsychological deficits 
which actually differ to an extent from typical cognitive findings in adults with OCD (see next 
section). It is crucial to understand the mechanisms underlying these deficits to guide the design of 
suitable interventions that could aid children with OCD who are struggling academically.  
 
1.2 Cognitive characteristics of paediatric OCD 
  Among the key areas of research into cognition in OCD are cognitive flexibility, reversal learning, 





directed and habit-directed control. Most of these domains have been labelled potential 
endophenotypes of OCD which means they are heritable quantitative traits associated with increased 
genetic risk for the disorder (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). This is because deficits in these domains 
also occur in the unaffected first-degree relatives (UFDRs) of adult OCD patients at a higher rate 
than the general population (Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009). Despite this, as will become 
increasingly apparent in this section, deficits in several domains are not as prominent in young people 
with the disorder, implying a cognitive divergence between child- and adult-OCD.  
1.2.1 Cognitive Flexibility 
   Cognitive flexibility is defined as the ability to adapt one’s attention to different tasks, strategies 
and stimuli which are relevant, while simultaneously disengaging from/ignoring irrelevant stimuli. 
Researchers have studied this function using set-shifting paradigms, such as the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (WCST) (Grant & Berg, 1948) and the CANTAB Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift 
Task (ID/ED) (Downes et al., 1989), as well as using other executive switching tasks such as the 
Trail-Making Task B (TMT-B) (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), and task switching tests. There are key 
differences between set-shifting paradigms and the latter two tasks: set-shifting involves shifting 
attention between different cognitive sets by learning from feedback to follow a certain rule, while 
the other switching tasks do not involve feedback learning and instead require shifting attention after 
being cued to switch.  
   The WCST involves sorting cards based on a specific rule that can change from time to time (e.g. 
from colour to shape). Findings on the WCST are mixed in paediatric populations, as on the one 
hand, children with OCD have been reported to be more perseverative, commit more overall errors, 
and complete fewer categories on the WCST compared to healthy controls (Baykal et al., 2014; Isik 
Taner, Erdogan Bakar, & Oner, 2011; M. S. Shin et al., 2008). This indicates that children with OCD 
are less able to direct attention to task-relevant information. In addition, Andrés et al. (2007) found 
that paediatric patients also make more non-perseverative errors also suggesting an impairment with 
attention and learning in general. Nonetheless, majority of studies report that children with OCD 
show no impairments on the WCST (Beers et al., 1999; Geller et al., 2018; Gruner et al., 2012; 
Kodaira et al., 2012; Ornstein, Arnold, Manassis, Mendlowitz, & Schachar, 2010). In contrast, adults 
with OCD typically commit more perseverative errors on the WCST compared to age-matched 
controls (Aigner et al., 2007; Bucci et al., 2007; Cavedini, Zorzi, Piccinni, Cavallini, & Bellodi, 2010; 
Lucey et al., 1997; Okasha et al., 2000; Paast, Khosravi, Memari, Shayestehfar, & Arbabi, 2016; 
Tükel et al., 2012). Gruner et al. (2012) suggest that WCST-impairments may be dependent on 





categories on the WCST while medication-naïve patients showed no impairment. Yet, Andrés et al. 
(2007) also checked for effects of medication but did not find any differences between medicated 
and unmedicated child patients on the task. 
   The ID/ED task dissociates the effects of intra-dimensional (ID) and extra-dimensional (ED) shifts 
which are implicit in the WCST (Rogers, Andrews, Grasby, Brooks, & Robbins, 2000). ID shifts 
involve the formation of an attentional set towards a stimulus dimension (e.g. lines), and then 
‘shifting’ between test stimuli within the same dimension. ED shifts involve attending to a new 
stimulus dimension (e.g. shapes) that was previously irrelevant. Adults with OCD more often than 
not show increased ED errors on the task (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Menzies, et al., 2007; 
Chamberlain, Müller, et al., 2006; Vaghi, Vértes, et al., 2017; Watkins et al., 2005) (see Chamberlain 
et al., manuscript submitted for meta-analysis), suggesting that they are perseverating at responding 
to the dimension that is no longer relevant. In contrast, Gottwald et al. (2018) discovered that 
adolescents with OCD made more errors compared to controls in the pre-ED shift portion of the task, 
which includes discrimination and reversal learning (ID shifts), but not attentional set shifting (ED 
shifts). However, Kim et al. (2018) reported that children with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), 
and not OCD, showed poor learning in the pre-ED phase. However, this effect disappeared after the 
authors statistically controlled for medication status suggesting an interaction between anxiety and 
medication on attentional learning. Different age ranges could also account for these differences as 
Kim et al. recruited children as young as 7 years old in their study, while Gottwald et al. only studied 
adolescents. Hybel et al. (2017) also did not find differences in cognitive flexibility (measured via 
post-ED errors) on the ID/ED task between child OCD patients and controls but they did not report 
pre-ED scores in their analysis. 
   Next, the TMT-B requires participants to alternate drawing lines between letters and numbers (e.g 
1-A-2-B). One study reported children with OCD made slower movements on the test compared to 
controls (Ornstein et al., 2010), which has also been demonstrated in adults with OCD (Ozcan, Ozer, 
& Yagcioglu, 2016). However, most other studies employing the test do not find any significant 
deficits in children with OCD (Beers et al., 1999; Garcia-Delgar et al., 2018), and even studies that 
found OCD-related impairments on the WCST reported no significant performance deficits on the 
TMT-B (Andrés et al., 2007; Shin et al., 2008). This indicates that the WCST may be more sensitive 
to set-shifting deficits in OCD compared to the TMT-B. Nevertheless, Gruner et al. (2012), using 
diffusion tensor imaging, uncovered brain white matter abnormalities in children with OCD 
pertaining to their task performance. Higher fractional anisotrophy (more diffusion of water 





the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), was correlated with better performance on the TMT-B within 
only the patient group. It was inferred that this atypical diffusion serves as a compensatory 
mechanism, allowing young patients to perform similarly to their healthy counterparts (Gruner et al., 
2012). 
   Task switching tests are similar in implementation to the TMT-B, as they involve switching from 
attending to one feature of a stimulus (e.g. shape) to another (e.g. colour) when cued. Studies 
generally revealed no behavioural differences between paediatric patients and controls on such tasks 
(Britton et al., 2010; Woolley et al., 2008). However, Wolff et al. (2017) demonstrated that OCD 
patients had slower reaction times on memory-based switching (requires remembering when to 
switch tasks, e.g. switching between attending between ‘number’ and ‘shape’ every 15 trials) but 
normal reaction times during cue-based switching (switching attention when provided with a cue), 
suggesting patients’ cognitive flexibility is impacted by working memory load. Interestingly, in a 
separate study, adolescent patients were shown to be faster than controls at attending to previously 
abandoned mental sets during task switching (Wolff, Giller, Buse, Roessner, & Beste, 2018), 
suggesting that young OCD patients are impaired at processing new information, but are able to 
flexibly reactivate old mental sets. Child patients showed underactivity in rostral brain regions, 
specifically the inferior frontal gyrus (Britton et al., 2010) and the inferior prefrontal cortices 
(Woolley et al., 2008) during task switching, which mirrors findings from adult OCD (Gu et al., 
2008; Vaghi, Vértes, et al., 2017). Furthermore, child OCD patients showed lower P1 event-related 
potential (ERP) amplitudes, as measured using EEG, during memory-based switching which 
corresponded to decreased activation in the right inferior frontal and temporal gyri (Wolff, Buse, 
Tost, Roessner, & Beste, 2017). 
Summary 
Evidence from the WCST suggests that children with OCD may present cognitive inflexibility but 
they appear to be unimpaired on other tasks in this domain. One study has suggested that adolescent 
patients have more of a basic learning impairment instead of a cognitive flexibility deficit (Gottwald 
et al., 2018) but these findings so far have not been replicated.  In spite of mixed behavioural results, 
studies employing neuroimaging reveal crucial prefrontal-cortical brain region differences between 






1.2.2 Reversal learning 
   Reversal learning tasks have typically been employed to study cognitive flexibility, and are also 
useful in probing instrumental learning and feedback processing. There are two types of reversal 
learning paradigms, namely deterministic and probabilistic reversal learning. During deterministic 
reversal learning subjects are trained to discriminate between two visual stimuli or spatial locations, 
one of which is rewarded every time it is chosen while the other is either unrewarded or punished. 
After some trials or after a learning criterion has been achieved, the outcomes associated with the 
stimuli are reversed. Probabilistic reversal learning is similar except outcomes associated with each 
stimulus are probabilistic, hence subjects must learn to respond to the stimulus that delivers positive 
feedback most of the time (e.g. 80% of the time) over a different stimulus that delivers positive 
feedback only a small proportion of the time (e.g. 20% of the time). Probabilistic reversal learning 
tasks differ considerably from others studying this domain as the feedback provided is not always 
reliable, adding an extra layer of complexity and enables investigation of learning under uncertainty.  
   Classically, adults with OCD are observed to be unimpaired on both deterministic and probabilistic 
reversal learning tasks compared with healthy controls (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, et al., 
2007; Ersche et al., 2011; Remijnse et al., 2009; Remijnse et al., 2006; Valerius, Lumpp, Kuelz, 
Freyer, & Voderholzer, 2008) although they have been found to show abnormally reduced right 
medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) activity when completing deterministic and 
probabilistic versions of the task (Chamberlain et al., 2008; Remijnse et al., 2006). However, studies 
employing more complex versions of deterministic reversal learning tasks (e.g. by increasing the 
number of choices rather than using the simpler two-choice paradigm) report that adults with OCD 
commit more post-reversal errors than healthy controls indicative of impaired cognitive flexibility 
(Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Endrass, Koehne, Riesel, & Kathmann, 2013). Additionally, a 
proportion of probabilistic reversal learning studies found that adult OCD patients commit more post-
reversal errors and shift more following misleading negative feedback delivered by the ‘correct’ 
stimulus (a measure commonly known as shifing to spurious negative feedback) (Apergis-Schoute 
et al., in-prep; Endrass, Kloft, Kaufmann, & Kathmann, 2011). This implies that patients’ responses 
are highly influenced by punishing or negative feedback. While no published research has explored 
reversal learning in paediatric OCD, one of the studies Dr. Julia Gottwald (a former PhD student in 
the University of Cambridge) presented in her doctoral thesis demonstrated that adolescents with 
OCD were unimpaired on deterministic reversal learning, but displayed more post-reversal errors on 





display significantly more shifting following spurious negative feedback during probabilistic reversal 
learning (Gottwald, 2017, thesis). 
   Lately, emerging research employing sophisticated computational models (which involve 
analysing trial-by-trial data to investigate latent decision-making processes such as feedback 
sensitivity and reward maximisation) has revealed adults with OCD actually present reduced choice 
consistency on probabilistic reversal learning tasks. Adults with OCD are more likely to select sub-
optimal options (increased exploration) and are less likely to re-select options that were previously 
chosen (reduced perseveration) (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Kanen, Ersche, Fineberg, Robbins, 
& Cardinal, 2019). These results are at odds with adult patients’ perseverative tendencies on other 
aforementioned cognitive flexibility tests, which may be attributed to the feedback on this type of 
task being probabilistic and thus promoting more uncertainty in decisions. Hitherto, no studies have 
examined probabilistic reversal learning in a sample of only paediatric patients with OCD, although 
one study has reported less perseveration on the task in a sample containing both adult and adolescent 
OCD patients (Hauser et al., 2017).   
Summary  
The majority of studies employing probabilistic and deterministic reversal learning tasks identify 
intact performance in adults with OCD, although patients show reduced lateral and medial OFC 
activation when completing the tasks. A few studies have also found evidence for adult patients to 
display increased perseveration on deterministic reversal learning tasks and more shifting to spurious 
negative feedback on probabilistic reversal learning tasks. The limited evidence available for child 
patients suggest intact deterministic reversal learning performance and impaired post-reversal 
performance on probabilistic reversal learning tasks, however more research is needed to draw firm 
conclusions. Computational modelling work demonstrates that adults with OCD make more 
exploratory and less perseverative choices on probabilistic reversal learning paradigms but it is 
hitherto unknown whether children with OCD show similar behaviour.  
 
1.2.3 Response Inhibition 
   Response inhibition refers to the ability to inhibit a pre-potent motor response, and impairment in 
this domain has been suggested to account for OCD patients being unable to stop repetitive rituals 
(Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005). Tasks used to study inhibition in 





(Stroop, 1935), Stop-Signal Task (SST) (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984), Go/No-Go (GNG) task, 
and the Continuous Performance Test (CPT). 
   The Stroop test entails reading different coloured words aloud and inhibition is measured via 
number of errors and reaction times when the word and the colour are incongruent (e.g. the word 
‘purple’ written in the colour green). A few studies have found that children with OCD make more 
errors and have longer reaction times compared to healthy controls on the task (Baykal et al., 2014; 
Isik Taner et al., 2011; Yamamuro et al., 2017). Furthermore, SSRI treatment did not improve 
performance in unmedicated patients suggesting that inhibition deficits are stable and resistant to 
treatment (Yamamuro et al., 2017). A majority of the studies, however, found no behavioural deficits 
on the Stroop test (Andrés et al., 2007; Chang, McCracken, & Piacentini, 2007; Geller et al., 2018; 
Gruner et al., 2012; Ota et al., 2013). Surprisingly, young patients performed even better than controls 
in Beers et al.’s (1999) study. In spite of this, administration of this task alongside neuroimaging 
methods has shed light on key brain abnormalities in child OCD patients. Using functional near-
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRs), patients displayed significantly reduced prefrontal haemodynamic 
activity during the Stroop test (Ota et al., 2013; Yamamuro et al., 2017). Abrnormal activity in young 
patients was present even in the absence of performance impairments (Ota et al., 2013). Specifically, 
changes in oxyhaemoglobin levels occurred more slowly in patients compared to controls in the 
frontopolar region of the prefrontal cortex, an area that is implicated in higher order cognitive control 
(Boschin, Piekema, & Buckley, 2015).  
   The GNG task, SST, and CPT generally measure the ability to inhibit a motor action following 
visual or auditory cues. Zandt et al., (2009) found that young OCD patients committed more 
inhibitory errors on a version of the SST known as the Walk-Don’t-Walk, in which participants have 
to draw lines along a path with a pen until they hear a tone cueing them to stop. Furthermore, on an 
emotional GNG task, OCD patients made more false presses when cued to inhibit responses (Waters 
& Farrell, 2014). Likewise, patients in Baykal et al.’s (2014) study tended to make more errors of 
commission on the CPT. Woolley et al. (2008) reported that young boys with OCD under-recruited 
the bilateral OFC, right thalamus, and basal ganglia whilst completing a ‘Stop Task’, revealing an 
inhibitory control-related dysfunction in the cortico-striatal-thalamo circuit. However, other studies 
reported no underperformance or reaction time deficits on these tasks in children with OCD (Beers 
et al., 1999; Gooskens et al., 2018; Hybel, Mortensen, Lambek, Thastum, & Thomsen, 2017; 





   Similar to what was discussed in the cognitive flexibility domain, adults with OCD show profound 
deficits in behavioural inhibition despite such deficits being unpronounced in children with OCD. 
Namely, adults with OCD are impaired at inhibiting responses on the SST and GNG (Chamberlain, 
Müller, et al., 2006; Menzies et al., 2007; S. Morein-Zamir et al., 2013; Penadés et al., 2007) and 
make more errors of commission on the Stroop test (Peles, Weinstein, Sason, Adelson, & Schreiber, 
2013; Penadés et al., 2007; Penadés, Catalán, Andrés, Salamero, & Gastó, 2005). Nonetheless, brain 
activity data is comparable between subtypes as adults with OCD also show reduced activation in 
bilateral OFC during inhibition tasks (Menzies et al., 2007; Page et al., 2009). 
Summary 
While there is some evidence for an inhibitory control deficit in children with OCD, the majority of 
studies do not describe significant impairments. Brain regions that seem to be associated with 
inhibitory control in children with OCD include the frontopolar cortex, OFC, thalamus, and basal 
ganglia.   
 
1.2.4 Memory 
   Broadly, pertinent studies have investigated the following domains of memory in children with 
OCD: working memory, long-term verbal and non-verbal memory, and visuospatial memory.  
   Working memory involves temporary maintenance and manipulation of information and is thought 
to underlie broad cognitive impairments in many psychiatric disorders (Gold et al., 2018). Both 
children (Andrés et al., 2007; Geller et al., 2017; Hybel et al., 2017; Shin et al., 2008; Taner et al., 
2011) and adults (Demeter et al., 2013; Krishna et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 2002; Tallis, Pratt, & 
Jamani, 1999) with OCD appear to have intact verbal working memory functioning, demonstrated 
by their proficiency on backwards digit span tests.  Incidentally, Geller et al. (2017) proposed that 
children with OCD only show impaired working memory when under time pressure, as they found 
that patients performed poorly on a timed arithmetic test but not on the (non-timed) digit span test. 
More unconventional tests of working memory have also garnered interesting results; Chang et al. 
(2007) found patients performed poorly on a spatial working memory task known as the Finger 
Windows test (Sheslow & Adams, 2003), which requires participants to remember the sequential 
placement (by an examiner) of a pencil into a series of holes in a plastic card.  Next, Wolff et al. 
(2017) administered a task switching paradigm where participants had to assess, on screen, whether 
a numerical target was smaller or greater than 5 or whether a target was even or odd. Patients 





switch tasks. This is indicative of children with OCD having specific deficits in visual working 
memory tasks but exhibiting intact verbal working memory measured via digit span. 
   Studies that assessed other memory domains show conflicting results. On the one hand, widespread 
memory impairments across verbal, non-verbal, and visuospatial memory tasks have been found in 
children with OCD (Andrés et al., 2007; Gottwald et al., 2018; Ornstein et al., 2010), but many papers 
also report no significant deficits in these domains (Beers et al., 1999; Chang et al., 2007; Geller et 
al., 2018; Hybel et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Shin et al., 2008). This is in contrast to findings in 
adult patients, as two meta-analyses have reported a prominent non-verbal memory deficit with large 
effect sizes in adult OCD (Abramovitch, Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013; Shin, Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 
2014). Garcia-Delgar et al.’s (2018) study provides fascinating insight into these opposing findings. 
Researchers administered various memory tests to 61 youths with OCD and divided the sample into 
‘selectively impaired’ and ‘globally preserved’ groups based on their task performance. Visuospatial 
and non-verbal memory were most affected in the ‘impaired’ group while the ‘preserved group’ 
exhibited comparable performance to controls, indicating that youths with OCD can display vastly 
different presentations of memory ability. These discrete profiles could not be explained by 
demographic and clinical factors as there were no differences between the two groups on age, gender, 
OCD severity and medication status. Nonetheless, the ‘selectively impaired’ group comprised a very 
limited sample of 9 patients, which could undermine the reliability of these findings.  
   Two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have clarified the brain activation 
profiles of paediatric OCD associated with memory ability. Diwadkar et al. (2015) found that 
children with OCD displayed aberrant activation of frontoparietal regions [dorsal prefrontal cortex 
(dPFC), parietal lobe, and middle frontal gyrus] that was modulated by dorsal ACC (dACC) activity 
during high and low working memory demands. The hyper-modulation by the dACC was proposed 
to reflect the inefficiency of control-related networks in paediatric OCD. Abnormal frontoparietal 
activation during working memory tests has also been reported in adults with OCD (De Vries et al., 
2014). Another theory with regards to impaired memory is that children with OCD fail to employ 
cognitive strategies when encoding information (Batistuzzo et al., 2015). When asked to use a 
semantic clustering strategy to solve a Verbal Episodic Memory test, children with OCD revealed 
decreased activity in the bilateral dorsomedial PFC, superior frontal gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus, 
inferior parietal lobe, superior and middle temporal gyri and putamen (Batistuzzo et al., 2015).  
Moreover, semantic clustering scores correlated with episodic memory scores in controls but not 
patients. The authors concluded that altered neural mechanisms underlie strategy implementation in 






Similar to other functions described, findings for a memory impairment in children with OCD are 
varied. Child and adult patients are not impaired on tests of verbal working memory such as the digit 
span test, but children with OCD may face difficulties specifically with visual working memory 
paradigms and timed tasks. In contrast, adults with OCD are mostly impaired on non-verbal memory 
tests. In addition, it was found that children with OCD can be divided into two discrete cognitive 
profiles, namely those with intact cognition and those with impaired visuospatial and verbal memory 
ability, which could explain disparities in the child OCD memory results. Finally, performance on 
various memory tasks in young patients seems to be driven by atypical activation of frontal, parietal, 
and striatal regions.  
 
1.2.5 Decision-Making 
   Decision-making tasks generally test whether participants can make favourable choices with the 
aim of accumulating rewards, points or positive feedback. Three studies investigated decision-
making using gambling tasks, namely the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 
& Anderson, 1994) and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) (Rogers et al., 1999). On the IGT, 
subjects are presented with four decks of cards, each associated with different probabilities of gaining 
and losing points. Subjects have to learn over time to select cards from decks that are advantageous 
(offer points without high risk of losses). Kodaira et al. (2012) reported children with OCD made 
more disadvantageous selections on the IGT and correspondingly, Norman et al. (2018) found that 
children with OCD showed underactivation of the ventromedial OFC when choosing advantageous 
choices on the IGT relative to controls and children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD). Medial OFC underactivation has also been observed in adults with OCD when they 
adjusted behaviour according to feedback on a probabilistic reversal learning task (Remijnse et al., 
2009). Along a similar vein, Norman et al. inferred that this underactivity displayed by children with 
OCD underlay impairments in learning from feedback and using stochastic information to guide their 
choices. Computational modelling of the data revealed that patients with OCD explored non-optimal 
decks more than other groups, suggesting a lack of confidence in their choices (Norman et al., 2018). 
Combined, results point towards OCD patients being intolerant of uncertainty, which is connected to 
possible OFC dysfunction (Norman et al., 2018). However, when tested on the CGT, children with 
OCD showed analogous performance to controls (Hybel et al., 2017). This is likely due to task 





is less risky, while the CGT explicitly informs participants of choice pay-offs, and is considered a 
more straightforward test of risky decision-making. Hence, children with OCD show impaired 
decision-making under uncertainty but intact decision-making under risk. These results mirror that 
of adult patients who similarly display difficulty with ambiguous decision-making but are unimpaired 
on risky decision-making (Pushkarskaya et al., 2015; Viswanath, Janardhan Reddy, Kumar, 
Kandavel, & Chandrashekar, 2009). Moreover, difficulty with ambiguous decision-making may be 
consistent with aforementioned reduced perseveration and more exploration on probabilistic reversal 
learning tasks (where outcomes are also stochastic) displayed by adult patients (Apergis-Schoute et 
al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019).  
   Two computational modelling studies reveal further evidence of uncertainty intolerance in children 
with OCD (Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser et al., 2017).  Hauser et al. (2017) administered the Information 
Sampling Task (Clark, Robbins, Ersche, & Sahakian, 2006) requiring participants to guess whether 
the majority of (initially) hidden cards are green or yellow. Participants are allowed to turn over 
cards, one-by-one, to reveal the colour underneath before making their decisions. When not penalised 
for turning over cards, patients turned over more cards than controls and also made more accurate 
judgements. Bayesian modelling revealed that all participants felt increasing urgency to make a 
decision the more they turned over cards, but adolescent OCD patients discounted subjective costs 
of taking longer to make a decision, such as fatigue, impatience and time. Erhan et al. (2017) likewise 
employed a Dot Discrimination task, a low level perceptual decision-making task requiring 
participants to decide whether clusters of dots are moving towards the left or right on a screen, with 
varying noise levels. Modelling of these data showed that patients took longer to accumulate 
evidence, and showed increased duration between accumulating evidence and executing responses 
compared to controls. Both studies concluded that decision-making thresholds are abnormally high 
in paediatric OCD patients, reflecting their desire for certainty before making choices. Adults with 
OCD equally show cautious decision-making on perceptual decision-making tasks suggesting that 
certainty-seeking is a shared trait between subtypes (Banca et al., 2015). However, adults with OCD 
typically do not show increased information seeking on information sampling tasks (Chamberlain, 
Fineberg, Blackwell, et al., 2007; Morein-Zamir, Shapher, Gasull-Camos, Fineberg, & Robbins, 
2020), suggesting an increased capacity to process evidence in adult subjects.   
Summary 
Decision-making is impaired in children and adults with OCD when task environments are 





driven by patients having poor tolerance for uncertainty. In addition, adults and children with OCD 
display underactivation in the medial OFC on tasks with probabilistic feedback. Children with OCD 
also show significantly increased and slower information seeking on information sampling tasks but 
this behaviour is not prominent in adults with OCD. 
 
1.2.6 Planning 
   Studies typically utilise “Tower” tests to investigate planning, which involve moving beads or disks 
from peg to peg with the aim of matching a model pattern as quickly as possible. These tests are 
considered planning tasks as it is assumed that planning a course of action is required to solve the 
task problems efficiently (Riccio, Wolfe, Romine, Davis, & Sullivan, 2004). The following tasks are 
commonly used to probe planning ability: Tower of London (TOL) (Shallice, 1982) (Shallice, 1982), 
Tower of Hanoi (TOH) (Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985), Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 
System (D-KEFS) Tower Test (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Holdnack, 2004) and Stockings of 
Cambridge (SOC) (Owen et al., 1995).  
   Compared to healthy controls, children with OCD require more moves to solve the SOC (Kim et 
al., 2018; Negreiros et al., 2019) and D-KEFS Tower Test (Ornstein et al., 2010), and used more time 
to solve the TOL (Huyser, Veltman, Wolters, De Haan, & Boer, 2010), revealing impaired planning 
ability. On the contrary, Hybel et al. (2017) and Beers et al. (1999) found equivalent performance 
across controls and patients on the SOC and TOH. However, Hybel et al. did not explicitly report 
response latencies in their analysis of the SOC, so we are unable to infer from their findings whether 
child patients showed slower planning on the task.  
   Intriguingly, Huyser et al. (2010) uncovered evidence for planning dysfunction being a state (a 
transient characteristic influenced by current environment), as opposed to a trait (a stable 
characteristic), feature of paediatric OCD. Brain abnormalities during planning, namely 
underactivation in the left posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and right parietal cortex, 
ceased to be statistically significant in patients following CBT treatment. Moreover, following 
treatment, patients were able to solve the task faster. This indicates that disrupted planning ability 
might be driven by symptom severity.  
   These findings are analogous to adults with OCD who are slower in completing the TOL and also 
show hypoactivation of the dlPFC during the task (Vaghi, Hampshire, et al., 2017). Moreover, 
although early studies report that CBT and even drug treatment are ineffective in remediating 





found that planning deficits are improved following administration of SSRIs to adults with OCD 
(Lochner et al., 2020)  
Summary 
Children with OCD tend to react slower and require more moves to solve planning tests, similar to 
adults with OCD. Slow planning is also associated with underactivation of the dlPFC and parietal 
cortex, which normalises following CBT in children with OCD and following SSRI treatment in 
adults with OCD. 
 
1.2.7 Action Monitoring  
   OCD has been frequently associated with overactive action monitoring, the generation of 
inappropriate error-detection signals, that gives rise to feelings of “wrongness” (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-
Jones, & Cohen, 2005). Action monitoring is studied by examining an event-related potential 
component of the brain known as error-related negativity (ERN). ERN is generated by a fronto-
central negative deflection that occurs 100ms after the execution of an incorrect response during 
forced-choice reaction time tasks (Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008). 
   Studies have explored action monitoring in paediatric OCD using a combination of 
electrophysiological measures (electroencephalogram, EEG) or fMRI, and reaction time tasks such 
as the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), Multisource Interference Task (MSIT) (Bush & Shin, 
2006), and the Simon’s task (Simon & Wolf, 1963).  
    All pertinent EEG studies to date have reported enhanced ERN in paediatric and adult OCD 
patients, uncorrelated with symptom severity, medication status, or presence of co-morbid disorders 
(Carrasco, Harbin, et al., 2013; Carrasco, Hong, et al., 2013; Hajcak, Franklin, Foa, & Simons, 2008; 
Hanna et al., 2012, 2018, 2016; Liu, Hanna, Carrasco, Gehring, & Fitzgerald, 2014; Riesel, 2019).  
One study even showed that UFDRs of children with OCD also display increased ERN (Carrasco, 
Harbin, et al., 2013) hence promoting overactive action monitoring as a plausible endophenotype of 
paediatric OCD. fMRI studies equally report OCD-related elevated activation in key frontal brain 
regions following task errors or high conflict trials, namely the ACC/dorsal ACC (Kate Dimond 
Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Huyser, Veltman, Wolters, De Haan, & Boer, 2011) (Fitzgerald et al., 2010; 
Huyser et al., 2011), posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, 2010), and 





to be unchanged following cognitive-behavioural treatment (Huyser et al., 2011), demonstrating the 
plausibility of this function as a trait marker.     
   One study investigated how abnormal action monitoring may manifest behaviourally. Liu et al. 
(2012) proposed that behavioural adaptation to conflicts/errors can be assessed by observing post-
error slowing and post-conflict adaptation during reaction time tasks. Post-error slowing involves 
slowing down responses after an error in an effort to reduce future errors, while post-conflict 
adaptation involves speeding up following a correct response to an incongruent trial which indicates 
that participants have learnt to attend to relevant information. Compared to controls, youths with 
OCD did not display either of these adaptive responses during the MSIT, demonstrating deficits in 
adjustment of cognitive control when conflict is present. Poor cognitive control has also been noted 
as a feature of adolescent OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018) and in real life could contribute to patients 
feeling that they are ill-equipped to handle stressful or triggering situations, leading to hypothetical 
coping mechanisms such as avoidance or checking.  
Summary 
Overactive action monitoring, operationalised as increased ERN and abnormal activation in specific 
frontal regions (i.e the ACC) in response to errors is a stable trait of paediatric and adult OCD. 
Overactive monitoring could be linked to an inability to adapt behaviour following mistakes and/or 
demanding problems. 
 
1.2.8 Habit-directed and goal-directed control 
      Actions are suggested to be regulated by two distinct systems. On one hand, the goal-directed 
system controls actions that are sensitive to the values of prospective outcomes, and rely on 
strengthening stimulus-response-outcome (S-R-O) associations. On the other hand, actions under the 
habit system are insensitive to such outcomes values, but instead are triggered automatically by the 
environmental stimuli/context and rely on the strengthening of stimulus-response (S-R) associations.  
While habitual responding is automatic and simple to execute, goal-directed responding requires 
complex reasoning and planning to attain a set-goal. These systems are suggested to work in 
conjunction to regulate behaviour (Balleine and Doherty 2010). In keeping with this account, OCD 
has been conceptualised as a disorder of maladaptive habit formation (Graybiel & Rauch, 2000) as 





   Outcome devaluation tasks and contingency degradation tasks are commonly used to probe the 
extent of reliance on habit and goal-directed policies. First, outcome devaluation tasks involve 
learning to make instrumental responses to different stimuli in order to receive a (typically) rewarding 
outcome. After overtraining, some stimuli become devalued or no longer deliver expected outcomes 
and subjects must withhold from responding to them. Strong habit formation is inferred if subjects 
continue to make responses to these devalued stimuli. Adults with OCD continue responding to 
devalued stimuli on outcome devaluation tasks under both appetitive and aversive contexts (Gillan 
et al., 2014, 2011) implying stronger habit-directed control and reduced goal-directed control. One 
study so far has administered an outcome devaluation task to adolescents with OCD and found poor 
instrumental learning of action-outcome associations in the training phase (Gottwald et al., 2018), 
which has not been reported in adult OCD studies. During devaluation, adolescent patients tended to 
respond more to devalued stimuli but also did not respond appropriately to still valuable trials. This 
suggests that adolescent patients show more of an impairment in action-outcome learning and 
retaining S-R-O associations in memory instead of a bias for habitual responding.   
   Next, contingency degradation tasks probe how behaviour is adjusted following changes in 
instrumental contingency. Subjects are instructed to respond to stimuli and assess how much their 
actions are predictive of an outcome. In some instances, actions are completely predictive of 
outcomes, whereas other times contingencies between actions and outcomes are degraded, meaning 
outcomes occur independent of action. Habitual responders are thought to continue instrumental 
responses even when action-outcome relationships are degraded. On this task, adults with OCD 
reportedly responded more than control subjects in situations when actions were not causal of 
outcomes (Vaghi et al., 2019), but adolescent patients do not show this inappropriate responding 
(Gottwald, 2017, thesis). Overall behavioural results from these two tasks point to reduced goal-
directed control in adults with OCD while evidence is less forthcoming in youths with OCD.   
   Neural evidence is also in favour of an imbalance between goal-directed and habit-directed systems 
in adult OCD. A symptom provocation study (which involves triggering obsessions and urges in 
OCD using provocative images or videos, e.g. an image of an unattended stove) reported that adult 
OCD patients displayed underactivity in brain regions associated with goal-directed control 
(prefrontal-caudate areas) and overactivity in regions associated with habit-directed control 
(subthalamic nucleus and putamen) (Banca, Voon, et al., 2015). These results suggest that triggering 
compulsions activates the habitual system, supporting the notion that compulsions are rooted in 
habits. However, symptom provocation studies show different results in paediatric samples, wherein 





regions (Gilbert et al., 2009). In addition, young patients were found to display hyperactivity in the 
temporal poles following provocation (Jaspers-Fayer et al., 2019), which are thought to be involved 
in integrating visceral emotional responses with sensory input (Pehrs et al., 2017). From this, we can 
perhaps infer that a bias for habitual control drives compulsions in adults with OCD, but compulsions 
in children with OCD may be more driven by emotions such as stress or anxiety.  
   Next, model-based and model-free control are also often used as computational proxies for goal-
directed and habit-directed behaviour respectively (but indeed they may not be completely equivalent 
(Miller, Shenhav, & Ludvig, 2019)). Model-based control is present when subjects are able to form 
an accurate model of an environment and adapt behaviour accordingly to maximise positive 
outcomes or avoid danger. A simple example of model-based behaviour would be understanding that 
one stimuli in a probabilistic reversal learning task is associated with a higher chance of rewarding 
outcomes, and directing all future responses to the stimulus in question. A model-free learner, by 
contrast, would be unable to learn the structure of the task and instead base responding purely on 
most recent feedback leading to more lose-shift and win-stay behaviour (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). The two-step sequential decision-making task (Daw et al., 2011) is 
commonly used to disentangle model-based from model-free behaviour and is described in detail in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. Adults with OCD typically show reduced model-based control on this task 
(Voon, Baek, et al., 2015; Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015; Wheaton, Gillan, & Simpson, 2019) 
perhaps due to an inability to employ sufficient goal-directed faculties to learn the complex task 
structure. To date, no studies have directly probed model-based and model-free behaviour in youths 
with OCD.  
Summary 
An imbalance between goal-directed control and habit directed systems, as well as reduced model-
based behaviour has been well documented in adults with OCD, but not in children with OCD who 
may show more of an impairment with basic instrumental learning (Gottwald et al., 2018). 
 
1.2.9 Meta-cognition 
   Meta-cognition describes an individual’s accuracy in judging their own actions, thoughts, and 
abilities. Inaccuracies in meta-cognition have been suggested to drive compulsions (Rachman, 1993) 
wherein individuals with OCD overestimate how much control their intrusive thoughts have over 
themselves and the environment. For instance, they may often believe that having an intrusive 





research suggests that adult patients’ reduced confidence in memories during situations of high 
responsibility (for example, needing to check that stove knobs are off in order to prevent a fire) lead 
to increased certainty seeking and checking in adult OCD (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans 
et al., 2008; MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod, & Richter, 1997; Tolin et al., 2001). However, there is 
less evidence for this behaviour in adolescents with OCD (Farrell, Waters, Boschen, & Milliner, 
2011). 
   More recently, research suggests the impairment may not lie solely in inaccurate meta-cognition 
but in a dissociation between meta-cognition and actions. On the aforementioned contingency 
degradation task, adults with OCD continued to make responses during degraded phases despite 
having full awareness that degradation had taken place (Vaghi et al., 2019). Moreover, on outcome 
devaluation tasks, adults with OCD persist with responding even though they are aware that the 
stimuli are now devalued (Gillan et al., 2014). More convincingly, on a complex predictive-inference 
task (described in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis) that was designed to test the strength of 
association between action and confidence in actions, adults with OCD were able to develop an 
accurate model of the stochastic task environment, indicated by confidence ratings, but they 
excessively changed their actions ignoring this knowledge. This dissociation between action and 
beliefs supports the notion that OCD is ego-dystonic in nature, in that patients understand their 
compulsions and worries are irrational but continue to partake in them.  
   In contrast, meta-cognition and its relationship to actions has not been as extensively studied in 
children with OCD, however, its existence can be inferred from other studies. For instance, on 
decision-making paradigms, child patients continuously sample information before making a 
decision even when sufficient information has already been acquired (Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser, 
Moutoussis, et al., 2017). In other words, young patients continue to request information even when 
doing so no longer has value within the context of the task. However, when tested on a contingency 
degradation task, adolescents with OCD showed intact knowledge of action-outcome contingencies 
and did not respond during degraded trials (Gottwald, 2017, thesis) suggesting actions and beliefs 
are not dissociated in young patients.  
Summary 
A dissociation between actions and beliefs is a plausible deficit in adult OCD which drives 






1.3 Overall summary and directions for thesis 
   Research thus far suggests that children with OCD are equivalent to adults with OCD on a few 
cognitive domains, including decision-making, action monitoring, planning, and some memory 
domains. However, there is less evidence for domains of cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, 
goal-directed vs. habit-directed control, and meta-cognition. Moreover, it is thought that adolescent 
OCD is more linked to a learning deficit as young patients show impaired rule and instrumental 
learning on cognitive flexibility and outcome devaluation tasks (Gottwald et al., 2018) which are not 
difficulties reported in adult OCD studies. This is indicative of a cognitive divergence between sub-
types and that more research needs to be invested in understanding the cognitive framework of 
paediatric OCD as it is apparent that not everything known in adults with OCD can be applied to 
children with the disorder. Despite heterogeneous behavioural findings, children and adolescents 
with OCD show similar patterns of brain activity to their adult counterparts on various cognitive 
paradigms, namely reduced activity in frontal regions encompassing the OFC and dlPFC during 
flexibility, memory, inhibition, and decision-making tasks as well as increased activity in ACC 
during conflict monitoring tasks. This suggests that brain areas underlying cognitive domains are 
already functionally abnormal in paediatric OCD but behavioural deficits only become pronounced 
in adulthood. 
1.3.1 Learning and decision-making 
   Impairments in learning and decision-making  outlined so far may be driving young patients’  poor 
performance and difficulty in concentrating in school settings (Negreiros et al., 2018; Piacentini et 
al., 2003), indicating research urgently needs to prioritise these domains. Evidence from decision-
making research suggests adult and child patients alike partake in aberrant evidence accumulation 
and exploration in situations particularly when task environments are uncertain or stochastic (Banca, 
Vestergaard, et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2018; Pushkarskaya et al., 2015; 
Viswanath et al., 2009). Adding to this, recent computational work suggests that adults with OCD 
display significantly reduced choice perseveration on probabilistic reversal learning paradigms 
(Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019). Nonetheless the learning 
impairment may be even more pronounced in adolescents with OCD as their instrumental learning 
is impaired even on tasks that offer deterministic feedback such as the ID/ED task (Gottwald et al., 
2018). Hence, to gain a holistic picture of atypical learning and decision-making in youths with OCD 
the experiments conducted in this thesis employed various paradigms that either offer probabilistic 





1.3.2 Feedback sensitivity  
  In addition to whether paradigms are probabilistic or deterministic, feedback valence (whether 
feedback is positive or negative) may also play a role in impaired learning and decision-making. 
Goal-directed control in adult OCD appears to be reduced regardless of valence (Gillan et al., 2014, 
2011), while goal-directed control has only been probed in an appetitive (rewarding) context in 
adolescents with OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018). Intriguingly, other learning paradigms offer evidence 
for abnormal processing of negative feedback and errors in adult OCD. Abnormal anterior cingulate 
cortex signalling has been detected in adults with OCD in response to prediction errors, which 
describe the mismatch between expectations and real-life outcomes (Hauser et al., 2017; Murray et 
al., 2019). Furthermore, adults with OCD also display reduced activation in medial and lateral OFC 
during probabilistic feedback processing (Remijnse et al., 2009). Behaviourally, adults with OCD 
are reported to switch choices excessively on a PRL task in response to negative feedback (Endrass 
et al., 2011), and also update actions excessively following prediction errors (Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 
2017).  Oversensitivity to negative feedback and intolerance of prediction errors is compatible with 
the robust finding of enhanced ERN following conflict detection in OCD (Riesel, 2019) and may be 
a factor driving learning and decision-making impairments. Moreover, it is in line with traditional 
theories of OCD suggesting avoidance of harm drives compulsive behaviour (Rasmussen & Eisen, 
1990, 1992). In fact, youths with OCD typically report high levels of harm avoidance in daily life 
(Bey et al., 2017; Cervin, Perrin, Olsson, Claesdotter-Knutsson, & Lindvall, 2020; Ecker & Gönner, 
2008; Ettelt et al., 2008).   
  However, recent computational studies of probabilistic reversal learning report no evidence of 
punishment oversensitivity in adults with OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; 
Kanen et al., 2019). Instead, prominent punishment avoidance may be more pronounced in adult 
patients on deterministic tasks (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Gillan et al., 2014; Morein-Zamir et 
al., 2013; Nielen, Den Boer, & Smid, 2009). Children with OCD, by contrast, show no abnormal 
punishment sensitivity on both probabilistic and deterministic tasks (Gottwald, 2017, thesis; Norman 
et al., 2018). Hence, it is uncertain whether feedback processing is disrupted in child-OCD as it may 
be in adult-OCD. 
   To assess the possibility that abnormal feedback processing contributes to poor learning and 
decision-making in youths with OCD in this thesis, computational models were fit to data from 
various learning tasks that are able to weigh the relative contribution of negative and positive 
feedback towards updating values associated with competing choices in Chapters 2,4, and 6. 





with OCD, an aversive paradigm probing Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) (described 
further below) was administered in Chapter 3.    
1.3.3 Other cognitive processes 
  While the focus of this thesis is directed towards understanding why learning and decision-making 
are abnormal in youths with OCD, the tasks employed are sufficiently complex to enable insight into 
various cognitive processes. For instance, in Chapter 4, a sequential decision-making task is used to 
investigate model-based reasoning, exploitative vs. exploratory decision-making, and evidence 
accumulation. Model-based reasoning, in particular, has not been directly probed in paediatric OCD 
despite evidence overwhelmingly suggesting adults with OCD rely on model-free decision-making 
strategies (Voon, Baek, et al., 2015; Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015; Wheaton et al., 2019). Moreover, 
in Chapter 3, I utilise a Pavlovian-to-Instrumental paradigm to probe instrumental and Pavlovian 
processing, as implicit and explicit learning are thought to be disrupted in youths with OCD 
(Gottwald et al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010). In parallel, the task also enables indirect inference of 
model-based and model-free mechanisms via examining how well subjects can integrate Pavlovian 
and instrumental influences to inform behaviour (see Chapter 3 for further explanation of this task). 
Difficulty in integrating Pavlovian and instrumental information is thought to be linked to reduced 
OFC control over striatum (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010), and indeed as mentioned earlier, aberrant 
lateral and medial OFC activity has been detected in both youths and adults with OCD.  Next, in 
Chapter 5, I administered a predictive-inference task originally employed by Vaghi et al. (2017) to 
understand the interplay between confidence and action in adults with OCD. The task has a 
probabilistic structure and involves using feedback and accumulating evidence over time to learn to 
position a ‘bucket’ on-screen in a location where a ‘coin’ is most likely to land. At the same time 
subjects have to rate how confident they are in their predictions of where the coin will land. Hence, 
this task not only probes learning and evidence accumulation, but also enables investigation of meta-
cognition which is found to be dissociated from action in adults with OCD (Vaghi et al., 2019; Vaghi, 
Luyckx, et al., 2017). Through these tasks, I hoped to deduce a comprehensive framework of learning 
and decision-making in youths with OCD as well as further current understanding of other potentially 
disrupted cognitive processes such as model-based/goal-directed control and meta-cognition. 
1.3.4 Focus on Adolescence 
   For various reasons, which will be outlined in this section, the studies in this thesis employed 





   Firstly, research into cognition in child-OCD so far employ samples with large age ranges, ranging 
from early childhood to late adolescence. For instance, participants in the studies of Hybel et al. and 
Lewin et al. were between 7-17 years old (Hybel et al., 2017; Lewin et al., 2014), while participants 
were between 7-18 years in Andres et al.’s (Andrés et al., 2008) and between 6-16 years in Shin et 
al.’s (Shin et al., 2008) studies. As mentioned in Section 1.1, clinical presentation of OCD appears 
to alter with age, and it is likely that cognitive characteristics associated with the disorder shift from 
early childhood to adolescence as well. Wide age ranges employed by past studies make it difficult 
to account for this heterogeneity. Hence, this thesis focused on an adolescent sample aged between 
12 and 19 years. Alongside this reason, Gottwald et al. (2018) who uncovered significant learning 
impairments associated with juvenile-OCD also employed this age range. Hence, it is cogent that the 
same age range is used to understand the mechanisms driving this learning impairment. Furthermore, 
an added advantage to employing a fully adolescent sample is one of practicality: it is simply easier 
to recruit adolescents for research purposes as opposed to younger children who require more 
extensive approval procedures from ethics bodies, schools, and parents. 
   The most important rationale for this thesis’ focus on adolescence is that adolescent development 
is a highly fascinating area of study, characterised by noteworthy physical, psychological, and 
neurological changes. This developmental stage is termed a sensitive period as significant brain and 
personality changes make adolescents susceptible to various psychiatric disorders (Kessler et al., 
2005). Moreover, such biological changes drastically affect cognitive and executive functioning in 
healthy adolescents. Maturation of the adolescent brain is influenced by hormonal fluctuations during 
puberty (Arain et al., 2013), whereby surges in sex hormones affect the development of the limbic 
circuitry including the ventral striatum and amygdala (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Spear, 2000). Crone & 
Dahl (2012) propose that this results in more emotional or affective influence over goal-directed 
control, translating to increases in novelty-seeking, sensation-seeking and a tendency to process 
status-relevant social stimuli (for example, receiving attention and admiration from peers) as having 
increased motivational salience. Neuroimaging experiments have further uncovered key neural 
signatures within the adolescent brain. Grey matter volume in the prefrontal-cortex, a region 
important for top-down control of behaviour, has been reported to follow a U-shape trajectory, 
peaking at pre-adolescence, declining at the onset of adolescence, and increasing once again with age 
(Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004). This decline has been suggested to underlie poor cognitive 
control in adolescents, resulting in increased risk-taking and impulsivity (Blakemore & Robbins, 
2012). Moreover, a recent resting state fMRI study revealed that functional connections between 





at age 14 years were stronger by age 26 and connections that were strong at age 14 became weaker 
by age 26, indicative of developmental brain reorganisation (Váša et al., 2019). Authors speculate 
that this disruption is crucial for facilitating the development of adult mental faculties. Studies 
employing cognitive tasks alongside fMRI methods are also highly informative, revealing 
adolescents, but not adults, have heightened activity in limbic and striatal regions during reward 
processing and when evaluating uncertain pay-offs associated with decisions (Silverman, Jedd, & 
Luciana, 2015; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). These brain functional differences can explain several 
findings reported in behavioural cognitive research, whereby adolescents, compared to adults, are 
more sensitive to punishing feedback on learning tasks (Hauser et al., 2015; Rodriguez Buritica et 
al., 2019; Rosenbaum, Grassie, & Hartley, 2020; van den Bos et al., 2012), display reduced goal-
directed decision-making (Decker, Otto, Daw, & Hartley, 2016), and have difficulty integrating 
appetitive and aversive feedback on probabilistic learning tasks (Palminteri, Kilford, Coricelli, & 
Blakemore, 2016). 
   Thus, it is interesting to ponder how OCD, a disorder associated with widespread brain (Piras et 
al., 2015) and executive (Abramovitch, Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013) dysfunction interacts with 
the significant biological and cognitive changes occurring during adolescence. Could this be a major 
reason for the cognitive distinctions between adult and juvenile-OCD? Moreover, equivalent 
performance between adolescents with and without OCD found across several cognitive domains 
may be due to the ongoing development of such functions in healthy adolescents. OCD may impair 
or stunt healthy maturation of said functions, leading to marked deficits in adulthood but not 
adolescence.  
1.3.5 Medication 
   Next, a limited proportion of the paediatric OCD studies reviewed investigated the effects of 
medication on cognitive performance. One of the studies that has reported that SSRI treatment 
successfully improved not only disorder symptoms but also performance on various cognitive 
domains in paediatric OCD (Andrés et al., 2008), which is consistent with findings from adult OCD 
studies (Lochner, Chamberlain, Kidd, Fineberg, & Stein, 2016; Lochner et al., 2020; Palminteri, 
Clair, Mallet, & Pessiglione, 2012). However, another study suggests that children with OCD 
medicated with SSRIs underperform on the WCST compared to medication-naïve child patients 
(Gruner et al., 2012). Thus, to understand the effects of SSRI medication on learning and decision-
making in adolescent OCD, each experimental chapter contains a section analysing whether 





1.3.6 Computational Modelling 
   The majority of studies that have probed cognition in youths with OCD employed standard 
frequentist statistical methods to analyse performance data from computerised tasks. At times, it can 
be inappropriate to draw strong conclusions from these types of analysis as standard cognitive tasks 
are often complex and lack specificity due to them probing many different functions simultaneously 
(Marzuki, Pereira de Souza, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2020). For example, the WCST is a complex task, 
tapping into visual search, learning from positive and negative feedback, exploration, attention, and 
potentially working memory as participants have to retain 3 different rules in memory and switch 
between rules accordingly. Hence, researchers using standard statistical tests that typically only 
capture differences in averaged individual data may fail to capture more distinct deficits in cognition.   
    Lately, adult OCD studies have successfully utilised computational modelling methods to 
dissociate latent decision-making processes in cognitive tasks (Banca, Vestergaard, et al., 2015; 
Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019; Mandali, Weidacker, Kim, & Voon, 2019; Voon, Derbyshire, 
et al., 2015). Modelling involves formulating a mathematical function equipped with different 
parameters of interest to analyse trial-by-trial data. Commonly used parameters in neurocognitive 
computational models include the learning rate (the extent to which new incoming information 
influences subsequent choices), perseveration/stickiness (how often choices are repeated), and 
inverse temperature (how often are more favourable/valuable choices chosen). Values of these 
parameters are estimated when a computational model is fit to participants' data, enabling 
quantification and classification of behaviour. A simple, elegant model of reinforcement learning is 
the Rescorla-Wagner model (Wagner & Rescorla, 1972) which was originally conceptualised to 
capture how strongly a conditioned (CS) was predictive of unconditioned stimulus (US) stimulus 
(termed associative strength) and how this changes over time (see Equation 1.1).   
Vt+1 = Vt + α(Rt – Vtotal) – Equation 1.1 
Key: V = value function; t = trial; R = outcome; α = learning rate 
  In the Rescorla-Wagner model above, Vt (value function) represents the current associative 
strength between a CS and a US (at trial t). In other words, Vt represents how strongly a CS is 
predictive of a US. In order to calculate the CS-US strength in the subsequent trial (Vt+1), Vt is 
added to the prediction error, Rt – Vtotal, which is essentially the total CS-US strength (Vtotal) 
subtracted from an outcome (Rt) representing whether the CS and US are contingent in trial t (1 if 
US-CS are contingent and 0 if they are not contingent). If Rt is 1 (meaning US and CS are 





the parameter α (learning rate), which determines how much an immediate outcome, R, influences 
the associative strength value, V. If α is 1, R completely influences a change in the CS-US strength. 
Inversely, as α approaches 0, immediate outcomes are less influential in changing the CS-US 
strength. This algorithm and many others are widely used in human and animal research to model 
learning. For instance, it can be used to understand how subjects learn to associate one stimulus 
(CS) with a higher chance of positive feedback (US) in probabilistic reversal learning tasks. More 
recently, reinforcement learning models have been employed to understand how psychiatric and 
neurological disorders disrupt otherwise healthy learning processes.    
   Computational modelling methods are advantageous for understanding the factors that most affect 
learning in youths with OCD. For example, by fitting the Rescorla-Wagner model containing the 
learning rate parameter (α) to data, we can decipher whether a subject tends to adapt the value 
function associated with a choice (termed ‘choice value’) based on most recent feedback or otherwise 
discounts recent feedback in favour of information accumulated over time. To-date, only 3 cognitive 
paediatric OCD studies have employed computational modelling techniques (Erhan et al., 2017; 
Hauser, Moutoussis, et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2018). Nevertheless, findings from these studies 
have illuminated how youths with OCD make decisions, namely through increased exploration and 
higher decision-making thresholds. Hence, computational modelling is a viable method for 
understanding underlying learning and decision-making processes in youths with OCD, a feat which 
has proven elusive in studies employing standard analyses of cognitive performance. In Chapters 
2,4,5, and 6 I fitted computational models to cognitive task data in order to disentangle these various 






1.4 Overview of Experimental Chapters 
   The overall aim of this thesis is to understand mechanisms contributing to atypical learning and 
decision-making in adolescents with OCD. I also sought to understand whether well-researched 
domains thought to be driving compulsions in adult OCD are equally impaired in adolescent-OCD, 
namely reduced goal-directed/model-based reasoning and a dissociation between meta-cognition and 
action. To achieve this, a battery of cognitive tasks probing learning and decision-making was 
administered to juvenile patients with OCD and age/gender-matched healthy controls, culminating 
in 5 different studies. Computational modelling was implemented in 4 out of 5 experimental chapters 
to gain greater insight into the complex processes contributing to learning and decision-making.  
 
Chapter 2: Mechanisms Underlying Performance on Well-Known Task of Cognitive Flexibility in 
Adolescent OCD 
Research generally concludes limited evidence for a cognitive flexibility deficit in youths with OCD. 
Nonetheless, some of the reviewed studies utilising cognitive flexibility tasks found impairments not 
related to flexibility, suggesting other factors are driving performance on these tasks. Thus, this study 
aimed to investigate the latent processes driving adolescent-OCD performance on a commonly used 
task of cognitive flexibility, namely the WCST. Twenty-three adolescent patients and 46 healthy 
adolescents were assessed on a computer-based version of this task. Bayesian hierarchical models 
were used to disentangle trial-by-trial performance of each group. The following model parameters 
were extracted: reward sensitivity, punishment sensitivity, decision-consistency, and attention to 
feedback. I predicted adolescent patients would show altered feedback sensitivity and decision-
consistency on the task, consistent with adult and paediatric studies reporting abnormal exploration 
and feedback processing in patients with OCD.  
 
Chapter 3:  Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer in Adolescents with OCD 
Evidence suggests that children and adolescents with OCD are impaired at conducting implicit 
(Pavlovian) and explicit (instrumental) learning (Gottwald et al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010). 
Additionally, goal-directed and model-based reasoning are reduced in adults with OCD (Gillan et al., 
2014, 2011; Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015), and there is also evidence for patients showing enhanced 
sensitivity to negative feedback and excessive avoidance of harm (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; 





processing were impaired in adolescents with OCD specifically under aversive contexts using a 
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer paradigm. I also aimed to understand whether adolescents with 
OCD could successfully integrate learnt instrumental and Pavlovian influences to guide behaviour, 
which would be indicative of intact model-based control. The task was administered to 19 
adolescents with OCD and 20 healthy controls. I hypothesised that adolescent patients would show 
reduced initial Pavlovian and instrumental learning which would contribute to reduced Pavlovian-
to-instrumental transfer later on. 
 
Chapter 4: Model-Based Decision-Making in Adolescents with OCD 
This study sought to understand model-free and model-based reasoning in youths with OCD (which 
is reported to be imbalanced in favour of model-free reasoning in adults with OCD) using a gold-
standard task for delineating between the two types of learning styles, namely the sequential decision-
making task (Daw et al., 2011). A child-friendly version of the task was administered to 20 
adolescents with OCD and 20 healthy adolescents. Task performance was modelled using a 
reinforcement learning drift diffusion model which took into account participant choices and reaction 
times. I predicted that adolescents with OCD would present significantly reduced model-based 
decision-making in line with findings from adult OCD research.  
Chapter 5: Meta-Cognition in Adolescent OCD: Are action and confidence dissociated? 
Difficulty relying on action-outcome knowledge in decision-making is thought to be one of the 
factors driving compulsions in OCD. This has been shown empirically; on a predictive-inference 
task, adults with OCD updated their self-reported confidence levels according to changes in the task 
environment, but their actions disregarded this knowledge errors (Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 2017). 
Hence, in this study, I aimed to uncover whether adolescents with OCD also display this confidence-
action dissociation when making decisions. The same predictive-inference task used by Vaghi, 
Luckyx et al. was administered to 23 adolescents with OCD and 46 healthy adolescents. A Bayesian 
learner model, also conceptualised by Vaghi, Luyckx et al., was used as a benchmark for ideal 
behaviour. Regression models were constructed to test how different parameters in the Bayesian 
model influence participants’ performance. A separate regression model was then constructed to 
understand the strength of the relationship between action and confidence in the task. I hypothesised 
that adolescents with OCD would display a significant dissociation between actions and confidence 





Chapter 6: Probabilistic Reversal Learning in Adolescents with OCD 
Recent computational work suggests that adults with OCD show reduced perseveration and abnormal 
exploratory decision-making on probabilistic reversal learning tasks. Thus, the focus of this study 
was to assess whether adolescents with OCD display similar patterns of behaviour. A probabilistic 
reversal learning paradigm (Murphy, Smith, Cowen, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2002) was administered 
to 50 adolescents with OCD and 53 healthy volunteers. The task contained two stimuli, one with an 
80% chance of providing positive feedback and one with only a 20% chance of positive feedback. 
The contingencies reversed halfway through the task. Trial-by-trial performance was modelled using 
a reinforcement learning model with the parameters reward sensitivity, punishment sensitivity, 
reinforcement sensitivity (exploitation), and stimulus stickiness (perseveration).  I hypothesised that 
adolescents with OCD would display reduced perseveration and increased exploration in line with 



















1.5 Overall Sample 
   In total, 23 patients diagnosed with OCD were recruited via Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services, independent charities, as well as advertisements placed around Cambridgeshire and on 
social media. To qualify for the study, those in the OCD group had to meet DSM-V-TR (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-V-Text Revision) diagnostic criteria for OCD, OCD must 
be their primary diagnosis, and they must score 12 or above on the Children’s Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Scahill et al., 1997). Apart from OCD, other significant Axis I mental disorders 
as diagnosed according to DSM-V-TR criteria including psychosis, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder 
other than OCD, Tourette’s Syndrome, Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, and eating disorders were exclusion criteria for this study. Severe physical impairments 
affecting eyesight or motor performance were also exclusion criteria, as they were predicted to affect 
performance on the tasks. Patients were screened by an experienced psychiatrist in an extended 
clinical interview supplemented by the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview [MINI for 
participants over 18, MINI-KID for participants under 18 (Sheehan et al., 1998, 2010)].  
   Fifty healthy controls in total were recruited via advertisements in state secondary schools around 
Cambridgeshire, local advertisements around Cambridge town, and via online job posting websites 
(e.g. Gumtree). They were screened using the age-appropriate MINI by an experienced psychology 
student to ensure they had no history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Precise information on 
the number of potential participants screened, excluded, and recruited are present in Figure 1.1.  
   Potential participants with OCD were thoroughly screened for comorbidities while controls were 
screened for any psychiatric disorder to enable investigation of the pure effects of adolescent-OCD 
on learning and decision-making, unconfounded by symptoms associated with other psychiatric 
conditions. 
   All participants were aged between 12 and 19 years and were fluent in English. This study was 
approved by the East of England - Essex Research Ethics Committee (REC 10/H030149/49). All 
volunteers gave written informed consent before beginning testing and received monetary 
compensation for their participation. If participants were under 16 years old, parental consent was 
also obtained. Participants were compensated at the rate of £8 an hour for contributing their time to 
the study. 
   Not all participants recruited were able to complete every cognitive task administered for this study. 
This is because the original study conceptualised for this thesis comprised the Wisconsin Card 





one controls and 7 patients participated in the original study but only 12 controls and 4 patients 
returned for the final version of the study consisting of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, PIT task, 
sequential decision-making task, predictive-inference task, and probabilistic reversal learning task. 
Hence, an additional 9 controls and 16 patients were recruited for the final study. Moreover, an extra 
30 adolescent patients and 32 adolescent controls who had completed the same probabilistic reversal 
learning paradigm I have used, but in a past study (Gottwald, 2017, thesis), were added to the current 
sample of participants in Chapter 6. Sample sizes therefore vary from task to task, and each 
experimental chapter contains a unique description of the sample and their demographic details.  
   In the Statistical Analyses and Results sections of all studies presented in this thesis, the group 
including adolescents with OCD and the healthy control group are referred to as OCD and CTL 
respectively. When investigating the effects of medication, the medicated OCD group and 
unmedicated OCD group are referred to as MED+ and MED- respectively. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1: SCREENING AND RECRUITMENT DETAILS FOR OVERALL SAMPLE. KEY- CTL: CONTROL GROUP; OCD: 
PATIENT GROUP; ADHD: ATTENTION DEFICIT HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER; CY-BOCS: CHILDREN’S YALE-
BROWN OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE SCALE. 
 
1.6 Clinical and Cognitive Questionnaires 
To obtain a measure of anxiety and depression, participants completed the Beck Anxiety Inventory 





obsessive-compulsive traits were assessed using the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised 
(OCI-R) (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998). OCD symptom severity was also assessed 
with the Children’s Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Scahill et al., 1997). IQ measures 
were obtained using the Wechsler’s Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II) 
(Wechsler, 2011). The Full-Scale IQ-2 subtests (FSIQ-2) from the WASI-II were used in these 
studies, comprising the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning tests. Lastly, the digit span subtest, 
consisting of forward and backward digit span, from the Wechsler’s Intelligence Scale for Children, 
Fourth Edition (WISC-IV) (Wechsler, 2003) was used to assess verbal memory span and working 
memory span. 
 
1.6.1 Statistical Analysis of Questionnaires (for all studies) 
Questionnaire scores were analysed in the same way in every experimental chapter. Levene’s test 
was used to assess homogeneity of variance while the Shapiro-Wilke’s test was used to assess 
normality. When comparing OCD and CTL, clinical and IQ questionnaires were analysed using 
independent samples t-tests. When homogeneity of variance was violated, Welch’s independent 
samples t-test was used. When data did not follow a normal distribution the two-sample Wilcoxon 
test was implemented. When comparing MED+, MED-, and CTL, one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted, followed by pairwise post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction if significant main 
effects of group were detected. The Kruskal-Wallis test for main effects and post-hoc Dunn tests 
with Bonferroni correction for pairwise comparisons were implemented when homogeneity of 











Chapter 2: Mechanisms Underlying Performance on Well-
Known Task of Cognitive Flexibility in Adolescent OCD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
   The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is a commonly used test of executive function, used 
for assessing cognitive flexibility and is found to be sensitive to frontal lobe impairment (Anderson, 
Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991; Robinson, Heaton, Lehman, & Stilson, 1980). Adults with OCD 
typically perform sub-optimally on the WCST and other cognitive flexibility tasks, such as the 
IDED task, TMT-B, and task switching tests (see Abramovitch et al., 2013 for meta-analysis). 
Impaired set-shifting (or increased perseverative errors) is thought to be the primary deficit 
displayed by adult OCD patients on these tasks, as patients show difficulty diverting attention from 
well-learnt rules that are no longer relevant, in favour of new, now relevant, rules. Cognitive 
inflexibility is thought to be intertwined with OCD symptomatology, as patients’ compulsions in 
daily life are performed according to highly rigid rules. Moreover, even healthy populations with 
genetic and environmental risk for the disorder, namely first-degree of relatives of patients, show 
inflexibility on set shifting tasks (Chamberlain et al., 2007; Ozcan, Ozer, & Yagcioglu, 2016; 
Rajender et al., 2011), leading to cognitive inflexibility being regarded a possible endophenotype of 
OCD (Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009).  
   However, a recent meta-analysis of 75 studies, assessing effect sizes from a variety of set-shifting 
tasks (WCST, IDED,TMT-B, probabilistic reversal learning task) administered to adult patients 
found no strong evidence for a pure cognitive flexibility deficit associated with OCD (Fradkin, 
Strauss, Pereg, & Huppert, 2018). Within the WCST, effect sizes of perseverative errors 
overlapped with effect sizes of non-perseverative errors, while in probabilistic shift tasks, 
perseverative errors showed low effect sizes. This suggests that OCD is linked to general 
underperformance on set-shifting tasks, and not a specific flexibility impairment. Authors theorised 
that increased errors on the tasks are attributed to overcomplicated exploration, where patients 
attempt to evaluate too many possible rules at once, or perhaps a failure to process and learn from 
feedback. Nonetheless, this study did not compare flexibility scores on the IDED task with any 
control subscores, so they were unable to conclude whether adult patients showed a cognitive 
flexibility deficit exclusively on this task. Another meta-analysis focused on adult OCD 
performance on the IDED task (Chamberlain et al., manuscript submitted) compared performance 
on the intra-dimensional stage (IDS, where participants must learn to shift attention between 





are introduced, e.g. shapes) with performance on the extra-dimensional stage (EDS, which involves 
shifting attention from a previously relevant exemplar to a new one, e.g. switching from lines to 
shapes). Thus, IDS was used as a control measure against the EDS flexibility measure. The meta-
analysis unveiled a robust EDS performance impairment in adult patients, but no strong IDS 
impairment, suggesting that adult patients are indeed predominantly inflexible when it comes to 
switching between different categories but are able to flexibly switch responses between stimuli 
from the same category. Results from these two meta-analyses collectively indicate that 
inflexibility may be a characteristic of adult OCD, but evidence for this appears to be task and 
measure dependent. Furthermore, alongside or instead of cognitive inflexibility, underperformance 
on set shifting tasks may also be driven by overactive exploration and/or poor feedback learning. 
   Findings from cognitive flexibility studies involving paediatric OCD patients are even more 
heterogeneous. On the WCST, young patients are reported to be more perseverative, commit more 
overall errors, and complete fewer categories compared to healthy controls (Baykal et al., 2014; 
Isik Taner et al., 2011; Shin et al., 2008), with one study even reporting young patients committing 
exclusively more non-perseverative errors than healthy subjects (Andrés et al., 2007). Moreover, in 
contrast to findings from adult OCD research, paediatric patients have been found to commit more 
pre-EDS errors on the IDED task (Gottwald et al., 2018). These mixed findings denote that child-
OCD is not associated with a clear flexibility deficit. In fact, as described in Chapter 1, majority of 
studies employing set-shifting tasks do not find differences in performance between young patients 
and controls (Andrés et al., 2007; Beers et al., 1999; Garcia-Delgar et al., 2018; Geller et al., 2018; 
Gruner et al., 2012; Hybel et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Kodaira et al., 2012; Negreiros et al., 
2019; Ornstein et al., 2010; M. S. Shin et al., 2008; Wilton et al., 2020).  
  These varied findings indicate that specific impairments on set shifting tasks are latent and 
unobservable using traditional group-based statistics. The WCST in particular is a complex task, 
tapping into visual search, learning from positive and negative feedback, exploration, attention, and 
potentially working memory as participants have to retain 3 different rules in memory and switch 
between them accordingly (Marzuki et al., 2020). To disentangle some of these latent processes 
driving WCST performance, cognitive scientists increasingly utilise computational models. The 
most well-known set of computational models for this purpose have been developed by Bishara et 
al. (2010), and contain parameters accounting for reward learning, punishment learning, decision-
consistency, and attentional focusing (see Methods section of this chapter). The parameters have 
been validated and found to correlate highly with typical WCST summary measures such as 





   This modelling approach has been used to successfully reveal implicit cognitive strategies 
employed by various neuropsychiatric patient groups, among them individuals with substance 
dependence (Bishara et al., 2010), prefrontal cortex lesions (Gläscher, Adolphs, & Tranel, 2019), 
and schizophrenia (Farreny et al., 2016). Such an approach to analysing WCST performance has 
yet to be implemented in research involving patients with OCD.   
    As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, studies employing computational 
modelling have found overactive exploration on decision-making tasks in youths with OCD (Erhan 
et al., 2017; Hauser, Moutoussis, et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2018). Similarly, it is interesting to 
speculate whether these features also influence performance on a cognitive flexibility task such as 
the WCST.  
   In this study, I sought to investigate latent processes underlying WCST performance in 
adolescents with OCD using computational modelling. As a proportion of the clinical sample were 
receiving serotonergic treatment, I also assessed how performance differed by medication status. It 
was hypothesised that the clinical sample would differ on model parameters representing feedback 




Sixty-nine participants in total completed the WCST. All twenty-three patient participants formed 
the OCD group and 46 participants were in the CTL group. I stopped recruiting control participants 
for this task after the 46th control to prevent group sizes from being too different between OCD and 
CTL groups. Eleven OCD patients were receiving SSRI treatment at the time of the study while 12 
were medication-naïve. Eight OCD patients were medicated with sertraline and 4 were medicated 
with fluoxetine. Mean SSRI dosage was 97.27mg (std dev: 58.33mg) and the dose range was 20 – 
200 mg. IQ data was missing from one participant from the OCD group. Further demographic 
details are outlined in the Results section of this chapter.  
2.2.2 Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
The WCST used in this study was run on a laptop via the Psychology Experiment Building 
Language programme (Mueller & Piper, 2014). The WCST contains up to 128 trials. Participants 
were shown 4 decks with a different combination of colours, numbers, and shapes (see Figure 2.1). 





according to one of three rules at a time, either number, colour or shape. The rule must be 
discovered using trial and error via visual feedback received after each card is sorted. Cards were 
sorted by clicking on the chosen deck using the laptop mousepad. If a card is sorted correctly, the 
feedback shown would be ‘Correct’. If the card was sorted incorrectly, the feedback shown would 
be ‘Incorrect’ (see Figure 2.2 for stimulus presentation within the task). There was no time limit for 
a card to be sorted on each trial, but participants were told to answer as quickly and as accurately as 
possible.  
After 10 cards have been successfully sorted consecutively, one set is completed and the sorting 
rule changes. The process continues until the participant either sorts all 128 cards or they complete 
9 sets. The total time taken to complete the task is 10 minutes. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: PRESENTATION OF THE WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TEST. THE FOUR STIMULUS CARDS ARE SHOWN AT 







FIGURE 2.3: STIMULI PRESENTATION OF WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TASK 
 
 
2.3 Statistical Analyses 
2.3.1 Standard analyses 
An a priori power analysis was conducted with α = .05 (two-tailed), power (1-β) set to .8, and mean 
and standard deviation based on statistically significant differences in WCST performance between 
paediatric OCD patients and healthy participants from Shin et al.’s (2008) study. The analysis 
called for 62 subjects in each group, indicating that my current study is underpowered. However, 
the sample size I have employed is considerably larger than a proportion of past studies that have 
shown a significant WCST impairment in paediatric OCD patients (Isik Taner et al., 2011; M. S. 
Shin et al., 2008), but it is smaller than the sample of paediatric patients employed in Baykal et al. 
(2014).   
All statistical analyses of measures from the WCST were implemented in RStudio 3.5.0. 
The following outcome measures were analysed: number of sets completed (out of 9), percentage 
perseverative errors (incorrectly choosing a deck based on the rule from the previous set), 
percentage of non-perseverative errors (other errors that are not perseverative), percentage of 





maintenance failures (number of times participants chose the wrong deck when completing the 
sets), number of trials needed to complete first set, and response times in milliseconds (ms). These 
are measures commonly analysed in studies utilising the WCST (Andrés et al., 2008; D. A. Geller 
et al., 2018; Gläscher et al., 2019; Isik Taner et al., 2011; Somsen, 2007; Somsen, Van Der Molen, 
Jennings, & Van Beek, 2000). 
To assess the effect of Group (CTL vs OCD) on each outcome measure, multivariate linear 
regressions were conducted. Aside from the Group variable, the following confounding variables 
were added into the regression models to control for their effects 1) Z-score standardised ages as 
WCST performance has been found to be age-dependent (Somsen, 2007; Somsen et al., 2000), 2) 
intelligence scores measured using the WASI-II as IQ was found to correlate with WCST 
performance (Foley, Garcia, Shaw, & Golden, 2009) and studies have reported that children with 
OCD show inferior performance on non-verbal IQ assessments compared to typically developing 
children (Abramovitch, Anholt, Raveh-Gottfried, Hamo, & Abramowitz, 2018; Batistuzzo et al., 
2020), and lastly 3) gender as gender differences are common when assessing general cognitive test 
performance (De Luca et al., 2003; Gur et al., 1999).   
Homoscedascity of residuals obtained from each regression model were assessed using the 
Breusch-Pagan test. When the assumption of homoscedascity of residuals was violated, a sandwich 
variance estimate function from the ‘sandwich’ R package (Zeileis, 2004) was applied to the 
regression model(s). This enabled the extraction of standard errors that were robust to non-constant 
variance. P-values were calculated using these new standard errors.  
Next, significance levels for the regression analyses were adjusted according to the Benjamini-
Hochberg (BH) procedure to control the false detection rate arising from multiple comparisons 
using the ‘p.adjust’ function in base R.  
The regression analyses were then repeated, this time exploring the effects of medication on the 
outcome measures. The patient group was divided into MED- and MED+. Post-hoc comparisons 
between the 3 independent groups were conducted using the Tukey test with Bonferroni correction. 
All statistical tests reported are two-tailed. 
Lastly, Pearson correlations were conducted to decipher the relationships between task measures 





2.3.2 Computational Model 
The main model used in this study is identical to the one used by Gläscher et al. (2019) and was 
originally described by Bishara et al. (2010). It has 4 free parameters to be estimated from fitting 
the model to data, namely reward rate (r, how quickly attention weights change to rewarding 
feedback), punishment rate (p, how quickly attention weights change to punishing feedback), 
decision consistency (d, how much deck choice is influenced by attention weights), attentional 
focusing (f, only important on trials with ambiguous feedback and represents the degree to which 
the update is focused only on the category/rule with the largest attention weight).  
The dependent variables fed into the model are an outcome variable which represent whether a trial 
was rewarded or not (1 or 0) and a matching matrix which quantify which categories (colour, 
number, or shape) associated with a chosen deck match the test card. For instance, if the chosen 






] – Equation 2.1 
The model calculates the probabilities associated with choosing each deck as a function of attention 
weights (a), which represents the weight given to each category per trial. The matrix elements of 
the attention signal always sum to one. It was assumed that for each participant’s first trial, the 





] – Equation 2.2 
Attention weights are updated using a feedback signal (s), which represents whether the categories 
were rewarded or not. For example, in the case where a chosen deck matches the test card based on 





] – Equation 2.3 
with each element of s representing colour, number, and shape respectively. The current attention 
weights are updated based on the feedback signal using the following equations: 





at+1 |punishedt = (1-p)at + ps  - if trial was punished – Equation 2.5 
where t refers to the current trial. Parameters r and p determine how rapidly attention weights 
change toward feedback signals following rewarding and punishing feedback respectively.  
In the example above, the feedback is unambiguous as the chosen deck matches the test card on 
only category. However, in some cases where more than one category is matched (for example, 
both colour and shape), the feedback signal relies on the free parameter f to modulate how focused 
or wide the attention is on each category’s feedback. When f approaches 0, attention is split evenly 





] – Equation 2.6 
As f increases, the feedback signal is split proportionally to current attention weights. For example, 
if the attention weight for colour is higher than shape, the feedback signal would follow suit and 
perhaps be represented by: 




] – Equation 2.7 
The following equations represent how the feedback signal is modulated by the attention weights 










𝑓  – Equation 2.9 
When outcome on the current trial is correct, the feedback signal is computed only with the 
matching attention weights, and when the outcome is incorrect, only the non-matching attention 
weights contribute to the feedback signal.  











where the d parameter influences the predicted probability of choosing a deck per trial. As d 
becomes higher, choices become more random and less dependent on attention weights (more 
exploratory). As d becomes lower, choices are heavily constrained by attention weights (more 
exploitative). 𝐦𝑡
′  is simply the matching matrix, 𝐦𝑡
   ,transposed to enable matrix multiplication (dot 
product) with 𝒂𝑡
 .  
The full model described above with 4 free parameters was compared to 4 other degenerate models. 
Each degenerate model had one parameter fixed to assess the contribution of each parameter to 
capturing behaviour on the task.  
The 1st two alternative models (RPD1 and RPD0) fixed the f parameter to be 1 and 0 respectively. 
The 3rd alternative model (RP1F) fixed d to be 1, and the final model (RRDF) assumed a single 
common learning rate for both reward and punishment.  
Models were fit to trial-by trial behavioural data using hierarchical Bayesian estimation by 
estimating the posterior distribution (distribution of data after model fitting) of the model 
parameters at the individual subject- and group- levels. At the group level, Uniform (0,1) 
distributions were used as priors (predictions about the distribution of the data before model-fitting) 
for the r and p parameters, while Uniform (0,5) distributions were used for d and f parameters. 
Inter-subject variance for r and p were sampled from Half-normal (0,0.05) distributions, while 
inter-subject variance for d and f were sampled from Half-normal (0,1) distributions. Individual 
subject parameters were represented by a Gaussian prior distribution, and the mean and variance of 
the prior distributions were sampled from the group-level and inter-subject variability distributions. 
Modelling data hierarchically reduces the influence of artefacts on model fitting and parameter 
estimation. Regularising individual parameters in this way produces better individual estimates and 
enables reliable group-level tests (Piray, Dezfouli, Heskes, Frank, & Daw, 2019). Furthermore, the 
shrinkage of estimates drawn from a higher level distribution leads to more conservative estimates, 
leading to an automatic multiple comparisons correction without a reduction in power which is 
often seen in classical statistics (Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012; Gelman & Tuerlinckx, 2000; 
Kruschke, 2011). 
Computation of the posteriors were conducted using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
sampling using JAGS software (Plummer, 2003). Four randomly initialised MCMC chains were 
run during model-fitting. Model comparison was conducted by calculating the Deviance 
Information Criterion (DIC) which takes into account accuracy of model fit and penalises model 





Posterior distributions of parameters were interpreted using the 95% highest posterior density 
interval (HDI), also known as the Bayesian credible interval. All values within the interval have a 
higher probability density (i.e. higher credibility) than any value outside the HDI. Parameter 
comparisons between OCD and CTL were calculated by subtracting the posterior distributions of 
the CTL group-parameters from the posterior distributions of the OCD group-parameters, 
generating the group mean differences per parameter. The 95% HDIs of the posterior distribution 
for the group mean differences were calculated and inspected to check whether they reliably 
included zero (indicating no difference between groups). 
Lastly, model-fitting was repeated to explore the effects of medication on behaviour. Group 
differences between CTL, MED-, and MED+ were analysed.  
Parameter recovery and simulation (which involves simulating data from the model using 
parameter values obtained from fitting the model to real data, and in turn fitting the model to the 
simulated data to check if parameter values can be recovered) was not run here as the winning 
model had already been fully validated in the study by Gläscher et al. (2019). Parameter recovery is 
described in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Standard Analyses (CTL vs OCD) 
Table 2.1 summarises the demographic and clinical characteristics for both groups. Groups were 
matched for gender, age, and IQ (intelligence quotient) scores. However, OCD had significantly 
elevated depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive severity scores compared to CTL.  
Table 2.1: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and statistical tests. 
 
CTL (n = 46) OCD (n = 23)  STATISTIC 
GENDER(F:M)  28/18 14/9 χ2 (1)=0, p = 1 
AGE 16.59 ± 1.78  15.95 ± 1.67 t(67) = 1.44; p = .15 
WASI-II (IQ)a 107.61 ± 11.62 108.32 ± 13.80 t(66) = -0.22; p = .83 
BDI ** 46.46 ± 5.27 58.35 ± 8.95 t(29.84) = -5.88; p = 2.96e-06 
BAI ** 45.98 ± 7.66 66.30 ± 9.55 Z = -6.52; p = 6.846e-11 
OCI ** 8.13 ± 6.49 30.74 ±  14.08 Z = -5.93; p = 2.99e-09 
CY-BOCS N/A 23.45 ± 5.19 N/A 
Key: CTL: Control Group; OCD: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 





Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child Yale-Brown Obsessive-
Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01, amissing data from one OCD participant.  
 
Table 2.2 displays the main group results per dependent measure as well as the results from the 
regression analyses. 
Table 2.2: Regression results of Wisconsin Card Sorting Task data.  
Note: Linear regression with sandwich estimator outputs a Z-value instead of a t-value. Independent measures in 
bold font indicate significance at p<.05. Key- CTL: Control group; OCD: Patient group; M: mean; SD: standard 
deviation; df: degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression 
standard error; p(): proportion; R2: r-squared, measure of effect size. 
 
The regression analyses revealed that OCD had showed slower response times (Coefficient 
estimate = 191.47, t(67) = 2.58, p = .043) and an increased proportion of unique errors compared to 
CTL (Coefficient estimate = 0.0042, t(67) = 2.78, p = .043). 











Table 2.3: Regression results from Wisconsin Card Sorting Task data controlling for age, gender, and IQ. 
Note: Linear regression with sandwich estimator outputs a Z-value instead of a t-value. Independent measures in 
bold font indicate significance at p<.05. M: mean; SD: standard deviation; df: degrees of freedom; BH: 
Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression standard error; IQ: intelligence scores; 
p(): proportion, R2: r-squared, measure of effect size. 
 
When controlling for the aforementioned variables, Group (OCD vs CTL) was no longer a significant 
predictor of response times and proportion of unique errors (p > .05). Age emerged as a significant 
predictor for several dependent variables: older participants completed more sets (Coefficient 
estimate = 0.66, t(63) = 3.37, p = .0045), committed less non-perseverative errors (Coefficient 
estimate = -1.36, t(63) = -2.20, p = .040), had faster response times (Coefficient estimate = -139.34, 
t(63) = -4.42, p = .00028), maintained sets more (Coefficient estimate = -0.36, t(63) = -2.42, p = 
.032), and required less trials to complete the first category (Coefficient estimate = -3.32, t(63) = -
2.17, p = .040). Additionally, the analyses revealed that those with higher IQ committed less 
perseverative errors (Coefficient estimate = -0.14, Z = -3.30, p = .0069) and had faster response times 






FIGURE 2.4: PLOTS COMPARING CTL VS OCD ON 7 OUTCOME MEASURES FROM THE WISCONSIN CARD SORTING 
TEST. AT FIRST, OCD APPEARED TO SHOW SIGNIFICANTLY MORE UNIQUE ERRORS AND SLOWER RESPONSE TIMES 
COMPARED TO CTL. HOWEVER, THESE DIFFERENCES CEASED TO BE SIGNIFICANT AT P<.05 WHEN CONTROLLING 
FOR AGE, GENDER, AND IQ.  
 
2.4.3 Exploratory Medication Analyses 
The analyses above were repeated this time dividing the OCD group into those not receiving (MED-
) and receiving (MED+) SSRI medication. The following results are termed ‘exploratory’ as there 
are too few participants in each group to draw strong conclusions. Demographic, intelligence, and 
clinical scores are found in Table 2.4. No apparent differences were found between groups on 
measures of age, IQ, and gender composition. MED- and MED+ displayed increased anxiety, 























GENDER(F:M)  28/18 8/4 6/5 χ2 (2)=0.35 , p = 
0.84 
- 
AGE 16.59 ± 
1.78  
15.87  




χ2 (2)=4.50 , p = 
0.11 
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F(2,65) = 0.19, 
p=0.83 
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F(2,66) = 42.1, 
p=1.64e-12 
CTL < MED- & 
MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 
 






χ2 (2)=42.57 , p 
= 5.7e-10 
CTL < MED- & 
MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 







χ2 (2)=35.30 , p 
= 2.16e-08 
CTL < MED- & 
MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 
 




t(20) = 1.16; 
p=0.26 
N/A 
Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; WASI-II: 
Wecshler’s Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory 
(t-scored); BAI: Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; a missing data from one MED- participant. 
 
Post-hoc tests revealed that compared to CTL, MED+ and MED- groups had elevated depression 
(Pairwise t-tests, MED- vs CTL: t(66) = 4.72; p = 3.80e-05, MED+ vs CTL: t(66) = 6.13; p = 1.66e-
06), anxiety (Dunn’s test, MED- vs CTL: p = 5.60e-07, MED+ vs CTL:  p = 2.25e-06), and 
obsessive-compulsive scores (Dunn’s tests, MED- vs CTL:  p = 3.18e-06, MED+ vs CTL: p = 5.23e-
05). There were no differences on these measures between MED- and MED+ (all p > .05).  
Per-group results and results of the regression analyses investigating effects of medication status on 
the WCST dependent variables are included in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. MED+ had a significant effect on 
response times (Coefficient estimate = 320.25, t(62) = 3.36, p = .0091), and a marginally significant 






Table 2.5: Summary of Wisconsin Card Sorting Test scores per group and per dependent variable 
Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; p(): 
proportion.  
Table 2.6: Regression results looking at effects of medication status on dependent measures of Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test.  
Note: Some dependent variables have a Z value reported as a fixed effect value as the linear regression with 
sandwich estimator outputs a Z-value instead of a t-value. Independent measures in bold font indicate 
significance at p<.05. Key: MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; M: mean; SD: 
standard deviation; df: degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: 
regression standard error; IQ: intelligence scores; p(): proportion. 
 
When controlling for age, IQ, and gender (see Table 2.7), MED+ became a significant predictor for 
proportion of unique errors (Coefficient estimate = 0.68, Z = 2.60, p = .033) alongside predicting 





Table 2.7: Regression results looking at effects of medication status on dependent measures of Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test, controlling for age, gender, and IQ.  
Note: Linear regression with sandwich estimator outputs a Z-value instead of a t-value. Independent measures in 
bold font indicate significance at p<.05. Key: MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient 
group; M: mean; SD: standard deviation; df: degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: 
confidence interval; SE: regression standard error; IQ: intelligence scores; p(): proportion. 
 
Post-hoc Tukey comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that MED+ had slower/increased 
response times compared to CTL (p = .0051). There were no significant differences in response time 
between MED- and MED+ (p = .067) as well as between MED- and CTL (p = .92). Post-hoc Tukey 
comparisons were also conducted for proportion unique errors as MED+ emerged as a significant 
predictor after controlling for confounding variables. It was revealed that MED+ committed more 
unique errors compared to CTL (p =.0014) and MED- (p =.031). There were no significant 
differences on this measure between CTL and MED- (p =.92). See Figure 2.4 for visualisation of 






FIGURE 2.5: PLOTS COMPARING CTL VS MED- VS MED+ ON 7 OUTCOME MEASURES FROM THE WISCONSIN CARD 
SORTING TEST. POST-HOC PAIRWISE TUKEY TESTS REVEALED THAT MED+ SHOWED MORE UNIQUE ERRORS 
COMPARED TO MED- AND CTL (WITH NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MED- AND CTL). ADDITIONALLY, MED+ HAD 
SLOWER RESPONSE TIMES COMPARED TO CTL (NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CTL AND MED-, AND BETWEEN MED- 
AND MED+). *-P<.05, N.S.-NON-SIGNIFICANT. 
 
2.4.4 Modelling Results 
The winning model from the computation modelling analyses revealed the RPDF model to be the 















Table 2.8: Comparison of model performance 
Model Description Number of parameters DIC 
RPDF Full model 4 7204.973 
RPD1 Attentional focusing (f) fixed at 1 3 
 7833.797 
RPD0 Attentional focusing (f) fixed at 0 3 7364.194 
RP1F Decision consistency (d) fixed at 1 3 7285.828 




The lower the DIC the better the model-fit. Hence the full RPDF model was the winning model.  
No group differences were found on any of the parameters when conducting group mean differences 






FIGURE 2.6: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. 
ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF GROUP 
DIFFERENCES (OCD-CTL) IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. ALL GROUP DIFFERENCE HDIS INCLUDED 0 
INDICATING NO NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS FOR EACH PARAMETER.  
 
 
There were also no group differences between parameters when dividing OCD into MED- and MED+ 






FIGURE 2.7: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES (CTL VS MED- VS MED+) PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT 
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. EACH PLOT REPRESENTS GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE RESULTS FOR EACH MODEL 
PARAMETER: R – REWARD RATE, P- PUNISHMENT RATE, D – DECISION CONSISTENCY, F – ATTENTIONAL 
FOCUSING. ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF GROUP DIFFERENCES IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. ALL GROUP DIFFERENCE HDIS INCLUDED 0 
INDICATING NO NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS FOR EACH PARAMETER. 
 
 
2.4.5 Correlational Analyses 
Correlations with obsessive-compulsive severity 
When considering all participants, OCI and CY-BOCS scores were not predictive of any measures. 
Nevertheless, when conducting correlational analyses within groups, marked patterns seemed to 
emerge. Within OCD, higher OCI scores was unexpectedly associated with better performance on 
the task, wherein patients with higher OCI scores completed more sets (r =0.57, p =.0045), made less 
unique errors (r =-0.45, p =.030), and made less set maintenance failures (r =-0.42, p =.047). 
Additionally, patients with more severe OCD revealed higher punishment rates (r =0.55, p =.0061) 
and decision-consistency (r =0.42, p =.045). CY-BOCS scores also correlated with p parameter 
values (r =0.55, p =.0086). However, I suspected these relationships were confounded by age of 





below) as well as showed a relationship with OCI scores (r = 0.50; p = .014). Furthermore, there was 
a trend (although non-significant) for CY-BOCS scores to also correlate with age (r = 0.42; p = .054). 
Hence, I conducted a further partial Pearson’s correlation to control for the effects and age, which 
indeed rendered the relationships between OCD severity and model parameter values insignificant 
in the OCD group (all p <.05).  
The opposite effect was unveiled when considering only CTL: higher OCI scores were associated 
with decreased punishment rates (r =-0.34, p =.020) and decision-consistency (r =-0.30, p =.043) 
values. Incidentally, OCI scores within CTL were also associated with increased reward rates (r 
=0.34, p =.023). OCI scores did not correlate with age or IQ in these participants, suggesting possible 
confounding variables were not driving the relationships.  
Within MED-, there appeared to be significant relationships between OCI/CY-BOCS scores and task 
measures, but these were no longer significant when controlling for age. Within MED+, no 
correlations between task/model measures and obsessive-compulsive severity emerged.  
Correlations with anxiety and/or depression 
When considering all participants, there was a significant negative relationship between depression 
scores and proportion of perseverative errors (r = -0.26, p = .031). When considering only MED-, 
more depressed participants made less non-perseverative errors (r=-0.36, p = .015). 
Correlations with age and IQ 
Within all participants, those with higher IQ scores made less perseverative errors (r = -0.33, p = 
.0060) and had higher p parameter values (r = 0.28, p = .021). Age showed a relationship with several 
dependent measures: older participants completed more sets (r =0.40, p = .00070), made less 
perseverative (r = -0.28, p = .018) and non-perseverative errors (r = -0.29, p = .016), had faster 
response times (r = -0.48, p = .000029), showed decreased set maintenance failures (r = -0.32, p = 
.0082), and had increased p (r =0.39, p = .0010) and d (r = 0.40, p = .00062) parameter values.   
Within OCD, age continued to positively correlate with number of sets completed (r =0.43, p =.039), 
model p values (r =0.58, p =.036), and model d values (r =0.61, p =.028), while correlating negatively 
with proportion of perseverative errors (r =-0.50, p =.016). Moreover, higher IQ predicted less 
perseverative errors (r =-0.45, p =.037), faster response times (r =-0.60, p =.0032), lower r (r =-0.50, 
p =.018) and f (r =-0.38, p =.029) model values as well as higher p (r =0.52, p =.013) and d (r =0.47, 





Next, within CTL only, older participants completed more sets (r=0.37, p =.011), made less non-
perseverative (r=-0.36, p =.042) and unique errors (r=-0.26, p =.040), had faster response times (r=-
0.48, p =.00066), made less set maintenance failures (r=-0.31, p = .033), and needed less trials to 
complete the first set (r=-0.37, p =.011). Additionally, older participants had increased d values (r= 
0.34, p =.023).  
Within MED-, participants with higher IQ had faster reaction times (r =-0.75; p =.0080).  
Lastly, when considering only MED+, older participants and participants with higher IQ showed 
increased p (age: r =0.65, p =.031; IQ: r =0.77, p =.0058) and d (age: r =0.78, p =.0058; IQ: r =0.73, 
p =.010) parameter values. 
Correlations with medication dosage 
Increasing medication dosage was associated with higher IQ scores (r =0.61, p = .049), but did not 
significantly correlate with any task measures or model parameter values. 
Correlations between task measures and model parameters 
Lastly, to verify that model parameter values map onto standard WCST measures, further Pearson 
correlations between model parameter values (r,p,d,f) and standard task measures (number of sets 
completed, proportion perseverative errors, proportion non-perseverative errors, proportion unique 
errors, failure to maintain set, number of trials needed to complete first set, and mean response times) 
were conducted. These analyses were conducted first considering all participants, then separately 



































r n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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r n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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r r = -0.73, p 
= .0073 
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.027 
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r n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
p r = 0.83, p 
= .0014 
n.s. n.s. n.s. r =-0.79 , 
p =.0040 
n.s. n.s. 
d r = 0.79, p 
=.0039 
n.s. n.s. n.s. r = -0.74, 
p =.0086 
n.s. n.s. 
f n.s. r =0.80 , p 
=.0029 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. r = 0.83, 
p = .0015 
Key: R: reward rate, P: punishment rate, D: Decision Consistency, F: Attentional Focusing; CTL: Control 
group; OCD: Patient group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; r: Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient; n.s: not significant; p(): proportion; RT: response time.  
 
2.4.6 Summary of Main Results 
OCD and CTL showed overall comparable performance on all WCST measures when controlling for 
age, IQ and gender. However, MED+ committed significantly more unique errors than MED- and 
CTL, and also showed slower response times compared to CTL but not MED-. MED- was equivalent 





   This is the first study that has aimed to fractionate cognitive processes contributing to WCST 
performance in adolescents with OCD using a computational model, originally conceptualised by 
Bishara et al. (2010). When assessing standard performance whilst controlling for age, gender, and 
intelligence, adolescents with OCD did not differ from healthy matched controls on any task 
measures. Group differences emerged when separating the OCD group by medication status: patients 
medicated with SSRIs exhibited more unique errors compared to control participants and non-





to my hypothesis, computational modelling revealed no marked group differences on the parameters 
investigated. Nevertheless, I uncovered a few correlations between obsessive-compulsive traits and 
model parameter values within the control group that are discussed below.  
2.5.1 Cognitive Flexibility 
   As described in the introduction of this chapter, the WCST is principally a test of cognitive 
flexibility. As adolescent patients in this study, regardless of medication status, did not differ from 
healthy controls on proportion of perseverative errors made, we can conclude the absence of a 
cognitive flexibility deficit in this sample. This is in line with previous paediatric OCD research that 
typically report no OCD-related impairment on the WCST (see Chapter 1). Additionally, this 
strengthens the notion that youths with OCD differ cognitively from adult patients, as the latter tend 
to show widespread deficits on this task (Fradkin et al., 2018). One line of reasoning for this is that 
cognitive flexibility becomes increasingly impacted as a function of disorder duration. Another 
explanation is that healthy adolescents perform less well on the task compared to adults due to their 
executive functions and frontal lobes still undergoing maturation. As a result, adolescents with OCD 
appear unimpaired when compared to healthy age-matched populations, but deficits in adulthood 
become more pronounced as patients are compared to adults with fully developed cognitive abilities. 
Nonetheless, research looking into age-dependent normative WCST scores has revealed that by the 
time healthy children are 10 years old, their performance on the task is indistinguishable from healthy 
adults (Chelune & Baer, 1986), suggesting the lack of group differences is not a developmental 
artefact. The cognitive differences between adults and adolescents with OCD is discussed further in 
the General Discussion (Chapter 7).     
2.5.2 Medication Effects 
   In this study I uncovered an unexpected effect of medication; medicated patients appeared to make 
more random guesses on the task as demonstrated by their tendency to choose decks that did not fit 
any rule presented on the test card. As a caveat, the variance within the medicated group on this 
measure was high and hence these results should be interpreted with caution. 
    Unique errors are posited to indicate a lack of recognition or awareness of rules in the task. Such 
errors are usually made by very young children tested on this paradigm (Somsen, 2007), who may 
have difficulty attending to and recognising all the different rules. Hence, it could be that the 
medicated patients in my study have attentional and rule-learning impairments. A learning deficit, in 
particular, has been thought to be a feature of adolescent-OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018), but it is 





Furthermore, if attention and learning were compromised in this group, it is unusual that the deficit 
is specific to unique errors and does not extend to other task measures such as failures to maintain 
sets which is also thought to reflect attentional issues (Mullane & Corkum, 2007; Pineda et al., 1998).  
   Another explanation behind unique errors is that they reflect delusional thinking in participants in 
that participants perceive non-existent rules and patterns between the test card and a selected deck. 
Indeed, a few studies report that patients with schizophrenia commit more unique errors than the 
general population (Kawasaki et al., 1993; Mattes, Cohen, Berg, Canavan, & Hopmann, 1991; Rossi 
et al., 2002). One study also found increased unique errors in first- and multiple-episode manic 
depressive disorder, with many patients in this study being on anti-psychotic medication (Fleck, 
Shear, Madore, & Strakowski, 2008). SSRIs, which in some cases can cause psychotic symptoms 
such as hallucinations (Lai, 2012; Schuld, Archelos, Friess, & Bourgeois, 2000), may have propelled 
schizotypy-like responding on this task in medicated patients. This is, nonetheless, purely speculative 
as I did not measure any psychosis-related symptoms in this sample to test this theory. Moreover, no 
patients exhibited any psychotic symptoms when screened prior to study enrolment.  
   Medicated patients in my study additionally revealed slow response times on the task, which is 
reminiscent of research identifying slower goal-directed planning in youths with OCD (Huyser et al., 
2010; Kim et al., 2018). Computational modelling studies have also highlighted that children with 
OCD engage in slower and more cautious decision-making compared to healthy children making 
(Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser et al., 2017), which has been linked to higher levels of subjective 
uncertainty experienced by patients. This uncertainty drives patients to accumulate more evidence 
than necessary to reach a decision. Medicated patients in my sample may have felt increased 
uncertainty surrounding rules present in the WCST, resulting in slower decisions/increased response 
times. Despite this more careful responding, medicated patients still committed more unique errors, 
which is consistent with research showing that young patients show comparable or even worse 
performance on planning tasks compared to healthy children despite slower latencies (Negreiros et 
al., 2019).  
   All in all, it is difficult to interpret the results for medicated patients as prior studies administering 
the WCST to youths with OCD have not analysed unique errors or response times (the latter likely 
due to the WCST being a self-paced task) (Andrés et al., 2007; Baykal et al., 2014; Beers et al., 1999; 
Bohon et al., 2020; Geller et al., 2018; Kodaira et al., 2012; Ornstein et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2014; 
Taner et al., 2011). Hence, I cannot ascertain whether this pattern of results is commonly found in 





complete performance profile on the WCST, and they are often included in research studying other 
populations (e.g. Horowitz-Kraus, 2014; Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006; Somsen, 2007; 
Somsen, Van Der Molen, Jennings, & Van Beek, 2000). Moreover, majority of research into 
paediatric OCD reported no medication effects. To my knowledge, only Gruner et al. (2012) has 
found that medicated children with OCD completed less categories on the WCST compared to 
unmedicated and control groups. However, a separate study by Andrés et al. (2007), in contrast, 
found no effect of medication on paediatric OCD WCST performance. Even within the adult 
literature, OCD patients medicated with SSRIs are reported to display superior performance to 
unmedicated patients on deterministic reversal learning (Apergis-Schoute et al., in prep), goal-
directed planning (Lochner et al., 2020), and during probabilistic reward and punishment learning 
(Palminteri et al., 2012). Relevant to the current study, adult patients medicated with serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SRIs) show similar performance on the WCST compared to non-medicated 
patients (Mataix-Cols, Alonso, Pifarré, Menchón, & Vallejo, 2002), suggesting no effect of 
serotonergic medication on performance. However, this particular study did not include measures of 
unique errors and response times.  
    Inversely, there is evidence for acute low dose SSRIs impairing learning and flexibility in healthy 
participants (Skandali et al., 2018), and for serotonin depletion improving these functions (Scholes 
et al., 2007). In line with this, and very intriguingly, medication dosage correlated with IQ scores in 
my study suggesting that receiving a lower dosage of SSRIs impacts performance on intelligence 
tests. However, SSRI dosage was not correlated with unique errors or response times so it is uncertain 
whether dosage influenced abnormal performance in medicated adolescent patients.   
  Ultimately, further research with larger samples of medicated and unmedicated adolescents with 
OCD investigating unique errors and response times on the WCST is needed to draw any firm 
conclusions. Larger samples will also enable us to determine whether these specific task deficits are 
features of ‘pure’ OCD or whether they are only pronounced in the presence of SSRIs.  
Further discussion surrounding effects of SSRI medication on cognition are present in Chapters 3,4, 
and 7 of this thesis.   
2.5.3 Computational Modelling 
   Next, computational modelling analyses implemented here unexpectedly detected no group 
differences in latent behavioural process on the task. Again, as this is the first study to implement 
modelling of WCST data in OCD, I am unable to determine whether these results are to be expected. 





of increased exploration [operationalised via the decision-consistency parameter (d)] compared to 
healthy controls. This may be due to the deterministic nature of the task. Most other computational 
studies modelled tasks with probabilistic pay-offs (Carlisi et al., 2017; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et 
al., 2019; Norman et al., 2018), which incorporate more uncertainty into the tasks’ structures. The 
WCST does not tap into uncertainty in the same way and hence patients do not engage in exploration. 
There were no differences in model parameter values even when dividing the OCD group by 
medication status, and despite standard analyses revealing more unique errors in medicated patients. 
However, this is likely due to unique errors not being captured in the model, as proportion of unique 
errors did not correlate with any model parameters.  
   At first obsessive-compulsive severity within the OCD group presented a noteworthy relationship 
with model parameters; where more severe patients had increased punishment rates and higher 
decision-consistency. However, when controlling for the effects of age (which correlated highly with 
task measures and OCI scores) these relationships ceased to be significant.  
   In contrast, obsessive-compulsive traits in the healthy control group showed more robust 
relationships with the model parameters, wherein OCI scores (not confounded by age and IQ) 
predicted lower punishment rates, higher reward rates, and lower decision-consistency. Lower 
decision consistency in controls with greater obsessive-compulsive traits is consistent with previous 
research suggesting that OCD is linked to lower perseveration and higher exploration (Fradkin, 
Ludwig, Eldar, & Huppert, 2020; Hauser et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2018). However, higher reward 
rates in this sample are unexpected as adult patients with OCD are often found to show reduced 
activity in brain areas related to reward processing such as the nucleus accumbens and limbic regions 
(Figee et al., 2011; Wi Hoon Jung et al., 2013). Lower punishment rates are also inconsistent with 
past studies revealing that adult OCD patients are more punishment sensitive (Endrass et al., 2011; 
Morein-Zamir et al., 2013; Nielen, Den Boer, & Smid, 2009). Nonetheless, although it appears that 
controls with obsessive-compulsive traits are updating internal values for each dimension more 
following rewards compared to punishment, their actions are not consistent with these value changes 
as demonstrated by their tendency to explore more (lower decision-consistency). This suggests a 
mismatch between choice value and action in controls with obsessive-compulsive traits.   
   All things considered, the correlational data are too premature to draw conclusions from as the 
relationships between obsessive-compulsive traits and parameter values in the control group do not 
appear in the actual clinical sample, and hence are not generalizable to the general population of 





reward rate, low punishment rate, and more exploration) mirror the experimental findings in Chapter 
6 where I modelled data from a probabilistic reversal learning task obtained from a much larger 
sample of adolescents with OCD. I discuss these findings in more detail in the discussion section of 
that chapter.  
2.5.4 Limitations and further research 
   A limitation of this study is that the OCD group’s sample size may have been too small to draw 
solid conclusions, especially when the group is further divided by medication status.  
  Next, while I used a very well-validated model to decompose behaviour on the WCST, I did not 
consider other models that may have captured the data better. For instance, I did not fit the trial-by-
trial reaction time data to any models. Future research should consider fitting a wider variety of 
models that may be more informative of behaviour on this task. 
   Lastly, I did not conduct any neuroimaging of participants due to time constraints within the PhD 
programme. As mentioned previously, abnormalities may be present in brain activity in young 
patients but be not pronounced in task behaviour yet. A recent study showed perseverative errors on 
the WCST in adolescents with OCD, but not in healthy controls, correlated with activity in the frontal 
lobes, including the right frontal pole and inferior frontal gyrus (Bohon, Weinbach, & Lock, 2020). 
While fascinating, Bohon et al.’s study employed a relatively small sample of only 11 OCD patients, 
hence it may be worth revisiting this task as a possible fMRI paradigm administered to a larger 
sample of patient participants.  
2.5.5 Conclusion  
   Consistent with previous literature, adolescents with OCD do not display a cognitive flexibility 
deficit on the WCST. Patients medicated with SSRIs showed increased unique errors and slower 
response times compared to unmedicated patients and controls. It is uncertain whether SSRIs are 
driving either poorer learning and attention, increased evidence accumulation, or increasing 
delusional thinking in this sample. While computational modelling revealed no differences in latent 
task behaviour between groups, obsessive-compulsive severity (measured via the OCI) showed a 
significant relationship with model parameters within the control group, but interpretation is difficult 
as these relationships were not present in the OCD group. All in all, findings support generally intact 






Chapter 3:  Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer in Adolescents 
with OCD 
3.1 Introduction 
  Harm avoidance has been proposed to be one of the factors driving compulsive behaviour in OCD 
(Rasmussen & Eisen, 1990, 1992), wherein compulsions are practiced to prevent incoming danger, 
harm, and unpleasant thoughts. Indeed, the majority of youths with OCD experience increased harm 
avoidance as measured via self-report rating questionnaires (Bey et al., 2017; Cervin et al., 2020; 
Ecker & Gönner, 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008). Moreover, I speculate that threat or harm sensitivity could 
be linked to adult (see Riesel, 2019 for review) and paediatric (see Marzuki et al., 2020 for review) 
patients’ tendency to display overactive ACC error signals when committing errors on conflict 
detection paradigms.    
  Lately, research has shown that a strong propensity for harm avoidance could be linked to disrupted 
goal-directed behaviour in adults with OCD. Gillan et al. (2014) administered a shock avoidance task 
where participants were trained to avoid shocks associated with specific computer images by pressing 
a foot pedal. During devaluation (where the electrodes delivering shocks were disconnected), patients 
with OCD still made more foot pedal responses than control participants to the images previously 
associated with a shock. It was inferred that patients with OCD formed a strong habitual avoidance 
response and failed to adjust their behaviour in a goal-directed manner. This particular study found 
results pertaining to instrumental learning (stimulus – outcome – response association), but a later 
study by Apergis-Schoute and colleagues (2017) found that Pavlovian learning (stimulus – outcome 
association) is also abnormal in adults with OCD. Experimenters trained adults with OCD and 
healthy adults on a shock avoidance task while collecting participants’ skin conductance response 
(SCR) data. SCR or sweat levels represent arousal and are widely used as a measure of aversive 
Pavlovian learning (Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, & Ohman, 1994). All participants differentiated 
between stimuli that predicted shock and neutral stimuli, however following reversal of threat 
contingencies, patients did not update their SCR to differentiate between the newly safe and unsafe 
stimuli. Both studies suggest that adults with OCD have difficulty inhibiting threat responses possibly 
due to an amalgamation of enhanced harm avoidance and a bias towards habitual responding.  
  Similarly, paediatric OCD patients are thought to be impaired in inhibiting Pavlovian fear responses 
as young patients have been found to display persistently large SCRs to stimuli that were previously 





young patients have also been reported to display abnormal SCR differentiation in general: McGuire 
et al. (2016) found that patients’ initially demonstrated the expected high and low SCRs towards a 
threatening conditioned stimulus (CS+) and a safe conditioned stimulus (CS-) respectively. But after 
extinction, their SCRs paradoxically decreased towards CS+ and increased in response to CS-. This 
aberrant differentiation in SCRs suggests that children with OCD display impaired adaptation 
towards Pavlovian conditioned cues. Additionally, poor SCR differentiation predicted worse 
cognitive behavioural therapy outcomes for children with OCD (Geller et al., 2019). This indicates 
that a proportion of children with OCD are unable to retain implicit contingency learning under 
extinction. An alternative explanation related to harm avoidance is that children with OCD ‘reset’ 
their learning in ambiguous contexts (in this case under extinction) as it is unclear to them which CS 
would be associated with the threatening unconditioned stimulus (US). Heightened anxiety may be 
driving these responses in children with OCD, as patients with anxiety disorders also show abnormal 
differentiation between CS+ and CS- on fear conditioning paradigms (Duits et al., 2015). All in all, 
adult OCD appears to be distinctly associated with maladaptive habitual avoidance responding while 
evidence thus far suggests abnormal fear learning in children with OCD.  
  Recently, Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) paradigms have been employed to understand 
how Pavlovian cues influence learnt instrumental actions to seek rewards or avoid punishment 
(Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 2016). Typically, the PIT task involves 3 key stages: the 
instrumental phase, Pavlovian phase, and Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) phases. In animal 
PIT studies (as described in detail by Cartoni et al. (2016)), the instrumental phase involves 
establishing a relationship between distinct actions and outcomes, such as pressing lever A for 
sucrose, and lever B for a food pellet. This phase is then followed by the Pavlovian phase which 
requires subjects to implicitly learn stimulus-outcome associations, for example learning that unique 
auditory tones (conditioned stimuli, CS) predict the delivery of different food outcomes 
(unconditioned stimuli, US). The outcomes used in the instrumental phase are re-used in this phase 
alongside a brand new reward (e.g banana slices). Hence 3 different CSs would uniquely predict the 
delivery of the three separate outcomes. Lastly, the PIT phase would be conducted to probe the 
motivational influences of CS over the learned responses from the instrumental phase. This phase 
would be performed under extinction, meaning the CS no longer predicted learnt outcomes. 
Behaviour from this last phase can model two PIT processes – specific and general transfer. Specific 
transfer refers to the selective effect of CS on responses related to the same outcome. Using the above 
example, animals are thought to demonstrate a specific transfer when the tone predicting sucrose 





involves an overall motivational influence of the CS on instrumental responding. Again using this 
example, a general transfer is said to occur when the tone predicting the delivery of a banana slice 
(which is not involved in initial training) enhances responding for both sucrose and food pellet levers.  
  It is thought that specific transfer reflects previous action-outcome learning while general transfer 
depends solely on the valence of the Pavlovian (CS) cue. We can observe examples of specific and 
general transfer in daily human life; seeing an advertisement for a particular clothing brand may elicit 
the desire to purchase an item belonging to the brand in question (specific transfer) as well as increase 
motivation to shop for other goods or from other stores (general transfer). In terms of studying 
psychopathology, the PIT paradigm is often utilised in addiction research to understand how 
Pavlovian cues (such as sounds coming from a pub) enhance desire for the consumption of drugs and 
alcohol (Garbusow et al., 2019; Hogarth et al., 2019; van Timmeren et al., 2020). There has been less 
consideration for how PIT effects are associated with the maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Contrasting with an appetitive PIT, which enhances desirable or motivational aspects, 
Pavlovian cues might modulate aversive aspects of a stimulus, thereby heightening patients’ desire 
to seek safety or avoid harm. This is in line with the aforementioned harm avoidance model of OCD. 
For instance, a person with OCD whose worries and urges revolve around disease and injury may be 
triggered to seek reassurance or wash themselves compulsively when close to potentially 
contaminated areas or when watching news reports of disease outbreak on television.  
  Relevant to the previous discussion of goal-directed and habitual behaviour, PIT tasks can probe 
how goal-directed outcome-response associations established in the instrumental phase transform to 
become habitual stimulus-response associations in the PIT phase (Garofalo & Robbins, 2017), as 
responses here are conducted under extinction. Additionally, it is reported that separate learning 
mechanisms underlie the types of transfer in the task, whereby specific PIT reflects more model-
based behaviour as it involves the matching of the correct instrumental response to a conditioned 
stimulus in order to achieve a desired outcome, while general transfer is elicited from the implicit 
motivational properties of the Pavlovian cue, and is hence more reflective of model-free behaviour 
(Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Concretely, specific transfer has been discovered to be associated with 
higher order cognitive skills but not general transfer (Garofalo, Battaglia, & di Pellegrino, 2019).  
   Some authors propose that the lateral OFC and its projections into striatum underlie the ability to 
successfully use Pavlovian cues to guide specific instrumental actions (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; 
Ostlund & Balleine, 2007). Hence, it may be that adults and children with OCD, who generally show 





et al., 2008; Woolley et al., 2008), would be less accurate at integrating the instrumental and 
Pavlovian influences necessary to conduct specific transfer on PIT paradigms. Moreover, as 
described in other sections of this thesis, children and adolescents with OCD are reported to be 
impaired in both instrumental and explicit learning (Gottwald et al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010), 
suggesting that young patients may be unable to adequately learn the fundamental instrumental and 
Pavlovian contingencies needed for specific transfer. Hence, they may only be able to show general 
transfer, which is a cognitively simpler action supposedly tapping into model-free processes. 
  Only one published study hitherto has explored PIT in relation to OCD. Using an aversive PIT task, 
Krypotos and Engelhard (2020) found that healthy adults with high obsessive-compulsive traits 
displayed less specific transfer responses compared to adults with lower traits indicating that the high 
trait group were worse at generalising learnt associations during the PIT phase. It can be inferred that 
this deficit is associated with decreased model-based behaviour as well as reduced lateral OFC 
functioning in populations with OCD (Voon, Baek, et al., 2015; Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015; 
Wheaton et al., 2019). No differences in general transfer were seen between high trait and low trait 
adults in Krypotos and Engelhard’s study, further demonstrating greater model-free reliance in this 
population.  
  In this current study, a PIT task previously employed by Garofalo and Robbins (2017) was 
administered to adolescents with OCD and healthy matched controls. The PIT task used was aversive 
in nature to probe instrumental and Pavlovian processing, as well as specific and general transfer 
under fearful contexts in the adolescents with OCD. Loud aversive sounds were used as the USs as 
this type of stimuli has been successfully used in prior fear conditioning experiments involving 
children with OCD (Geller et al., 2017; McGuire et al., 2016). Participants were instructed to learn 
to avoid the noises by moving a joystick in the correct direction. It was hypothesised that adolescents 
with OCD would show weaker specific transfer reflecting reduced model-based control and lateral 
OFC dysfunction in this population, but intact general transfer, similar to Krypotos & Engelhard’s 
(2020) findings. Furthermore, as harm avoidance is prevalent in those with OCD, I hypothesised that 
adolescent patients would display increased responses overall during the Instrumental and PIT phases 








Originally, 41 participants (21 CTl, 20 OCD) were projected to complete this task, however 1 
participant with OCD was tested outside of Cambridge and was not able to come to the laboratory to 
be administered the PIT task. Another control participant was not able to complete the task due to 
equipment failure. Hence, thirty-nine participants completed the PIT task, with 19 adolescents 
diagnosed with OCD forming the OCD group and 20 healthy adolescents forming the CTL group. 
Eleven adolescents with OCD were receiving SSRI treatment when they completed the task while 8 
were medication-naïve. Out of the 11 medicated patients, 8 were receiving sertraline while 3 were 
receiving fluoxetine. Mean SSRI dosage was 97.27 mg (s.d. 58.33) and the dose ranged from 20 mg 
to 200 mg. IQ and digit span data was missing from one OCD participant. Further demographic 
details are outlined in the Results section of this chapter. 
3.2.2 Equipment 
To collect skin conductance responses (SCR) during the PIT task (see Procedure below), I attached 
Vermed disposable Galvanic Skin Response snap electrodes to each participants’ fingertips (middle 
and index fingers) on their non-dominant hands. These electrodes were connected to a DC amplifier 
(Biopac Systems –MP150 – GSR100). A gain factor of 5 µS/V and low-pass filter set at 0.05 Hz 
were used for recording the analogue signal, which was then passed through the digital converter at 
a 200 Hz rate. The signal was fed into AcqKnowledge 3.9 (Biopac Systems). During certain phases 
of the task, participants were instructed to respond to stimuli by moving a joystick left or right. An 
isometric hand dynamometer (Biopac Systems—MP150—TSD121C—DA100C) attached to the 
base of the joystick was used to record hand grip compression (vigour) responses from participants. 
A transducer inserted inside the joystick converted grip pressure into signals fed into AcqKnowledge 
3.9. Participants were told to squeeze the joystick, where the transducer was located, every time they 
moved the joystick left or right.  
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a desktop screen with a joystick located on the table in front of 
them. They were required to wear headphones throughout the task, as well as electrodes on their 
middle and index fingertips to record their SCRs (see Figure 3.1). Before beginning the task, the 
volume of the unpleasant noises was calibrated according to individual tolerance levels. We advised 
each participant that the noises would be irritating without being at all painful. Participants completed 






FIGURE 3.1: SET-UP OF EQUIPMENT FOR PAVLOVIAN-TO-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER STUDY. PARTICIPANTS WERE 
SEATED IN FRONT OF A DESKTOP COMPUTER WEARING HEADPHONES. THEY USED A JOYSTICK (CONNECTED TO A 
HAND DYNAMOMETER TO MEASURE GRIPPING FORCE) TO INTERACT WITH THE TASK. ELECTRODES WERE 
ATTACHED TO THE PARTICIPANTS’ INDEX AND MIDDLE FINGERTIPS TO MEASURE SCRS. SCR SIGNALS WERE FED 
THROUGH A BIOPAC DC AMPLIFIER AND DATA WAS COLLECTED ON A SEPARATE LAPTOP RUNNING 
ACQKNOWLEDGE 3.9 SOFTWARE. 
 
3.2.4 Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer Task 
The task consisted of 3 experimental phases, namely Instrumental Conditioning, Pavlovian 
Conditioning, and the PIT phases, which are described in detail below. The entire task was presented 
using the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA). 
Phase1: Instrumental Conditioning 
The aim of this phase was to train participants to create an instrumental association between goal-
directed responses (moving the joystick left or right) and unconditioned stimuli (two aversive noises 
labelled US1 and US2). We used a ‘Space Mission’ narrative to keep participants engaged throughout 
the task. They were told that they were currently under attack on their mission, and their goal was to 
avoid being hit by two possible attacks, namely ‘bombs’ and ‘missiles’ presented as cartoon images 
on screen. Each attack was associated with 1 of 2 aversive noises (either US1 or US2) played at the 
same time as the image. Participants were told they could avoid hearing the noises if they moved the 
joystick in time either to the left or right. They were also told that there was a preferred direction that 
could stop each attack.  
During the game (see Figure 3.2), each trial began with a visual message displaying “defend yourself” 
for 2s alongside an image of the US (bomb or missile) that was about to come. For the following 30s 





1.5s – 3s). If participants successfully moved the joystick in the correct direction, they would be 
shown an image displaying ‘Avoided’ for 1s and no noise would be delivered. USs were able to be 
avoided by moving the joystick the correct way only 80% of the time, but participants were not told 
of this. Instead, they were advised that if an attack still occurred despite moving in the correct 
direction, it was due to them not squeezing the joystick with enough strength. 
Before beginning the instrumental conditioning phase, participants first completed a training session 
with 4 trials that was identical to the actual phase except without any noises delivered whenever they 
were ‘hit’. During the real phase, participants underwent 8 trials in total (4 trials featuring US1 and 
4 trials featuring US2). The duration of the phase was approximately 8 minutes. The association 
between instrumental response (left/right) and type of attack (US1/US2) was counterbalanced across 
participants. At the end of this phase, I assessed explicit learning by asking participants to pair each 
US with its corresponding avoidance responses. Participants also rated how confident they were in 
their pairings on a scale from 1-9. Lastly, they were instructed to rate how much they wanted to avoid 
the attacks on a scale from 1-9 (as a measure of level of aversion). 
 
FIGURE 3.2: PRESENTATION OF 1 TRIAL DURING THE INSTRUMENTAL PHASE. PARTICIPANTS WERE ABLE TO 
RESPOND AS MUCH AS THEY WANTED WITHIN A 30 SECOND WINDOW. THEIR GOAL WAS TO LEARN TO MOVE THEIR 








Phase 2: Pavlovian Conditioning 
In this phase, I aimed for participants to passively learn the associations between different images 
and USs. Before beginning this phase, participants rated on a scale from 1-9 how much 4 different 
images of outer space appealed to them. These 4 images were later used as conditioned stimuli (CS). 
Participants were presented with new instructions informing them that they would ‘travel across 
different galaxies’ while still experiencing attacks. The two USs from the Instrumental phase were 
re-used here, alongside one new US featuring an image of dynamite and a different aversive noise 
(US3). Moreover, participants were told that due to malfunction, they would no longer be able to use 
the joystick to defend themselves against the attacks. Their goal now was to gather information to 
further their mission, namely by learning which US was presented most frequently alongside each 
CS (see Figure 3.3). 
There were 68 trials in total (17 trials for each of the 4 CS/images), and the phase lasted 15 minutes 
in total. In each trial, one of the 4 CS were presented to participants followed by either the US 
(aversive noise + image of attack, either bomb, rocket or dynamite) or a message saying ‘Avoided’. 
These outcomes lasted 1s and were presented 4.5s after CS onset. In between trials, there was a 
variable interval ranging from 7s-9s. Two of the scenes (CS1 and CS2) were paired with US1 and 
US2 from the Instrumental phase, while CS3 was paired with the new US3. The fourth scene (CSm) 
was not associated with any noise, and always displayed ‘Avoided’ when presented on screen. The 
pairings of different USs with CSs was counterbalanced across participants. 
After the phase concluded, participants were asked to explicitly tell the experimenter which CS was 
paired with each US. Participants also rated how confident they were in their pairings on a scale from 
1-9. In addition, participants rated once more on a scale from 1-9 how much the space scenes 






FIGURE 3.3: IMAGES OF SPACE WERE USED AS THE CS IN THE PAVLOVIAN PHASE. DIFFERENT UNPLEASANT 
SOUNDS (US) WERE DELIVERED DEPENDING ON THE CS BEING PRESENTED. THE NEUTRAL CS (CSM) HAD NO 
NOISE PRESENTED ALONGSIDE IT. 
Phase 3: Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer 
Here, we aimed to test the ability of Pavlovian cues (CSs) to trigger instrumental avoidance responses 
even when they were no longer associated with any aversive US (under extinction). This phase was 
identical to the Instrumental Conditioning phase except the aversive noises were no longer delivered 
and images of the attacks (bomb, missile, dynamite) were no longer presented. Images of outer space 
that previously served as different CSs were presented in the background of each trial (see Figure 
3.4).  
At the beginning of this phase, participants were told that their joystick had resumed working, and 
that they could use it to defend themselves again. However, they would no longer be told at the start 
of each trial what attack was about to come. They were told that they should still respond with the 
joystick to avoid any possible attacks. In reality, no noises were delivered throughout the entire phase. 
Participants underwent 6 trials for each CS condition (a total of 24 trials) and for a duration of 






FIGURE 3.4: STIMULUS PRESENTATION DURING THE PIT PHASE. PARTICIPANTS WERE TOLD TO RESUME 
RESPONDING USING THE JOYSTICK WHEN PRESENTED WITH DIFFERENT CS, BUT THEY WERE NOT TOLD THAT NO 
NOISES WOULD BE DELIVERED IN THIS PHASE.  
 
 
3.3 Statistical Analyses 
Analyses and data cleaning were conducted using AcqKnowledge 5.0, Matlab R2017b, and RStudio 
3.5.  
Prior to all analyses, the Levene’s test was used to assess homogeneity of variance while the Shapiro-
Wilke’s test was used to assess normality. 
3.3.1 Instrumental Conditioning Phase 
Learning was assessed in this phase by examining the effects of US (US1 & US2) and Group (CTL 
& OCD) on percentage of correct responses (whenever a participant moved the joystick in the 
reinforced direction for each US) made. Due to violation of the normality assumption, a non-
parametric version of a mixed-Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) that uses approximate degrees of 
freedom called the mixed Welch-James from the ‘welchADF’ package in RStudio (Villacorta, 2017) 
was used to assess this and other measures reported below. The main test statistic is the TWJ similar 
in interpretation to the F statistic that is output from conducting standard ANOVAs. Generalised eta-
squared (η2G) values were calculated and reported as measures of effect size, with 0.02, 0.13, and 





To measure any distinctions in urges to avoid the USs between groups, a further Welch-James test 
was conducted with mean number of responses as the dependent variable and with Group and US as 
independent variables. If one group had more of an urge to avoid the US, the mean responses made 
by that group would be higher. Likewise, if one US was considered more aversive than the other, it 
would elicit an increased number of responses.   
I investigated how accurate groups were in explicitly reporting which US was paired with which 
response using a Fisher’s exact test for count data. Participants' confidence ratings for this explicit 
association test were analysed using a Welch-James test with Group and US as independent variables.  
Explicit ratings of urge to avoid USs were analysed using a rank-sum Wilcoxon test. Confidence and 
urge ratings were converted to proportions by dividing each raw score by 9 (which is maximum 
rating on the scales).   
3.3.2 Pavlovian Conditioning Phase 
The only behavioural data collected in this phase were liking ratings of CSs before and after 
Pavlovian trainings, an explicit CS-US associations test, and confidence ratings of explicit CS-US 
associations. Group differences in CS-US explicit associations per CS-type were analysed using 
Fisher’s exact test. Confidence and liking ratings were converted to proportions by dividing each raw 
score by 9 (maximum rating on the scales). Confidence ratings were analysed using a mixed Welch-
James test with Group and US as independent variables. Liking ratings were also analysed using a 
mixed Welch-James test with Group as the between-subjects’ variable, and CS (CS1, CS2, CS3, 
CSm) and time (before and after Pavlovian training) as the within-subject variables. Post-hoc 
Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction were used for post-hoc comparisons of liking ratings 
between the different CSs.  
3.3.3 SCR Analysis 
SCR analyses were only conducted in the Pavlovian phase to determine whether subjects had learnt 
to implicitly distinguish between the aversive CSs and CSm. SCRs were not analysed in the 
Instrumental and PIT phases as the movement of the joystick during data acquisition resulted in 
artefacts in the SCR data.  
Following data collection, peak-to-peak amplitude of event-related SCR signals were extracted using 
Autonomate version 2.8 (Green, Kragel, Fecteau, & LaBar, 2014) which was run as a toolbox in 
Matlab R2017b. Autonomate was used as it is a straightforward method of analysing SCR amplitude 
enabling automatic data pre-processing (using down sampling, which reduces the sampling rate in 





isolation of overlapping responses, and amplitude output.  The time window for the peak-to-peak 
amplitude of the largest signal deflection was set at 0.5s - 4.5s after the onset of each stimulus. The 
detection slope (minimum slope amplitude required to be coded as a SCR) was set at 0.02 μS/s. 
Default values provided by Autonomate were used for all other parameters: the detection length 
(minimum length of the rising period for a potential response to be considered valid) was 0.7s, the 
down sampling factor (by which the input data are down sampled prior to analysis) was 25, the buffer 
length (the size of the search window applied to the beginning and end of valid response periods of 
the down sampled data when looking for the response trough and peak in the non-down sampled 
data) was 0.125, maximum responses (maximum number of responses that can be detected in a time 
window before the data are considered too noisy for analysis) was set at 8, and the sampling rate was 
set at 200Hz. 
After processing using Autonomate, individual SCRs were z-transformed using the average and 
standard deviation of each subject’s SCR amplitudes over the entire Pavlovian phase (as was 
previously done by Gillan et al., 2014) For each participant, the first 9 trials were collapsed and 
designated ‘Block 1’ while the last 8 trials were collapsed and designated ‘Block 2’. To investigate 
learning over time using SCRs, a mixed-ANOVA was used to assess mean z-scored SCR amplitudes 
with Group as a between-subjects’ variable, and Block (1 and 2) and CS (CS1, CS2, CS3, CSm) as 
within-subject variables. If participants implicitly learnt the associations between CSs and USs, I 
expected to observe increased SCR over time for CSs 1,2, and 3, and decreased SCR over time for 
CSm.  
3.3.4 PIT Phase 
Specific PIT was investigated by exploring only the effects of CS1 and CS2 (collapsed) on mean 
number of responses and force. Responses were classified as congruent (going in the same direction 
that was reinforced in the Instrumental phase towards the corresponding CS) or incongruent (going 
in the opposite direction to the one that was reinforced). A mixed Welch-James test was conducted 
with mean number of responses as the dependent variable, Congruence (Congruent vs Incongruent) 
as the within-subjects’ variable, and group as the between-subjects’ variable.  
General PIT was investigated by only considering the effects of CS3 and CSm on mean number of 
responses and force. A mixed Welch-James test was conducted with mean number of responses as a 
dependent variable, CS (CS3 & CSm) as a within-subjects’ variable and Group as a between-





3.3.5 Grip Analysis 
Force measures obtained via grip strength over the hand dynamometer were recorded in kilograms 
(Kg) and extracted from the continuous signal by calculating the mean maximum amplitude per event 
per trial. These measures were used as a further measure of general PIT. The data were extracted per 
subject using AcqKnowledge 5.0. A mixed Welch-James test was conducted on mean force 
amplitudes with Group as the between-subjects’ variable and CS (CS3 & CSm) as the within-
subjects’ variable. Participants who did not make any responses to either CS3 or CSm, or both were 
excluded from this analysis.  
All analyses were then repeated with OCD split into MED- and MED+ to explore the effects of 
medication on PIT performance.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 CTL vs OCD 
Thirty-nine participants (20 CTL and 19 OCD) completed the Pavlovian-to-Instrumental task. 
Demographic, clinical, and intelligence scores are summarised in Table 3.1. OCD and CTL were 
matched for age, gender, and IQ. OCD displayed significantly increased depression, anxiety, and 

















Table 3.1: Demographic, intelligence, and clinical scores and comparisons 
Key: CTL: Control Group; OCD: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child Yale-Brown Obsessive-





CTL (n = 20) OCD (n = 19)  STATISTIC 
GENDER (F:M) 13:7 12:7 χ2(1) = 0.014; p = .90 
AGE 15.95 ± 2.05 
16.29 ± 1.74 
t(37) =-0.56; p = .58 
WASI-II (IQ)a 
111.75 ± 10.29 107.63 ± 13.96 
t(37) =1.05; p = .30 
Digit Spana 
(Forwards) 11.05 ± 2.63  11.21 ± 2.19 
Z = -0.043 ; p = .97 
Digit Spana 
(Backwards) 8.40 ± 2.44 8.05 ± 1.87 
Z = 0.93; p = .35 
BDI** 
45.2 ± 6.89 59.05 ± 9.55 
Z = -4.00; p =  6.902e-05 
BAI** 47.85 ± 9.55 67.52 ± 10.10 t(26.89) = -7.56; p =  4.00e-08 
OCI** 8.85 ± 7.13 30.47 ± 15.31 t(37) = -5.70; p =  1.592e-06 
Y-BOCS N/A 






Instrumental Conditioning Phase 
When assessing learning of the instrumental condition, it was found that CTL (US1: 88.89 ± 15.35; 
US2: 87.86 ± 16.86) and OCD (US1:89.70 ± 10.97; US2: 88.17 ± 14.79) both showed satisfactory 
performance (see Figure 3.5). There were no differences in learning between groups (p = 0.90). 
Additionally, there was no effect of US-type on learning (p = .50). Moreover, most participants 
responded correctly when asked to explicitly indicate the correct avoidance response for US1 
(Participants who responded correctly, CTL: 18/20; OCD:16/19) and US2 (Participants who 
responded correctly, CTL: 19/20; OCD:16/19). Fisher’s tests showed no group differences in explicit 
rating accuracy for US1 (p = 1.00) and US2 (p = 0.60). There was no difference in confidence ratings 
between CTL and OCD (p = .84), as well as between confidence ratings for US1 and US2 (p = .33). 
 
FIGURE 3.5: BOTH CTL AND OCD RESPONDED MOSTLY CORRECTLY TO US1 AND US2 IN THE INSTRUMENTAL 
PHASE.   
 
Next, there were no differences in number of responses (see Figure 3.6) made towards US1 and US2 
(p = .18) or between CTL and OCD (p = 0.66). CTL and OCD were also comparable in their explicit 






FIGURE 3.6: NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS IN MEAN NUMBER OF AVOIDANCE RESPONSES MADE 
TO EACH US.  
 
Pavlovian Conditioning Phase 
Two CTL participants did not show any SCRs and were hence excluded from this analysis. When 
considering the mean SCR amplitudes per group and per CS in this phase (see Figure 3.7), the mixed-
ANOVA showed a main effect of CS, F (3,102) = 2.95; p = .036; η2G = 0.036. Post-hoc t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction revealed that overall CS3 elicited greater SCR amplitudes compared to CS2 
(t(71) =3.17; p = .014). There were no significant differences in SCRs elicited by CSm compared to 
any of the CS+s, which made it difficult to ascertain whether participants were implicitly able to 
discriminate between the neutral and aversive CSs. There was also no main effect of Group (p = .51) 






FIGURE 8.7: MEAN Z-SCORED SCR AMPLITUDE FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE PAVLOVIAN PHASE (BLOCK1) AND 
THE SECOND HALF (BLOCK 2). OVERALL, THERE WAS A MAIN EFFECT OF CS, WHEREIN POST-HOC TESTS REVEALED 
CS3 ELICITED SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER SCRS COMPARED TO CS2. NO OTHER DIFFERENCES WERE FOUND.   
 
Next, I considered participants’ explicit responses. One CTL’s responses were missing due to 
software failure. It was found that CTL were able to explicitly associate the US with the CS in this 
phase (Answered correctly - CS1: 19/19, CS2: 18/19, CS3: 19/19). Most OCD also responded 
correctly (Answered correctly - CS1: 16/19, CS2: 16/19, CS3: 17/19). Fisher’s tests revealed no 
significant differences in accuracies for each of the CS (CS1: p = .23; CS2: p = .60; CS3: p = .49).  
When investigating confidence ratings for this phase, I found a significant main effect of Group 
(TWJ(1,22.21) = 9.64, p = .0051; η2G = 0.15), where OCD (0.84±0.20) made lower confidence ratings 
than CTL (0.96±0.067) – see Figure 3.8. There was also a significant main effect of CS-type 
(TWJ(2,19.63) = 3.63, p = .046; η2G = 0.038). Post-hoc paired Wilcoxon tests revealed CS1 elicited 
lower ratings than CS3 (CS1: 0.87±0.18; CS3: 0.94±0.12; Z = -2.18, p = .029). There were no 
differences in ratings elicited between CS1 and CS2 (CS2: 0.91±0.17; p = .16) and between CS2 and 






FIGURE 3.8: CONFIDENCE RATINGS DURING PAVLOVIAN PHASE PLOTTED BY CS-TYPE AND GROUP. OCD 
DISPLAYED LOWER CONFIDENCE RATINGS REGARDLESS OF CS-TYPE. ADDITIONALLY, OVERALL CS1 ELICITED 
LOWER CONFIDENCE RATINGS COMPARED TO CS3.  
 
Following this, the Welch-James test investigating liking ratings of the CSs revealed a significant 
effect of time (TWJ(1,36.99) = 7.26, p = .011; η2G = 0.007) and a time by CS interaction (TWJ(3,28.93) 
= 6.60, p = .0016; η2G = 0.014). The significant effect of time indicated that liking ratings across the 
CS decreased from pre-conditioning to post-conditioning. Furthermore, post-hoc rank-sum Wilcoxon 
tests revealed that CS1 (Z = 1.30, p = .097), 2 (Z = 2.53, p = .0056), and 3 (Z = 2.73, p = .0031), 
decreased in their ratings from pre- to post- conditioning, but CS- significantly increased in liking 
ratings (Z = -2.13, p = .017).  
Although results from the SCR analysis were unclear, the explicit associations and liking ratings 
indicated that participants were, on average, able to learn the CS-US associations.    
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Phase 
First specific PIT was assessed (see Figure 3.9). A significant effect of Congruence was found over 
the mean number responses, wherein more congruent responses were made compared to incongruent 
responses (TWJ(1,35.28) = 5.34, p = .027; η2G = 0.059). There was no effect of Group (p = .78) 






FIGURE 3.9: THE MEAN NUMBER OF CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT RESPONSES WERE ASSESSED AS A MEASURE 
OF SPECIFIC PIT (COLLAPSING ACROSS CS1 AND CS2). PARTICIPANTS MADE MORE CONGRUENT RESPONSES 
COMPARED TO INCONGRUENT, INDICATING SUCCESSFUL SPECIFIC TRANSFER. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN GROUPS.  
 
Next, general PIT was assessed first by measuring the mean number of responses made towards CS3 
and CSm (see Figure 3.10). There was a significant effect of CS (TWJ(1,21.75) = 4.40, p  = .048; η2G 
= 0.041) wherein more responses were made in response to CS3 compared to CSm. Next, I 
considered participants’ force data and also found a trend for more force applied to CS3 compared 
to CSm (TWJ(1, 27.80) = 4.18, p  = .051; η2G = 0.029) – see Figure 3.11. Three CTL and 2 OCD 
were excluded from the force analysis as they did not make any responses to CSm. In both general 
PIT analyses, there was no effect of Group (number of responses: p = .56; force: p = .56), indicating 






FIGURE 3.10: GENERAL PIT WAS FIRST ASSESSED BY INVESTIGATING THE MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES MADE 
TOWARDS CS3 AND CSM. THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT OF CS, WHERE PARTICIPANTS MADE MORE 
RESPONSES TO CS3 COMPARED TO CSM (REGARDLESS OF GROUP). THIS REVEALS THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE 
ABLE TO CONDUCT GENERAL TRANSFER.  
 
FIGURE 3.11: GENERAL PIT WAS FURTHER ASSESSED BY CHECKING THE AMOUNT OF FORCE APPLIED ON THE 





PARTICIPANTS TO APPLY MORE FORCE WHEN RESPONDING TO CS3 COMPARED TO CSM (WITH NO DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN GROUP).  
Unfortunately, as a result of software issues (in Acqknowledge 3.9) some participants were missing 
a small proportion of event triggers (that signal the beginning of a new trial) in their force data files. 
Due to the inter-trial interval being variable, it was not possible to precisely pinpoint when the event 
triggers were meant to occur, and as a result force responses associated with missing event triggers 
had to be discarded from the analyses. There was no significant difference in mean number of events 
removed per participant between groups (CTL: 1.5 ± 2.12; OCD: 1.37 ± 1.86; Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test: p = 1.00). Additionally, there were no noticeable differences in proportion of events missing per 
CS-type (CS1: .056, CS2: .060, CS3: .043, CSm: .068; χ2(3) =1.63; p = .65). 
 
3.4.2 Exploratory Medication Analyses 
The analyses were repeated dividing OCD into MED- and MED+. This analysis is termed 
exploratory as the sample size in each group is limited. MED- and MED+ had significantly higher 
anxiety, depression, and OCD severity scores compared to CTL, but MED- and MED+ were 




















Table 3.2: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and statistical test. 
 
CTL (n = 
20) 
MED- 
(n = 8)  






13:7 6:2 6:5 χ2(1) = 0.014; p = .90 N/A 




16.27 ± 1.86 









108.81 ± 15.03 







 12.0 ± 
2.00 
10.64 ± 2.66 




(Backwards)a 8.40 ± 2.44 
7.63 ± 
2.20 
8.36 ± 1.63 
χ2(2) = 1.75; p = .42 N/A 
BDI** 
45.2 ± 6.89 
57.5 ± 
11.43 
60.18 ± 8.33 
χ2(2) = 16.12; p = 
.00032 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+  




66.55 ± 10.03 
F(2,36) = 29.18, p = 
2.93e-08 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+  




29.00 ± 13.82 F(2,36) = 16.19, p = 
9.66e-06 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+  
CY-BOCS N/A 24.88 ± 
6.24 
22.18 ± 4.29 
t(17) = 1.12, p = .28 N/A 
 Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); 
OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; a missing data from 
one MED- participant. 
Post-hoc tests revealed that compared to CTL, MED+ and MED- had elevated depression (Pairwise 
Dunn’s tests, MED- vs CTL: p = .021, MED+ vs CTL: p = .00072), anxiety (Pairwise t-tests, MED- 
vs CTL: t(36) = 6.23; p = 1.03e-06, MED+ vs CTL: t(36) = 6.17; p = 1.22e-06), and obsessive-





= 4.50; p = .00021). There were no differences on these measures between MED- and MED+ (all p 
> .05).  
Briefly, there was no effect of medication status over all instrumental learning measures, specific 
transfer, and general transfer (all Group effects were p > .05).  
Nonetheless, there were effects of medication present during the Pavlovian phase. When making 
explicit associations between CSs and USs, 8/8, 7/8, and 8/8 MED- participants answered correctly 
for CS1, CS2, and CS3 respectively. The number of MED+ participants that answered correctly were 
as follows, CS1: 8/11, CS2: 9/11, and CS3: 10/11. There was a significant effect of medication status 
for CS1 accuracy (p = .026), but not for CS2 (p = .52) or CS3 (p = .12). When considering only CS1, 
MED+ answered less accurately than CTL (p = .041), but there were no differences between MED- 
and MED+ (p = .23) or between MED- and CTL (p = 1.00). 
Moreover, when investigating confidence ratings per CS-US association, there was a significant 
effect of medication status on confidence ratings (TWJ(1, 22.21) = 9.64, p  = .0051; η2G = 0.17). 
Post-hoc tests revealed that MED+ (0.82±0.20) had lower confidence ratings overall than CTL 
(0.96±0.067), Z = 4.02; p = .00018 – see Figure 3.12. There were no significant differences in 
confidence ratings between MED- (0.88±0.20) and CTL, p = .096, as well as between MED- and 
MED+, p = .55. 
There were no effects of medication detected when exploring CS liking ratings and SCR amplitudes 






FIGURE 3.12: CONFIDENCE RATINGS PER CS-US ASSOCIATION FROM PAVLOVIAN PHASE. OVERALL, MED+ 
DISPLAYED LOWER CONFIDENCE COMPARED TO CTL. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONFIDENCE 
RATINGS BETWEEN MED- AND CTL, AS WELL AS BETWEEN MED- AND MED+.  
 
3.4.3 Correlation Analyses 
When considering all participants, there was a significant relationship between verbal memory span 
(forwards digit span score) and number of responses to CS3 during the PIT phase (r = 0.34, p = .033).  
When considering only OCD, larger working memory span (backwards digit span score) was 
associated with less responses to CSm (r =-0.54, p = .017), indicative of better general transfer. Next, 
there initially appeared to be a significant effect of OCD severity: those with higher OCI scores (r = 
-0.61, p =.0056) and higher CY-BOCS scores (r = -0.46, p =.046) made fewer responses to CSm. 
However, age also correlated negatively with this measure (r = -0.57, p =.010), as well as showed a 
significant association with OCI scores (r = 0.53, p = .021) and marginally with CY-BOCS scores (r 
= 0.45, p =.054). Hence, I conducted a partial Pearson’s correlation analysis between OCD severity 
and mean responses to CSm whilst controlling for age. OCI scores (p = .066) and CY-BOCS (p = 
.26) scores were no longer significantly associated with decreased responses to CSm.  
Within MED+, medication dosage significantly correlated with IQ (r = 0.61; p =.049). 
Finally, there were no significant correlations between task measures and demographic/clinical 






3.4.4 Summary of Main Results 
CTL and OCD revealed equivalent learning during Instrumental and Pavlovian phases, however 
OCD were significantly less confident in their CS-US association ratings compared to CTL, which 
was driven primarily by the MED+ group. Next, CTL and OCD revealed intact specific transfer as 
both groups made more congruent responses to CSs that previously predicted USs from the 
instrumental phase. Both groups also displayed intact general transfer as they made more responses 
to CS3 (aversive stimulus only present in Pavlovian) compared to the neutral CS (CSm). There was 
also a trend for increased force applied in response to CS3 compared to CSm, which is also indicative 
of intact general transfer. In sum, there were no significant distinctions between CTL and OCD in 




  In this study, I aimed to probe the effects of aversive Pavlovian cues on instrumental avoidance, as 
well as indirectly investigate model-based behaviour and harm avoidance, in adolescents with OCD 
on a recently developed aversive Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) paradigm. All 
adolescents, regardless of OCD presence, revealed intact learning during instrumental and Pavlovian 
conditioning, and further displayed significant specific and general transfer effects during the PIT 
phase. Adolescent OCD patients did not show any tendencies for increased avoidance responding 
during instrumental and PIT phases, and rated their urges to avoid the aversive stimuli as being 
similar to controls. However, during Pavlovian conditioning, adolescents with OCD, particularly 
those medicated with SSRIs, had lower confidence in their explicit CS-US ratings. The medicated 
patients also showed slightly reduced accuracy in their explicit CS-US pairings.  
  The lack of overall group differences in learning and strength of specific/general transfer appear to 
contradict previous findings of reduced instrumental and implicit learning in adolescents and children 
with OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010). However, the task employed by Gottwald et al. 
(2018) was appetitive in nature, whereas the current study employed an aversive PIT paradigm. The 
aversive contexts present in the task may have motivated the adolescents with OCD to respond 
congruently during the PIT phase to enable successful avoidance of the unpleasant noises. Hence, it 
could be that a bias for model-free/habit-directed responding is only present in appetitive contexts 
where adolescent patients are perhaps less motivated to tap into model-based processes that are more 





anxiety and compulsivity (Wise & Dolan, 2020), further supporting OCD patients’ intact 
performance during aversive PIT. However, there are caveats to equating specific and general 
transfer to model-based and model-free processes respectively, which are discussed further on in this 
section. 
  Next, patients in my study did not make more avoidance responses nor report higher subjective 
urges to avoid the aversive stimuli than controls, indicating that punishment sensitivity is not 
enhanced in these patients with OCD. These results contrast with previous work highlighting loss or 
punishment aversion in adult patients with OCD (Endrass et al., 2011; Morein-Zamir et al., 2013), 
as well as subjective ratings of increased harm avoidance in paediatric patients (Bey et al., 2017; 
Cervin et al., 2020; Ecker & Gönner, 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008). However, emerging computational 
modelling evidence from probabilistic reversal learning paradigms suggests that adolescent and adult 
patients with OCD are not affected by punishing feedback (such as losing points) any more than are 
healthy controls ( Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019). It is possible that enhanced harm avoidance 
in OCD only occurs within a narrow range of circumstances, for example during shock avoidance 
paradigms (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Gillan et al., 2014) as shocks may be more 
threatening/painful than aversive auditory stimuli, or when patients’ symptoms are directly provoked 
(Banca, Voon, et al., 2015).  
  The only significant group difference detected was in confidence ratings of CS-US associations 
during the Pavlovian phase, where adolescents with OCD overall rated their confidence as being 
lower. This aligns with meta-memory research reporting reduced memory confidence, but intact 
memory performance in patients with OCD (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans et al., 2008; 
MacDonald et al., 1997; Tolin et al., 2001). However, no studies have directly probed meta-memory 
in adolescents with OCD except Farrell, Waters, Boschen, and Milliner (2011) who unfortunately 
did not compare their patients to a control group and hence we cannot infer whether meta-memory 
is predominantly atypical in juvenile-OCD. Meta-memory research typically employs paradigms that 
are designed to provoke stress and a sense of responsibility in individuals with OCD. For instance, 
the ‘stovetop task’ requires participants to check a virtual or real stovetop several times and to rate 
their confidence in remembering to check all the necessary knobs, thus simulating a scenario that 
would commonly trigger compulsive behaviour in individuals with OCD in real-life (Boschen & 
Vuksanovic, 2007; Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006). The Pavlovian phase in the current PIT 
paradigm may have also prompted stress in patients with OCD, especially as there was no way to 
defend themselves against incoming unpleasant noises. In contrast, patients’ memory confidence was 





the task outcomes, as they were able to prevent the delivery of the unpleasant noises by learning 
appropriate response-outcome associations.  
   Similar to Chapter 2, I have detected an effect of medication: medicated patients with OCD were 
slightly less accurate in matching USs to CSs and also reported the lowest memory confidence out 
of all groups in the Pavlovian phase. Unfortunately, past studies showing implicit and instrumental 
learning in youths with OCD did not explore the effects of medication on performance (Gottwald et 
al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010) and hence it is uncertain whether SSRIs do in fact play a role in these 
learning processes. Nevertheless, half of Vloet et al.’s subjects with OCD were medicated with SSRIs 
(10/20) while most adolescents with OCD in Gottwald et al.’s study were also medicated (23/36), 
suggesting a possible influence of SSRIs on learning. In addition, as highlighted in the Discussion 
section of Chapter 2, low dose SSRIs have been found to impair learning and flexibility in healthy 
participants (Skandali et al., 2018), and indeed in this current chapter SSRI dosage showed a 
significant positive relationship with IQ. Hence, there is a possibility that lower doses of SSRIs are 
disrupting learning and memory confidence in medicated patients, although this is speculative as 
memory confidence during the Pavlovian phase did not correlate with medication dosage.  
   Moreover, recently Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-prep) found that adults with OCD medicated with 
SSRIs were more impaired at acquisition learning (learning contingencies prior to a reversal) on a 
probabilistic reversal learning task compared to medication-naïve patients and control subjects. 
Authors suggest that the medicated patients may have had a more severe form of OCD to have 
necessitated psychotropic medication treatment. Similarly, it may be the case in this current, as well 
as previous, chapter that SSRIs successfully reduced clinician rated symptoms of OCD, which is why 
medicated and unmedicated patients showed comparable symptom severities, but deficits in 
cognition and meta-cognition remain especially impaired in the medicated group.  
  Despite their low confidence, the OCD group were generally able to learn CS-US associations 
similarly to controls during the Pavlovian phase as indicated by their explicit responses and CS liking 
ratings (participants’ liking ratings for the aversive CSs decreased while their liking of the CSm 
increased). Unfortunately, SCR results appeared to be uninformative of learning ability as 
participants’ SCR amplitudes showed no significant differentiation between the aversive CS and 
neutral CS. Instead, on average, CS3 significantly elicited higher SCRs compared to CS2, potentially 
due to CS3 being associated with a novel US in the Pavlovian phase. Overall, the SCR results may 
have been the result of equipment issues as previous fear conditioning studies have found that healthy 





(Geller et al., 2017; McGuire et al., 2016; Neumann, Waters, & Westbury, 2008). Although great 
care had been taken to ensure set-up of SCR apparatus and analyses were being done correctly, signal 
contamination may still have occurred.  
  Next, there is an emerging debate surrounding the cognitive processes being employed during 
specific and general transfer in PIT paradigms. The majority of PIT studies consider specific and 
general transfer to be a proxy for goal-directed and habit-directed behaviour respectively (Hogarth, 
Balleine, Corbit, & Killcross, 2013; Hogarth et al., 2019; van Timmeren et al., 2020). However, 
Garofalo and Robbins (2017) found in their aversive PIT study that outcome devaluation (explicit 
removal of the object delivering an outcome, in this case removal of headphones delivering 
unpleasant sounds) failed to decrease both specific and general transfer in healthy participants, 
suggesting that both types of transfer reflect more habitual responding. Moreover, overtraining, 
which is commonly considered to enhance habit-directed behaviour (Dayan & Berridge, 2014; 
Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2009; Yin & Knowlton, 2006) actually increased specific transfer 
in Garofalo and Robbins’ study. Additionally, stronger PIT effects, collapsed across specific and 
general transfer, have been reported to be negatively associated with model-based reasoning (Sebold 
et al., 2016). These results suggest that habitual/model-free processes are underlying both specific 
and general transfer, which may explain why adolescents with OCD were able to conduct both types 
of transfer similarly to healthy adolescents in my study. 
  Nonetheless, other studies employing appetitive PIT paradigms have demonstrated that outcome 
devaluation does reduce specific PIT responses in participants (Hogarth et al., 2019; van Timmeren 
et al., 2020), suggesting that specific PIT under appetitive contexts is goal-directed. Perhaps task 
valence is key here; in fearful or aversive contexts it may be crucial for safety behaviours to persist 
and become automatic, leading to such behaviours being present even though the previously aversive 
environment is now safe. In contrast, continuing to conduct reward-seeking behaviour in neutral 
environments that were previously appetitive is not as necessary for survival. This underscores why 
specific transfer responses appeared more habitual in Garofalo and Robbins’ (2017) aversive PIT 
task compared to in aforementioned studies employing appetitive PIT tasks. Research directly 
comparing the effects of aversive and appetitive PIT on behaviour is necessary to answer these 
pertinent queries.  
3.5.1 Limitations 
  Regrettably the SCR results were inconclusive, hence I was unable to replicate the finding of 





(2016)’s and Geller et al. (2017). Moreover, I was unable to verify from the SCR data whether 
participants had learnt the US-CS associations during the Pavlovian phase, although fortunately I 
was still able to confirm successful learning from participants' reports of explicit associations and 
liking ratings.    
  Next, due to technical issues, some participants were missing trials in their force data (see Results 
section), although this did not differ significantly between participant groups and CSs. Nevertheless, 
the missing data may have contributed to the relatively weaker effect of CS-type (whether CS3 or 
CSm) on force applied by participants, as Garofalo & Robbins (2017) reported their participants 
applied significantly more force towards CS3 compared to CS- in their study.  
  Lastly, the somewhat limited sample, especially when dividing the OCD group by medication 
status, makes it difficult at this stage to draw strong conclusions. Krypotos and Engelhard (2020) 
found significant results in their PIT study with 28 subjects in their high OC group, which suggests 
that slightly larger samples in each of my groups may reveal more prominent effects. 
3.5.2 Conclusion 
  Adolescents with OCD and healthy adolescents alike display intact instrumental and Pavlovian 
learning, alongside intact specific and general transfer on a novel aversive PIT paradigm. This 
indicates that adolescents with OCD are able to mobilize goal-directed faculties supposedly 
necessary to conduct specific transfer, although there is equivocation regarding whether specific 
transfer is indeed tapping into goal-directed processes. Moreover, there was no difference in 
frequency of avoidance responding between groups, suggesting that adolescent patients are not 
excessively harm avoidant. Next, adolescent patients are generally able to correctly learn 
instrumental and Pavlovian contingencies although medicated patients are slightly less accurate in 
explicitly pairing CS and US stimuli and also report lower memory confidence. This suggests that 
SSRI medication may be linked to disrupted implicit learning and reduced meta-memory. However, 
in spite of this, medicated patients were still able to conduct general and specific transfer to the same 
extent as other groups. In light of these results, it is clear that adolescents with OCD are generally 
unimpaired on deterministic tasks such as the PIT task and WCST from Chapter 2. Hence, the 
remainder of this thesis employs tasks with probabilistic structures (see Chapters 4-6) which better 








Chapter 4: Investigating Model-Based Decision-Making in 
Adolescents with OCD 
4.1 Introduction 
Researchers typically associate model-based and model-free reasoning with goal-directed and 
habitual behaviour respectively (Cushman & Morris, 2015; Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Doya, 
Samejima, Katagiri, & Kawato, 2002). Behaving in a model-based way is cognitively taxing as it 
involves building a mental decision-tree comprising all possible states, actions, and outcomes present 
in an environment (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Model-based learners use this cognitive map to constantly 
‘plan ahead’ in order to make optimal decisions, which requires a degree of goal-directed control. In 
contrast, model-free behaviour is less cognitively demanding as decision-making is based on 
prediction errors or most recent feedback instead of planning (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Model-free 
individuals learn from the immediate outcomes garnered after sampling choices; if the outcome 
gained is equivalent to what was predicted, an individual will continue applying the same strategy. 
If outcome and prediction differ, strategies are updated accordingly. Habitual responding, which 
simply involves continuously responding in the same way or to the same stimulus, is a characteristic 
strategy of model-based behaviour as it is a computationally efficient way of making decisions, albeit 
at the cost of behavioural flexibility (Cushman & Morris, 2015).  
   Research has demonstrated an imbalance between goal-directed and habitual control in individuals 
with OCD (Gillan & Robbins, 2014). Outcome devaluation tasks have been instrumental in 
highlighting this imbalance. Adults with OCD are more prone to responding to devalued stimuli 
(Gillan et al., 2014, 2011; Snorrason, Lee, de Wit, & Woods, 2016), suggestive of a reliance on more 
habitual strategies. Adolescents with OCD also display poor goal-directed control; an outcome 
devaluation study found they were worse at responding to valuable trials and withholding their 
responses to devalued trials (Gottwald et al., 2018). Moreover, paediatric patients display poor goal-
directed planning highlighted by their tendency to be slower and require more moves on planning 
tasks such as the TOL and SOC (Huyser et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2018; Ornstein et al., 2010). In fact, 
impaired goal-directed planning has been found in adult and child patients, as well as their first-
degree relatives (Bey et al., 2018; Cavedini et al., 2010; Delorme et al., 2007; Negreiros et al., 2019; 
Vaghi, Hampshire, et al., 2017), making it a candidate cognitive endophenotype and thus a robust 
feature of OCD. Moreover, prefrontal and striatal brain areas thought to underlie goal-directed and 





al., 2015; Bernstein et al., 2016; Gilbert et al., 2009; Gillan & Robbins, 2014; Vaghi, Vértes, et al., 
2017).  
   In neurotypical adults, model-free and model-based signatures of behaviour are thought to operate 
in parallel, and often compete for control (Daw et al., 2011). Studies have directly probed this using 
a two-stage decision task, considered to be a gold standard task for delineating model-free from 
model-based behaviour. The two-stage decision task also shows construct validity with outcome 
devaluation paradigms (Friedel et al., 2014), demonstrating that model-free and model-based 
behaviours are related to goal-directed and habitual control. In brief, the task involves participants 
navigating from a first stage to a second stage to gain rewards (see Methods section of this chapter 
for visualisation of this task). In Stage 1, there are two stimuli participants can choose from, one with 
a higher probability of transitioning to a state with one pair of stimuli, while the other has a higher 
probability of transitioning to a state with a different pair of stimuli. When in one of the these new 
states (which forms Stage 2), participants have to choose one of the stimuli to receive rewards.  The 
probabilities of the four Stage 2 choices providing rewarding feedback changes slowly and 
independently through a random Gaussian walk process. The extent of a subject’s model-based 
learning can be determined through observing their Stage 1 choices. A model-based learner would 
take into account transition probabilities (from Stage 1 to Stage 2), wherein they would make Stage 
1 decisions based on which Stage 2 state they are aiming to transition into (i.e. to the Stage 2 state 
that has a stimulus that offers more rewards at the time). In contrast, a model-free learner is more 
likely to make Stage 1 decisions based purely on which choice led to a rewarding outcome in the 
preceding trial. Adults with OCD reveal more model-free behaviour on the task than healthy controls, 
making choices based on which stimulus most recently offered rewards rather than attending to and 
making inferences from the task structure (Voon, Baek, et al., 2015; Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015; 
Wheaton et al., 2019). Additionally, dimensional psychiatry studies reveal that more model-free 
behaviour on the task is associated with increased compulsivity in healthy individuals (Gillan et al., 
2019; Gillan, Kosinski, Whelan, Phelps, & Daw, 2016). All in all, these results suggest that adults 
with OCD rely more on model-free strategies to make decisions over model-based ones.  
    Hitherto, research has not formally captured whether youths with OCD have reduced model-based 
control compared to typically developing adolescents. Model-based behaviour in healthy people has 
been found to emerge with age, as it is absent in children, increasingly present during adolescence, 
and finally strengthened in adulthood (Decker, Otto, Daw, & Hartley, 2016). However, a recent study 
has obtained evidence for model-based strategies being utilised even by young children; in an adapted 





low-stake (value of rewards were 1-fold), children as young as 5 years old were able to employ 
mostly model-based strategies when stakes were higher (Smid, Kool, Hauser, & Steinbeis, 2020). 
Intriguingly and most relevant to juvenile-OCD, development of model-based control is found to be 
reduced in adolescents who have had high compulsivity traits from a young age (Vaghi et al., 2020) 
which suggests that symptoms of OCD disrupt healthy maturation of model-based behaviour (Loosen 
& Hauser, 2020).  
4.1.1 Reinforcement Learning-Drift Diffusion Model 
   Nearly all studies employing the two-step decision-making task computationally model their data 
using a reinforcement learning model (first conceptualised by Daw et al., 2011) in order to derive 
estimates of model-based behaviour. In this model, the choices participants make at each stage of the 
task are used to estimate the model-based w parameter. High values of w indicate more model-based 
behaviour and vice versa. Additionally, likelihoods of choices are estimated using a softmax logistic 
function containing an inverse temperature parameter, but this method has been criticised for failing 
to capture the dynamics of decision-making. The inverse temperature parameter represents the extent 
to which subjects partake in value-driven over exploratory decision-making, but value-driven 
decision-making in itself is a complex process and the parameter is not informative of underlying 
factors contributing to a bias for either type of choosing. 
   Recently, computational psychiatry work is utilising a class of models known as drift-diffusion 
models (DDM) (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) to supplement existing reinforcement learning (RL) 
models and overcome the limitations of using a softmax choice rule. DDM aims to capture noisy 
processes leading up to a decision and it assumes that choices are made by continuously sampling 
noisy decision evidence until a decision boundary is reached in favour of one of two alternatives 
(Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016). This is done by modelling reaction times alongside 
choice data, enabling more detailed understanding of latent decision-making processes. 
Reinforcement learning studies have thus opted to combine standard RL models with DDM (leading 
to a new class of models termed RL-DDM) to reap the benefits of both types of models (Fontanesi, 
Gluth, Spektor, & Rieskamp, 2019; Pedersen, Frank, & Biele, 2017). A major benefit to using RL-
DDM is that it can be used to capture various factors contributing to decision-making, not just limited 
to feedback sensitivity and tendencies for exploitation/exploration, but also evidence accumulation 
efficiency and the trade-off between speed versus accuracy during response selection (Pedersen et 
al., 2017). In particular, RL-DDM can further disentangle processes contributing to value-driven 
decision-making which is only captured by the inverse temperature parameter in standard RL models. 





the more valuable option stems from clear and accurate representations of all choice values, favouring 
accurate over speedy decision-making, or from a tendency to favour exploitative over exploratory 
decision-making (Pedersen et al., 2017). In the context of model-based/model-free decision-making, 
Shahar et al. (2019) reported that fitting a RL-DDM to two-step decision-making task data led to 
more reliable estimates of the model-based w parameter. Moreover, parameters from the DDM 
portion of the model enabled better understanding of model-based decision-making. The drift rate 
scaling parameter (see Statistical Analyses section of this chapter for more details), which captures 
the extent to which subjects are able to discriminate between values associated with competing 
choices, correlated with model-based w values as well as predicted increased advantageous choice 
selection and quicker response times. This highlights that being able to discriminate effectively 
between choice values is indicative of greater model-based control.  
   Drift-diffusion models applied to perceptual decision-making tasks have been particularly 
informative in highlighting inefficient evidence accumulation in OCD: child and adult patients show 
reduced drift rate parameter values compared to healthy population (Banca, Vestergaard, et al., 2015; 
Erhan et al., 2017; Mandali et al., 2019) indicative of poor information processing and less perceptual 
discrimination between competing choices (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). In addition, patients 
show increased evidence accumulation and slower responding (indexed by a decision boundary 
parameter from DDM) when uncertainty is high but despite this increased cautiousness, patients do 
not make more accurate choices compared to controls, which is again suggestive of poor evidence 
processing (Banca, Vestergaard, et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2017; Mandali et al., 2019). Cautious 
decision-making without performance improvement has also been found in paediatric patients on 
goal-directed planning tasks (Kim et al., 2018; Ornstein et al., 2010). Collectively, these findings 
denote disrupted evidence accumulation to be the reason for impaired decision-making in OCD. In 
addition, as efficient evidence accumulation (measured via drift rates) is associated with model-based 
behaviour in the sequential decision-making task (Shahar et al., 2019), it is likely that poor model-
based control in OCD is also linked to patients’ disrupted evidence accumulation. 
   Therefore, in this current study I modelled two-step decision-making task data obtained from 
adolescents with OCD and healthy adolescents using a RL-DDM previously implemented by Shahar 
et al. (2019) in an effort to decompose several latent decision-making processes and explore how 
they link to model-based behaviour. Concretely, I sought to understand 1) whether model-based 
decision-making is indeed reduced in adolescents with OCD compared to healthy controls, if so 2) 
what are the decision-making processes contributing to this reduced model-basedness, and 3) are 





able to consider various factors contributing to reduced model-based behaviour and disrupted 
decision making, namely feedback sensitivity, a bias for exploratory/exploitative decision-making, 
maladaptive choice perseveration, poor information processing/value discrimination, and reduced 
speed of evidence accumulation. Additionally, using the RL-DDM which accounts for both choices 
and response times enabled more reliable and holistic estimates of model-based behaviour (Shahar 
et al., 2019). In line with prior work on adults with OCD, I hypothesised that adolescents with OCD 





Forty-one participants were recruited to complete the Sequential Decision Making task, however data 
for one control participant failed to be saved due to software issues. Thus, in total, 40 participants 
(20 OCD, 20 CTL) completed the task. Eleven patients with OCD were receiving SSRI medication 
at the time of completing the task, while 9 patients were medication-naïve. Out of the 11 medicated 
patients, 8 were receiving sertraline while 3 were receiving fluoxetine. Mean SSRI dosage was 97.27 
mg (s.d. 58.33) and the dose ranged from 20 mg to 200 mg. Digit span and IQ data is unavailable for 
one participant with OCD. Further demographic details are outlined in the Results section of this 
chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Sequential Decision-Making Task  
This task was originally used by (Decker et al., 2016) and was adapted from Daw et al.'s (2011) Two-
Step Markov Decision-Making task. The task was designed to distinguish between model-free and 
model-based decision-making strategies. This particular version was created with a child-friendly 
narrative and colourful imagery, designed to be engaging to young participants.   
Task 
Each trial in the task consisted of two choice stages (see Figure 4.1). In the first stage, participants 
chose between two spaceships; Choosing the blue spaceship had a 70% probability of transitioning 
to the red planet (common transition) and a 30% probability of transitioning to the purple planet (rare 
transition). Choosing the green spaceship was associated with opposite transition probabilities (30% 





or purple planet, forming Stage 2. In Stage 2, there were two aliens on each planet, and participants 
had to choose one of the aliens to uncover possible treasure. After choosing an alien, participants 
would either be presented with a picture of treasure or nothing, according to a slowly drifting 
probability between 0.2 and 0.8. This gradual changing reward-probability was to encourage 
exploration of choices. Participants had 3 seconds (s) in Stage 1 and Stage 2 to respond, otherwise 
the current trial would terminate and move on to the following trial. Following choices in Stage 2 
was 1s of animation, 1s of reward feedback, and a 1s inter-trial interval. The task consisted of 200 
trials separated into 4 blocks.  
At the end of the task, to ascertain knowledge of the task structure, participants were asked to select 
the spaceship that mostly went to the red planet.  
Tutorial  
Participants underwent an extensive tutorial to ensure they understood the task before moving on to 
the experimental phase. They were first introduced to the alien stimuli and were told that aliens were 
willing to share treasure with them. However, all aliens need to dig up mines to find treasure, and 
aliens with a good mine will provide more treasure compared to aliens with a bad mine. Furthermore, 
an alien with a good mine for now may not necessarily have a good mine later on, and vice versa for 
aliens with bad mines. This was to introduce participants to the idea that the probability of receiving 
rewards changes slowly between aliens. A series of interactive exercises was presented alongside 
instructions to ensure participants understood the concepts.  
Participants were then introduced to the spaceships, which form Stage 1 of the task. Participants were 
not made aware of the explicit transition probabilities associated with each spaceship, but were 
simply told that each spaceship goes to one planet more than the other. A practice round of 20 trials 
was conducted using aliens and planets that were different from the stimuli presented in the actual 
experimental phase of the task. After the practice, participants were given hints to further cement 
their understanding of the task: 
Hint 1 
Remember which aliens have treasure. How good a mine is changes slowly so an alien that has a lot 
of treasure to share now, will probably be able to share a lot in the near future 
 





Remember, each alien has its own mine.  Just because one alien has a bad mine and can't share very 
often, does not mean another has a good mine. Also, there are no funny patterns in how an alien 
shares (treasure) like every other time you ask or depending on which spaceship you took. The aliens 
are not trying to trick you. 
 
Hint 3 
The spaceship you choose is important because often an alien on one planet may be better than the 
ones on another planet.  You can find more treasure by finding the spaceship that is most likely to 
take you to right planet. 
 
FIGURE 4.1: STRUCTURE OF SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING TASK.  
 
The task was presented using Psychtoolbox-3 and Matlab R2017b. 
4.3 Statistical Analyses 
4.3.1 Standard Analyses 
Data cleaning and statistical analyses were implemented in Matlab R2017b and RStudio 3.5.0. 
Mixed regressions were used to analyse task data using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2014) implemented in R. Model-based behaviour was assessed using separate models for 





done by Decker et al. (2016). Trials in which subjects failed to make a first- or second-stage choice 
in time were also removed.  
A logistic mixed-effects regression model (previously done by Daw et al., 2011; Decker et al., 2016; 
Otto et al., 2013) was used to model first-stage choices (stay or switch to stimulus chosen on previous 
trial) as a function of the Stage 2 outcome from the previous trial (rewarded or not), the previous 
trial’s transition type (common or rare), and an interaction between the two. The rationale behind 
this regression model is that a purely model-free learner would ignore the last transition and rely 
primarily on previous outcome to make choices. If the previous trial was rewarded, model-free 
learners would be more likely to choose the same Stage 1 stimulus regardless of type of last transition. 
This translates to a significant main effect of the outcome variable in the regression model. Inversely, 
a model-based subject would have intact knowledge of transition structures and would hence only 
choose the same stimulus as the previous trial if the trial was rewarded and the last transition type 
was common. This would manifest as a significant outcome-by-last-transition interaction. To assess 
how experimental groups (OCD vs CTL) differ in their strategies to the task, group was added to the 
outcome-by-transition-type interaction term. Per subject variance to the fixed intercept and to the 
outcome-by-transition-type interaction term were added as random variables (see Equation 4.1). 
p(Ystay(t+1)) ~ Last-Transitiont x Outcomet x Groupt + (Transition-Typet x Outcomet | Subject) 
– Equation 4.1 
Probability of repeating Stage 1 choices was plotted as a function of Outcome and Transition-type. 
A model-free learner’s data would be similar to the idealised ‘Model-Free’ plot in Figure 4.2 and 
likewise, a model-based learner’s data would be similar to the idealised ‘Model-Based’ plot in the 






FIGURE 4.2: THE IDEALISED MODEL-FREE LEARNER (LEFT) WOULD SHOW A MAIN EFFECT OF PREVIOUS 
OUTCOME/REWARD BUT NOT TRANSITION-TYPE, WHILE THE IDEALISED MODEL-BASED LEARNER (RIGHT) WOULD 
SHOW A SIGNIFICANT OUTCOME-BY-TRANSITION-TYPE INTERACTION. 
Next, a linear mixed effects regression was used to model reaction times for Stage 2 choices. Current 
transition type (common, rare), Group, and an interaction between the two were added as independent 
variables (see Equation 4.2). Per subject variance to the fixed intercept and to the Current Transition 
term were added as random variables. Here, it was theorised that model-based learners would slow 
down Stage 2 responses following rare transitions and speed up following common transitions (show 
a significant effect of Current Transition), indicating that they had successfully learnt the task 
structure. 
RT2,t ~ Current Transition-Typet x Groupt + (Current Transition-Typet | Subject) – Equation 4.2 
Per subject beta coefficients/regression slopes associated with the Outcome-by-Last-Transition 
interaction term (termed MB-IChoice) from the choice regression model, and beta coefficients 
associated with the Current Transition term (termed MB-IIRT) from the response time regression 
model were extracted as measures of strength of model-based decision-making. Pearson’s 
correlations were conducted between clinical/demographic/intelligence scores and beta coefficients 
and computational model parameter values (described on next page).  
These analyses were then repeated controlling for age and IQ, as model-based reasoning has been 
found to strengthen with age (Decker et al., 2016) and is associated with higher order thinking skills 
(Otto, A. R., Skatova, A., Madlon-Kay, S., & Daw, 2015; Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013). 





unmedicated (MED-) groups to assess the effects of SSRI treatment on model-based ability in 
adolescent OCD.  
4.3.2 Reinforcement Learning Models 
The full reinforcement learning model for this task has been described in detail in prior studies (Daw 
et al., 2011). At each trial (t), the model takes into account the three states present in the task: Stage 
1 with rockets represented by s1,t, the planet experienced in Stage 2 represented by s2,t , and the planet 
not experienced represented by s3,t, as well as the actions (stimulus chosen) taken at each state (a1 for 
Stage 1 and a2 for Stage 1). The value of each Stage 1 choice stimulus (Q) at each trial is determined 
via the sum of two components: 1) the model-free value (QMF) that reflects the previous trial’s 
outcome (rewarded or not) in Stage 2 after choosing a specific stimulus in Stage 1 (i.e. the QMF value 
for a chosen Stage 1 stimulus would increase if the previous Stage 2 outcome is rewarding) and 2) 
the model-based value (QMB) that reflects the highest value out of the two stimuli in Stage 1, which 
is in turn based on whether a specific chosen stimuli is associated with a common transition towards 
a rewarding Stage 2 state (e.g. if the red planet in Stage 2 is more rewarding than the purple planet, 
QMB would be equal to the Q value of the blue rocket in Stage 1, as it has a higher probability of 
flying to the red planet when selected). In simpler terms, the model-free component takes into account 
Stage 2 reward history, while the model-based component takes into account both reward history and 
transition-type.  
In the model, the Stage 2 QMF was updated using a SARSA(λ) temporal difference learning model 
(Rummery and Niranjan, 1994): 
QMF(s2,t+1 ,a2,t+1)  = QMF(s2,t,a2,t)  +  α2δrew,t – Equation 4.3 
Where the reward prediction error, δrew,t, is defined by the the Stage 2 QMF subtracted from the Stage 
2 outcome, rt:   
 δrew,t = rt - QMF(s2,t,a2,t) – Equation 4.4 
rt is 1 when a reward is received, and 0 otherwise.  
Next, the Stage 1 QMF value was updated using both the reward prediction error and state prediction 
error (δstate,t): 
QMF(s1,t+1,a1,t+1)  = QMF(s1,t,a1,t)  + α1δstate,t +α1λδrew,t – Equation 4.5  





δstate,t = QMF(s2,t ,a2,t) –  QMF(s1,t ,a1,t) – Equation 4.6 
An eligibility trace parameter (λ) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) was used to reduce the influence of the 
reward prediction error, δrew,t, on the updating of Stage 1 QMF values. When λ = 1, both state and 
reward prediction errors are used to update the current Stage 1 choice value, but when λ = 0, only the 
state prediction error is taken into account. It is thought that a model-free learner would have high λ 
values which means that Stage 1 choices which led to rewards in Stage 2 were more likely to be 
repeated regardless of whether a common or rare transition preceded the reward (Daw et al., 2011).  
α in Equations 4.3 and 4.5 is a learning rate parameter used to control how quickly values of QMF 
change according to prediction errors, δi,t. In the full model, there are separate α (α1 and α2) for each 
stage to account for possible differences in learning between the two stages.  
As for model-based calculations, the temporal difference learning algorithm calculated the Stage 1 
action value (QMB) for each choice based on the transition probabilities that would lead to the Stage 
2 outcome: P(s2|a1) = 0.7 and P(s3|a1) = 0.3 for when choice 1 was chosen and P(s2|a1) = 0.3 and 
P(s3|a1) = 0.7 when choice 2 was chosen. The Stage 2 action values in this model-based approach are 
equivalent to model-free algorithm described above, as the Q-value here is just an estimate based on 
the immediate reward rt with no further stages to anticipate. Hence QMB  = QMF at Stage 2.  
The QMB in Stage 1 for each action, a, at Stage 1 was defined using Bellman’s equation as follows: 
QMB(aj,t) = P(s2|a1)*max[QMF(s2,t)] + P(s3|a1) *max[QMF(s3,t)] –Equation 4.7 
Here, the transition probabilities for each state were multiplied by the maximum QMF value of the 
Stage 2 state visited in that trial.  
To connect Q-values to actual participant choices, net action values at Stage 1 were first defined as 
the weighted sum of the model-free and model-based values: 
Qnet(s1,aj) = wQMB + (1-w) QMF(s1,aj) – Equation 4.8 
w is a free floating weighting parameter used to describe the extent of model-based decision making. 
w = 0 indicates pure model-free behaviour while w = 1 indicates pure model-based behaviour. The 























While the probability of a choice in Stage 2 was calculated using another softmax function but this 















  – Equation 4.9 
The free inverse temperature parameter βi
  controls the extent to which options in each stage were 
chosen according to their Qnet values. High values of βi
  indicate more reward 
maximisation/exploitation while lower values reflect decision-making inconsistent with choice 
values (more exploration). βi
  was allowed to vary between stages in the full model (β1
 and β2
 ). This 
was done to capture any possible differences in choice-value consistency between stages. The 
function rep(a) is a binary indicator, equating to 1 if the choice in the current trial (at) matched the 
choice in the previous trial (at-1). Free parameter p described the tendency to make perseverative 
choices during the first stage, wherein higher values signify increasing perseveration. p was not 
included in the softmax function for Stage 2 choices as different states are visited from trial to trial 
and hence choice repetition is less likely to play a role in behaviour. 
In this full model, 7 free parameters were included: β1, β2, α1, α2, λ, p, and w. The full model was 
compared with a model that contained a single β and α for both stages, to assess whether this simpler 
model with 5 parameters was better able to capture participant behaviour than the full model.  
In addition, a model was formulated to assess whether behaviour was better explained by algorithms 
with separate learning rates for rewarding (point gained) and neutral (no point gained) outcomes. A 
similar TD learning model with separate learning rates has been implemented in a study exploring 
risky decision-making in healthy adolescents (Rosenbaum, Grassie, & Hartley, 2020). The particular 
model for this study was identical to the full reinforcement learning model described above, except 
the learning rate in the TD algorithm would be represented by αrew if the Stage 2 outcome was 
rewarding (rt = 1), and αneu if no reward was received (rt = 0). This is how Stage 2 QMF would be 
updated: 
QMF(s2,t,ai,t)  = QMF(si,t,ai,t)  +  αrew,iδrew,t  –  if rt = 1  – Equation 4.10 
QMF(s2,t,ai,t)  = QMF(si,t,ai,t)  +  αneu,iδrew,t  –  if rt = 0  – Equation 4.11 
The valence-based learning rates were also used when updating the Stage 1 QTD using the Stage 2 
prediction error: 





QMF(s1,t,a1,t)  = QMF(s1,t,a1,t)  + αneuδstate,t + αneuλδ2,t  –  if rt = 0 – Equation 4.13 
Two versions of models with αrew and αneu parameters were assessed: one with β allowed to vary 
between stages, and one with a single β. In total, 4 RL models were fitted to data and compared. 
4.3.3 Reinforcement Learning + Drift Diffusion Model 
To better capture the dynamics of decision-making processes and take into account choice latencies, 
I programmed a reinforcement learning drift diffusion model (RL-DDM), similar to the one 
implemented by Shahar et al. (2019). The basic DDM assumes that decisions are made by 
continuously sampling noisy decision evidence until a decision boundary in favour of one of two 
alternatives is reached. This particular model is termed a Wiener drift diffusion model whereby the 
decision process is described as a continuous random walk process.  
In RL-DDM, evidence was accumulated to one of two boundaries at each stage on every trial, with 
the two boundaries representing choice 1 and choice 2 respectively. Time taken to reach either one 
of the boundaries on either trial as well as the distance between the two boundaries determined the 
response time and choice. At each trial, the RL-DDM calculates the likelihood of the RT of choice i 
with the Wiener first passage of time (WFPT) distribution:  
RTs,i,t ~ WFPT [a, T, z, v(t)] – Equation 4.14 
Where the WFPT returns the probability that choice i was chosen along with the observed RT. The 
distribution contains four parameters, the first one being the boundary separation parameter (a). This 
parameter adjusts the speed-accuracy trade-off, and describes the amount of evidence needed until a 
decision boundary is reached. Higher values of a reflect more evidence accumulated leading to more 
careful, slower, and more accurate decisions. A smaller a, inversely, indicates faster and more erratic 
decisions.  
Next, the non-decision time parameter (T) adjusts the time used on processes not related to decision-
making, including stimulus encoding and motor processes. Tasks with higher motor complexity tend 
to elicit greater values of T (Voss et al., 2004).  
The starting point parameter (z) controls the extent to which one choice is preferred over another 
before decision evidence is available.  
Lastly, the drift rate parameter (v) describes ‘perceptual sensitivity’ (Voss et al., 2004), indicating 
how quickly evidence from choices can be processed. A high v indicates higher sensitivity to the 





a lower v represents less discriminability between choice values leading to higher likelihood of 
‘guessing’.   
As v reflects value sensitivity, it was mathematically defined as the difference in values between 
choice 1 and choice 2 at each stage multiplied by the scaling parameter, m. For Stage 1, the 
differences between Qnet(2) and Qnet(1) was used: 
vs,t = m*[Qnet,t(2) - Qnet,t(1)] – Equation 4.15 
Meanwhile, the difference between QMF for choice 1 and choice 2 was used to define drift rates on 
Stage 2:  
vs,t = m*[QMF,t(2) – QMF,t(1)] – Equation 4.16 
The free parameter m transforms the difference between Q values to an appropriate scale for the 
DDM framework. As m is proportional to v, higher values of m translated to greater drift rates. In 
other words, when m is 1 (the lowest possible value) the drift rates, v, are equal to the simple 
difference between Q values. But as m increases, even small differences between Q-values are 
magnified and this results in faster decisions towards the choice with the greater Q-value.  
a, T, and m were free parameters in the model. z was fixed to be 0.5 as I assumed no prior bias 
towards either choice (as was done in Shahar et al.’s study). Separate a, T, and m parameters were 
used for Stage 1 and Stage 2 (Shahar et al., 2019). The WFPT distribution replaced the softmax 
function from the standard reinforcement learning model. Parameters from the winning standard RL 
model were included in the RL-DDM model alongside the DDM parameters.  
4.3.4 Model-Fitting 
Hierarchical Bayesian inference was used for model-fitting, wherein the mean and variance for each 
model parameter was drawn from a group level distribution separate for OCD and CTL groups. The 
method described here was similar to that used in Chapter 2. Group level parameters (indicated by 
the notation group) were sampled from the following priors below. Prior distributions used for DDM 
parameters here were the same ones used in Pedersen et al. (2017).  
α1group, α2group, αgroup, αrew, group, αneu, group, λgroup, pgroup, wgroup, Tgroup ~ Uniform (0,1) 
βgroup, β1group, β2group ~ Uniform (0,10) 





mgroup ~ Uniform (1,10) 
Next, inter-subject variability, σ, in the model parameters were sampled from the priors below. 
Variability priors for parameters from the standard RL model were taken from Kanen et al. (2019) 
while variability priors for parameters from the RLDDM model were taken from Perdersen et al. 
(2017). 
σα1, σα2, σα, σαrew, σαneu, σλ, σp, σw ~ Half-normal (0,0.05)   
σβ1, σβ2 ~ Half-normal (0,1) 
σa1, σa2, σT1, σT2, σm1, σm2 ~ Uniform (0.001, 5)  
Subject-level trial-by-trial parameters were each represented by a Gaussian prior distribution, with 
the mean and standard deviations of the distributions sampled from respective group level 
distributions. For example, αsubject ~ Normal (αgroup, σα). 
Computation of the posteriors were conducted via MCMC sampling using JAGS software (Plummer, 
2003). Four randomly initialised MCMC chains were run during model-fitting. I used the JAGS 
Wiener module (Wabersich & Vandekerckhove, 2014) containing the aforementioned WFPT 
distribution to estimate the likelihood of RTs and choices. Model comparison was conducted by 
calculating the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) which takes into account accuracy of model fit 
and penalises model complexity (number of free parameters) enabling prevention of over-
parameterisation (Wilson & Collins, 2019). Lower DIC values indicate better fit.  
Posterior distributions were interpreted using the 95% HDI. Comparisons between patients and 
controls were calculated by subtracting the posterior distributions of the control group-parameters 
from the posterior distributions of the patient group-parameters, generating the group mean 
differences per parameter. The 95% HDIs of the posterior distribution for the group mean differences 
were calculated and inspected to check whether they reliably included zero (indicating no difference 
between groups). 
To assess effects of SSRI treatment on decision-making and model-based behaviour computational 
modelling analyses were repeated with the OCD group divided into MED- and MED+.  
4.3.5 Parameter Recovery 
Parameter recovery was conducted to verify the validity of the winning model and that parameter 





and RL-DDM models were first used to simulate synthetic data from 100 ‘participants’ each in the 
CTL and OCD groups. Simulation was conducted in Matlab R2017b. Code for parameter recovery 
was adapted from Shahar et al. (2019). The free parameters were replaced with the mean fitted 
parameter values per group estimated from the actual human data. I then ascertained whether the true 
parameter values could be recovered by fitting the winning model to the simulated data, and checking 
whether the true and generated parameter values fell within their corresponding 95% HDI. This same 
method for parameter recovery was conducted by Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-prep). 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Standard Results (CTL vs OCD) 
Demographic, clinical, and intelligence scores are summarised in Table 4.1. OCD and CTL were 
matched for age, gender, and IQ. There were also no differences in digit span scores. OCD displayed 



















Table 4.1: Mean Scores and standard deviations per group and measure.  
 
CTL (n = 20) OCD (n = 20)  STATISTIC 
GENDER (F:M) 13/7 13/7 N/A 
AGE 16.20 ± 1.98 16.32 ± 1.69 
 
Z = 0.12; p= .90 
 
WASI-II (IQ)a 
112.35 ± 10.89 107.63 ± 13.96 
t(37) = 1.18; p=.25 
BDI** 
44.55 ± 7.22 58.55 ± 9.56 
Z =  -4.07; p= 4.62e-05 
BAI** 47.40 ± 5.82 67.20 ± 9.93 Z =-5.09; p = 3.57e-07 
OCI** 8.10 ± 6.67 30.70 ± 14.94 t(26.30) = -6.20 ; p = 1.48e-
06 





10.80 ± 2.86 
 
8.30 ± 2.20 
 




11.21 ± 2.44 8.05 ± 1.87 
 
t(37) = 0.38, p =.71 
 
Key: CTL: Control Group; OCD: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child Yale-Brown Obsessive-
Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; a missing data from one OCD participant. 
 
All participants except for 1 CTL subject were able to correctly identify the Stage 1 rockets that most 
likely went to each Stage 2 planet, indicating that majority of participants (and importantly, all OCD 
subjects) successfully learnt the probabilities associated with Stage 1 choices. 
The results of the mixed effects logistic regression for first-stage stays revealed a significant effect 





participants repeated choices when the most recent previous choice resulted in a reward. They also 
repeated choices when the previous choice was followed by a common transition that resulted in a 
reward. There was no main effect of Group (CTL vs OCD) or any significant interactions with this 
variable. The results are summarised in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3. 
Table 4.2: Results of Mixed Logistic Regression on First-Stage Stays 
Fixed Effects Beta Coefficient Standard Error Z-Value p-value 
Outcome (win)** 0.37 0.054 6.81 9.82e-12 
Last Transition 
(Common) 
0.050  0.049 1.01  .31 
Group   0.17   0.11  1.47 .14 
Outcome x Last 
Transition ** 
0.45 0.085 5.30 1.17e-07 
Outcome x Group 0.080 0.051 1.75 .081 
Last Transition x 
Group 
 0.030  0.046  0.66 .51 
Outcome x Last 
Transition x Group 








FIGURE 4.3: PROPORTION OF FIRST STAGE STAYS PLOTTED BY TRANSITION TYPE (COMMON VS RARE), BY 
PREVIOUS REWARD (REWARDED VS UNREWARDED) AND BY GROUP (CTL VS OCD). REGRESSION ANALYSES 
SHOWED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS IN EFFECTS OF TRANSITION TYPE AND PREVIOUS OUTCOME ON FIRST 
STAGE STAYS. FIRST STAGE STAYS, FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS, WERE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR FOLLOWING 
REWARDED TRIALS (MODEL-FREE BEHAVIOUR) AND FOLLOWING TRIALS WHICH WERE REWARDED DURING 
COMMON TRANSITIONS (MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOUR). HENCE, PARTICIPANTS TENDED TO DISPLAY A MIXTURE OF 
MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOUR. 
 
The regression analysis was repeated this time adding z-scored age and IQ scores as interaction terms 
(see Table 4.3). There was a main effect of IQ, suggesting participants with higher IQ repeated Stage 
1 choices more than those with lower IQ. IQ also showed a significant positive interaction with 













Table 4.3: Results of Mixed Logistic Regression on First-Stage Stays with IQ and Age as interaction terms 
Fixed Effects Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard Error Z-Value P-Value 
Outcome 0.76 0.49 1.55  0.12  
Last 
Transition 
-0.37 0.44 -0.83  0.41  
Group  0.097 0.11 0.90 0.37 
Age 0.062 0.10 0.60 0.55  




-2.21 0.62 -3.59 0.00033 
Outcome x 
Group 









0.0053 0.069 0.076 0.94 
Outcome x 
Age 









0.026 0.066 0.40 0.69 













0.024 0.0056 4.33 1.51e-05 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
Next, the linear mixed effects regression on Stage 2 response times showed a significant effect of 
Current Transition (see Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4), wherein rare transitions resulted in slower response 
times. There was no significant effect of Group.  
Table 4.3: Results of Linear Mixed Regression on Second-Stage Response Times 
Fixed Effects Beta Coefficient Standard 
Error 




-0.077 0.011 -6.95 37.66 2.98e-08 












FIGURE 4.4: RESPONSE TIMES WERE SLOWER FOLLOWING RARE TRANSITIONS COMPARED TO COMMON 
TRANSITIONS, INDICATING THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD INTACT KNOWLEDGE OF TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
ASSOCIATED WITH EACH FIRST-STAGE CHOICE. THERE WERE NO DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OCD AND CTL.  
The response-time regression analyses were repeated controlling for age and IQ (see Table 4.5). 
There was a significant interaction between Current Transition and IQ. In other words, those with 
higher IQ displayed slower reaction times when current transitions were rare, indicating superior 













Table 4.5: Results of Linear Mixed Regression on Second-Stage Response Times with Age and IQ as 
Interaction Terms 
Fixed Effects Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard Error T-Value Df P-Value 
Current 
Transition 
0.18  0.095 1.88 34.53 0.069  
Group 0.023 0.021 1.07 35.01 0.29 
Age 0.0019 0.021 0.091 35.01  0.93 








0.0054 0.010 0.52 34.60 0.61 
Current 
Transition x IQ 
** 











4.4.2 Exploratory Medication Analyses 
Next, the analyses were repeated dividing the OCD group into MED- and MED+. Demographic, 
intelligence, and clinical scores are found in Table 4.6. 











































Χ2(2) = 17.06, p= 
.00020 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+ 






F(2,37) = 29.00; p 
= 2.65e-08 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+ 







F(2,37) = 19.11; p 
= 1.99e-06 
MED- & MED+ > CTL 
MED- = MED+ 


























F(2,36) = 0.37; p 
= 0.69 
N/A 
Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group WASI-II: 
Wechsler’s Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory 
(t-scored); BAI: Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; 
a






Post-hoc tests revealed that compared to CTL, MED+ and MED- groups had elevated depression 
(Dunn’s test, MED- vs CTL: p = .016, MED+ vs CTL: p = .00043), anxiety (Pairwise t-tests, MED- 
vs CTL: t(37) = 6.23, p = 9.08e-07, MED+ vs CTL: t(37) = 6.20, p = 1.02e-06), and obsessive-
compulsive scores (Pairwise t-tests, MED- vs CTL: t(37) =5.28, p = 1.77e-05, MED+ vs CTL: t(37) 
=4.78, p = 8.25e-05). There were no differences on these measures between MED- and MED+ (all p 
= 1.00).  
When conducting the logistic mixed regression, there was no significant effect of Medication status 
on first-stage stays or any significant interactions with the group terms (see Table 4.7). There was 
also no effect of Medication status on second-stage reaction times (see Table 4.8). As there were no 
significant effects of group, the analyses were not repeated controlling for age and IQ.  
 
Table 4.7: Results of Mixed Logistic Regression on First-Stage Stays (By Medication Status) 
Fixed Effects Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard Error Z-Value P-Value 
Outcome** 0.34 0.057 5.91 3.50e-09 
Last Transition 0.035 0.051 0.68 .50 
MED+  0.22 0.15 1.4 .16 
MED- -0.026 0.18 -0.14 .89 
Outcome x Last 
Transition** 
0.42 0.090 0.47 2.48e-06 
Outcome x MED+ 0.12 0.069 1.74 .082 
Last Transition x 
MED+ 





Outcome x Last 
Transition x MED+ 
0.10 0.11 0.91 .36 
Outcome x MED- -0.053 0.083 -0.65 .52 
Last Transition x 
MED- 
-0.094 0.073 -1.30 .20 
Outcome x Last 
Transition x MED- 














-0.071 0.012 -5.97 36.68 6.94e-07 




-0.024 0.015 -1.59 36.67 .12 










4.4.3 Computational Modelling Results 
Standard Reinforcement Learning 
The best-fitting model (as determined by calculating the DIC score) was the model with separate 
learning rates for rewarding and neutral outcomes, as well as separate inverse temperature parameters 
for Stage 1 and Stage 2 (see Table 4.9). 
 Table 4.9: DIC scores per model. Model 3 was the winning model 
Model Parameters DIC 
1 β1, β2, α1, α2, λ 
(Lambda), p, w 
16112.11 
2 β, α, λ, p, w 16121.39 
3 β1, β2, αrew, αneu, λ, p, w 16079.39 
4 β, αrew, αneu, λ, p, w 16097.22 
 
 
When analysing group differences in model parameter values between OCD and CTL, OCD showed 
lower Stage 2 inverse temperature values (β2) compared to CTL indicating an increased tendency 
for exploration (less value-driven responding) during Stage 2, but no group differences were detected 
on other parameters including the model-based w parameter (see Figure 4.5). 
 
FIGURE 4.5: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. 





DIFFERENCES (OCD-CTL) IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. THE GROUP DIFFERENCE HDI FOR B2 (BETA2) 
WAS NEGATIVE AND DID NOT INCLUDE 0, INDICATING THAT OCD HAD LOWER Β2 VALUES THAN CTL. 
 
When dividing the OCD group by medication status and re-fitting the winning model to data, it was 
found that MED+ had lower β2 values compared to CTL (see Figure 4.6), indicating the 
aforementioned effect of OCD was driven by MED+. There were no groups differences on other 
parameters. 
 
FIGURE 4.6: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES (CTL VS MED- VS MED+) PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT 
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. EACH PLOT REPRESENTS GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE RESULTS FOR EACH MODEL 
PARAMETER. ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF GROUP DIFFERENCES IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. MED+ WAS FOUND TO HAVE LOWER Β2 VALUES 
COMPARED TO CTL.  
 
Reinforcement Learning + Drift Diffusion Model 
The winning RL model was included as the RL portion of the RL-DDM, excluding the softmax 





to the model implemented by Shahar et al. (2019). The parameters are αrew, αneu, λ, p, w, a1, a2, T1, 
T2, m1, m2.  
After fitting the model to data and calculating group mean differences, it was found that OCD had a 
markedly lower boundary separation parameter value for Stage 2 (a2) compared to CTL, indicative 
of less careful evidence accumulation, and favouring speed over accuracy. There were no distinctions 
between groups for other parameters (see Figure 4.7). 
 
FIGURE 4.7: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES PER PARAMETER FROM THE RL-DDM COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. 
ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF GROUP 
DIFFERENCES (OCD-CTL) IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. OCD DISPLAYED LOWER A2 VALUES THAN CTL. 
 
In addition, the same RL-DDM but with separate group parameters for MED- and MED+ was fit to 
data. Group mean difference analyses revealed lower a2 parameter values for MED+ compared to 
CTL (see Figure 4.8). MED- and MED+, as well as MED- and CTL were equivalent on this 
parameter. Although, MED- showed credibly lower a2 values than CTL when considering mean 90% 







FIGURE 4.8:  SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES (CTL VS MED- VS MED+) PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT 
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. EACH PLOT REPRESENTS GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE RESULTS FOR EACH MODEL 
PARAMETER. ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF GROUP DIFFERENCES IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. MED+ WAS FOUND TO HAVE LOWER A2 VALUES 
COMPARED TO CTL (95% HDI). NOT PICTURED: MED- SHOWED LOWER A2 VALUES WHEN CALCULATING THE 
MEAN 90% HDI. 
 
Parameter Recovery 
Previously-fitted parameters used to generate the simulated data and their corresponding recovered 
values are presented in Table 4.10 for the RL model and Table 4.11 for RL-DDM. All generative 
parameter values fell strictly within their corresponding recovered 95% highest posterior density 






Table 4.10: Parameter recovery analysis with simulated data generated by best-fit reinforcement learning model 
Group Parameter Empirical 
values 
Simulated values 95% HDI Interval 
CTL α-rew 0.44 0.44 [0.41, 0.47] 
 
α-neu 0.91 0.91 [0.88, 0.95] 
 
β1 4.94 4.97 [4.79. 5.19] 
 
β2 4.61 4.56 [4.34, 4.80] 
 
λ 0.66 0.68 [0.64, 0.72] 
 
p 0.24 2.34 [0.22, 0.25] 
 
w 0.60 0.60 [0.58, 0.63] 
OCD  α-rew 0.49 0.50 [0.47, 0.53] 
 
α-neu 0.69 0.67 [0.65, 0.70] 
 
β1 4.09 4.05 [3.85, 4.25] 
 
β2 2.84 2.80  [2.69, 2.91] 
 
λ 0.54 0.51 [0.48, 0.55] 
 
p 0.18 0.17 [0.16, 0.18] 
 






Table 4.11: Parameter recovery analysis with simulated data generated by best-fit reinforcement learning drift 
diffusion model 
Group Parameter Empirical values Simulated 
values 
95% HDI Interval 
CTL α-rew 0.53 0.53 [0.52, 0.56] 
 
α-neu 0.90 0.94 [0.90, 1.00] 
 a1 1.31 1.32 [1.30, 1.33] 
 a2 1.58 1.59 [1.58, 1.60] 
 
m1 1.75 1.66 [1.58, 1.75] 
 
m2 1.88 1.86 [1.80, 1.91] 
 
T1 0.025 0.026 [0.024, 0.028] 
 
T2 0.036 0.036 [0.035, 0.038] 
 
λ 0.64 0.67 [0.59, 0.75] 
 
p 0.48 0.51 [0.48, 0.54] 
 
w 0.66 0.66 [0.61,0.70] 
OCD  α-rew 0.49 0.49 [0.47, 0.52] 
 
α-neu 0.64 0.67 [0.63, 0.71] 
 a1 1.18 1.18 [1.17, 1.18] 
 a2 1.26 1.28 [1.27, 1.29] 
 
m1 1.68 1.59 [1.46, 1.71] 
 






T1 0.015 0.016 [0.015, 0.017] 
 
T2 0.076 0.077 [0.075, 0.078] 
 
λ 0.53 0.57 [0.52,0.65] 
 
p 0.26 0.26 [0.24, 0.29] 
 
w 0.54 0.55 [0.49, 0.61] 
 
 
4.4.4 Correlation Analyses 
Correlations between clinical symptoms and task measures 
When considering all participants, anxiety (r = -0.39, p = .019) and obsessive-compulsive scores 
(OCI) (r = -0.33, p = .040) were associated with lower β2 values, indicating more exploration in 
Stage 2. As OCI and anxiety scores also correlated with each other (r =0.80; p <.0001), I re-analysed 
these correlations partialling out the effects of each independent variable (e.g. checking relationship 
between OCI and β2 values controlling for anxiety). I found no significant effects of OCI or anxiety 
on β2 values when doing these partial correlations (all p > .05), suggesting a shared effect of OCI 
and anxiety on β2 values. Next, still within all participants, high OCI scores were associated with 
decreased lambda (λ) values (r = -0.31, p =.048) indicating Stage 1 choices were less influenced by 
Stage 2 rewards. Within only CTL, depression scores were significantly correlated with drift rate 
scaling values in Stage 1 (m1) (r = 0.49, p = .027), β1 (r = 0.59, p = .0064), and MB-IChoice (r =0.52, 
p = .019) values.  
There were no significant correlations between clinical scores and task measures when considering 
only OCD, only MED-, and only MED+. 
Correlations between age, IQ, working memory and task measures  
When considering all participants, IQ correlated with β2 values (r = 0.35, p = .030), and with m1 (r 
= 0.55, p = .00031) and Stage 2 (m2) (r = 0.39, p = .015). IQ was also predictive of more model-
based behaviour as indexed by beta-coefficients obtained from the choice (MB-IChoice) (r = 0.54, p = 
.00034) and RT (MB-IIRT) (r = -0.40, p = .019) mixed regressions. In addition, working memory 





(r = 0.41, p = .0089), m2 values (r =0.53, p = .00049), and model-based behaviour indexed by MB-
IIRT (r =-0.35, p =.029). Lastly, older participants displayed increased m2 parameter values (r = 0.36, 
p = .022). 
Next, within OCD, IQ correlated with several measures, being associated with increased m1 (r = 
0.67, p = .0017), m2 (r = 0.49, p = .034), lambda (r = -0.47, p = .041), β1 (r = 0.66, p = .0020), β2 (r 
= 0.59, p = .0076) values and more model-based behaviour indexed by MB-IChoice (r = 0.65, p = .0024) 
and MB-IIRT (r = -0.53, p = .019). Age also showed a positive association with β2 values (r = 0.54, p 
= .014). Working memory correlated with m1 (r = 0.54, p = .016), m2 (r = 0.59, p = .0081), and β2 
(r = 0.53, p = .019) values.  
Within CTL, participants with higher IQ showed increased β1 scores (r = 0.53, p = .017), while 
participants with greater working memory span displayed increased perseveration (p) parameter (r = 
0.46, p = .043) and β2 values (r = 0.46, p = .043).  
Within MED-, IQ significantly correlated with decreased lambda values (r= -0.89; p = .0040), and 
increased β1 (r= 0.75; p = .032) and β2 values (r= 0.77; p = .027).  
Within MED+, IQ significantly predicted increased β1 (r =0.58, p = .018), MB-IChoice (r =0.59, p 
=.012), and reduced MB-IIRT (r =-0.75, p = .030) values. 
Correlations with Medication Dosage 
Medication dosage was significantly associated with increased IQ (r =0.61, p =.049), increased m1 
values (r =0.62, p = .040), increased reward rates (α-rew) (r =0.70, p = .016), and more model-based 
behaviour based on MB-IIRT (r =-0.75, p =.0077). When partialling out IQ (as it correlated with 
medication dosage as well as with several task and model measures), only medication dosage’s 
relationship with reward rates remained significant (r =0.80, p = .0055, all other correlations p >.05). 
Extra Correlations 
In addition, I sought to understand whether increased exploration (shown by decreased β2 values) in 
OCD was linked to their decreased a2 values, as both parameters describe value-based decision-
making in Stage 2. In other words, I wanted to check whether increased exploration was linked to 
patients’ tendencies to value speed over accuracy. There was no correlation between the two 
parameter values within the OCD group (p = .79) suggesting values in one were not being driven by 
the other. Instead β1 and β2 values were significantly influenced by m1 (r = 0.78; p <.0001) and m2 





with higher values (more exploitation) when they were able to discriminate effectively between 
differing choice values. a2 values did not correlate with any model parameters.  
Correlations between model-based measures and computational model parameters 
Finally, to understand how latent decision-making processes relate to model-based behaviour, further 
correlational analyses were conducted between model-based indices (MB-IChoice, MB-IIRT, w 
parameter) and model parameter values (see Table 4.12). 
Table 4.12: Correlations between model-based metrics and computational model parameter values 
All Participants MB-IChoice MB-IIRT w - parameter 
α-rew r = 0.41 
p = .0089 
r = -0.42 
p = .006247 
n.s 
α-neu n.s. n.s n.s 
m1 r = 0.71 
p = 3.63e-07 
r = -0.58 
p = 7.99e-05 
n.s 
m2 r = 0.35 
p = .026 
n.s. r = 0.40 
p = .011 
T1 n.s n.s n.s 
T2 n.s n.s n.s 
a1 r = 0.40 
p = .0096 
n.s n.s 
a2 n.s r = -0.41 
p = .0082 
n.s 
λ n.s n.s r = -0.36 
p = .021 
p n.s n.s n.s 
w r = 0.34 
p = .034 
r = -0.38 
p = .016 
N/A 
β1 r = 0.64 
p = 8.55e-06 
r = -0.38 
p = .017 
n.s 
β2 n.s n.s r = 0.42 
p = .0062 
OCD only MB-IChoice MB-IIRT w - parameter 
α-rew n.s. r = -0.47 
p = .035 
n.s. 
α-neu n.s. n.s. n.s. 
m1 r = 0.84 
p = 4.20e-06 
r = -0.77 
p = 5.55e-05 
n.s. 
m2 n.s. n.s. r = 0.47 
p = .035 
T1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
λ n.s. n.s. r = -0.63 





p n.s. n.s. n.s. 
w n.s. r = -0.63 
p = .0064 
N/A 
β1 r = 0.74 
p = .00017 
r = -0.52 
p = .018 
n.s. 
β2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
CTL Only MB-IChoice MB-IIRT w - parameter 
α-rew r = 0.57 
p = .0090 
n.s. n.s. 
α-neu n.s. n.s. n.s. 
m1 r = 0.49 
p = .030 
n.s. n.s. 
m2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a2 n.s. r = -0.65 
p = .0020 
n.s. 
λ n.s. n.s. n.s. 
p n.s. n.s. n.s. 
w n.s. n.s. NA 
β1 r = 0.61 
p =.0047 
n.s. n.s. 
β2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
MED- Only MB-IChoice MB-IIRT w - parameter 
α-rew n.s. n.s. n.s. 
α-neu n.s. n.s. n.s. 
m1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
m2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
λ n.s. n.s. n.s. 
p n.s. n.s. n.s. 
w n.s. r = -0.83 
p = 0.005962 
N/A 
β1 r = 0.79 
p = 0.011 
n.s. n.s. 
β2 r = 0.70 
p = 0.037 
n.s. n.s. 
MED+ Only MB-IChoice MB-IIRT w - parameter 
α-rew n.s. n.s. n.s. 
α-neu n.s. n.s. n.s. 
m1 r = 0.96 
p = 3.70E-06 
r = -0.87 
p = 0.00057 
n.s. 
m2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
T1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 





a1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
λ n.s. n.s. r = -0.66 
p = 0.026 
p n.s. n.s. n.s. 
w n.s. n.s. N/A 
β1 r = 0.84 
p = 0.0012 
r = -0.72 
p = 0.013 
n.s. 
β2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Key: n.s.: non-significant 
 
4.4.5 Summary of Main Results 
OCD and CTL were equivalent on all measures of model-based behaviour, namely MB-IChoice, MB-
IIRT, and w. This was also the case when comparing CTL with MED- and MED+. Computational 
modelling using the standard RL model revealed that OCD had lower β2 values than CTL, indicating 
OCD showed less exploitation/more exploration during Stage 2. Fitting RL-DDM to data revealed 
that OCD had reduced a2 values compared to CTL, indicating faster and less accurate decisions 
during Stage 2 in OCD. These group differences were primarily driven by MED+.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
   This is the first study to formally probe model-based behaviour in adolescents with OCD using a 
sequential decision-making task originally developed by Daw et al. (2011). To derive reliable and 
comprehensive estimates of model-basedness, I fit a reinforcement learning-drift diffusion model 
(RL-DDM) to task data which takes into account choice and response time data (previously done by 
Shahar et al., 2019). This is an improvement on past studies that have only estimated model-based 
behaviour based on choices. Modelling choices and reaction times together also enabled greater 
insight into various latent decision-making processes important for describing behaviour on the task. 
Contrary to findings from adult OCD studies, adolescents with OCD were equivalent to healthy age-
matched controls on all model-based metrics investigated (MB-IChoice, MB-IIRT, model-based w). 
Nonetheless, adolescent patients differed from controls in behaviour during Stage 2 of the task, 
wherein they made more exploratory choices (lower inverse temperature, β2) and favoured speed 
over accuracy when responding (lower boundary separation parameter, a2). These results were 





4.5.1 Model-Based Decision-Making 
   Comparable model-based behaviour between patients and healthy participants across all metrics 
investigated is firmly indicative of intact age-appropriate model-based reasoning in adolescents with 
OCD. The finding is unexpected as several studies have reported reduced model-based and goal-
directed behaviour in adult OCD patients (Gillan et al., 2014, 2011; Voon, Baek, et al., 2015; Voon, 
Derbyshire, et al., 2015; Wheaton et al., 2019). This implies that impairments in model-based 
reasoning only emerge in adulthood in OCD. Perhaps model-based reasoning deteriorates as a 
function of disorder duration as recent research reports that adult OCD patients with a longer disease 
duration, compared to patients with shorter disease durations, displayed increased habitual 
responding on an outcome devaluation task (Chase et al., 2020). As adult patients have lived with 
the disorder for longer, their cognitive faculties responsible for model-based reasoning may be 
experiencing greater decline compared to adolescent patients who have acquired the disorder 
relatively recently.  
   A slightly different interpretation of these findings could be that OCD disrupts otherwise healthy 
development of model-based reasoning. This is supported by research showing that young children 
and adolescents rely primarily on model-free heuristics compared to healthy adults who are more 
model-based (Decker et al., 2016). Additionally, presence of compulsive symptoms in healthy 
adolescents has been found to predict slower maturation of model-based behaviour and fronto-striatal 
regions important for high-order decision-making (Vaghi et al., 2020). Therefore, adolescents with 
OCD at first show equivalence to healthy adolescents but eventually healthy adolescents go on to 
strengthen their model-based reasoning while the same behaviour remains stunted in those with 
OCD, thus accounting for why OCD-related differences in model-basedness are only pronounced in 
adulthood. 
4.5.2 Other features of decision-making 
   The secondary rationale behind observing behaviour on the current task was to assess general 
learning and decision-making in adolescents with OCD. The first finding to be discussed here is that 
adolescents with OCD displayed significantly reduced inverse temperature values corresponding to 
Stage 2 choices indicating less value-driven responding and more exploration. The exploration 
parameter did not correlate with boundary separation parameter values (discussed later in this 
section) in patients, suggesting that quick erratic responding does not necessarily account for 
increased exploration in this sample. Drift rate scaling parameter values showed a strong association 
with the tendency to exploit over explore, indicating that participants who were able to discriminate 





rewards. However, drift rate scaling parameter values did not differ significantly between patients 
and controls, suggesting that choice value sensitivity is more or less intact in patients, but they still 
have a tendency for exploratory decision-making. Possible explanations for exploration are 
considered in brief here, but more in-depth discussion is presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis.   
   Recent computational research employing reinforcement learning tasks and models reveal 
increased exploration and more switching between choices in adults and children with OCD 
(Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019; Norman et al., 2018). The 
tasks in these studies contained choice stimuli with probabilistic pay-offs suggesting that stochastic 
environments are necessary to promote exploratory behaviour in subjects with OCD. Similarly, in 
the current sequential decision-making task, adolescents with OCD engaged in significantly more 
exploration during Stage 2, which contains options with outcome probabilities that change frequently 
throughout the task, but not during Stage 1 which contains options with stable outcome probabilities. 
Indeed, literature into the explore-exploit dilemma posits that in a dynamic environment, where 
values of all potential options are uncertain, it is considered conducive for an individual to be able to 
adapt their behaviour by flexibly alternating between exploratory and exploitative strategies 
(Addicott, Pearson, Sweitzer, Barack, & Platt, 2017). Empirical research also finds that in healthy 
people, increasing uncertainty surrounding choice pay-offs promotes more exploratory behaviour 
(Parr & Friston, 2017; Stojic, Schulz, Analytis, & Speekenbrink, 2020). Patients have been found to 
experience more subjective uncertainty than healthy people (Stern et al., 2013). Hence, a combination 
of task uncertainty and subjective uncertainty may be driving abnormal exploration in adolescents 
with OCD. Patients perhaps feel the need to ‘check’ alternative options to obtain confirmation that 
all choices are delivering correct predicted feedback and in the hopes of reducing overall uncertainty. 
Poor model-based reasoning and/or inaccurate representation of choice values (measured via drift 
rate scaling parameter) do not seem to account for this over-exploration as metrics corresponding to 
these measures were equivalent in my patient and control participants.   
   Alternatively, what appears to be exploration as may be the result of attentional lapses. Poor 
attention may be impacting learning of values associated with choices or resulting in patients not 
using learnt value-knowledge to make decisions. In line with this, random, value-less responding is 
found to be associated with attention-deficit traits in healthy children (Dubois et al., 2020). 
Attentional deficits are present in adult patients with OCD, as reported by a meta-analysis revealing 
attentional control in patients to be impaired in across several studies, with moderate effect sizes 
(Abramovitch et al., 2013). However, evidence is less consistent in child-OCD studies, as so far only 





2007) while two other studies did not find deficits (Okazaki et al., 2018; Shin et al., 2008). Moreover, 
another study has only found deficits in attention in child patients with both tic disorder and OCD 
(Lucke et al., 2014). Thus, it is unclear whether attentional issues are indeed driving this reduced 
value-driven responding in adolescents with OCD. 
   There is also evidence for brain regions underlying the use of exploratory strategies (Daw, 
O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Domenech, Rheims, & Koechlin, 2020; Laureiro-
Martínez, Brusoni, Canessa, & Zollo, 2015; Trudel et al., 2020), namely the ventromedial PFC 
(vmPFC) and dACC, to be overactivated in patients with OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2018; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2018, 2010; Huyser et al., 2011; Riesel et al., 2019; Stern et al., 2011, 2013), 
implying a neural basis for over-exploration in OCD. This is discussed in more detail in the General 
Discussion (Chapter 7).  
  The next finding is that adolescents with OCD showed lower boundary separation parameter values 
than controls on Stage 2 of the task, indicating less evidence accumulation, as well as faster and more 
error-prone responses. At first, this appears to contradict findings from previous studies modelling 
decision-making data in OCD using drift-diffusion models, as patients tended to have lower drift 
rates indicating less choice value sensitivity and more time spent processing evidence (Banca, 
Vestergaard, et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser, Moutoussis, et al., 2017; Mandali et al., 2019). 
However, a closer look at the studies mentioned reveal that the tasks employed were always self-
paced, meaning that subjects were under no time pressure to make choices. In fact, Banca et al. (2015) 
discovered that while adult OCD patients had lower drift rates when the decision-making task being 
employed was self-paced, introducing a monetary penalty for slowness on some trials led to 
drastically lower decision boundaries in patients. My findings mirror this as the task I have 
administered terminates the current trial every time participants fail to answer within an allotted time 
window. Thus, evidence accumulation in OCD appears to be contingent on task conditions: when 
given enough time to respond, patients prefer to spend elongated periods accumulating evidence, 
whereas when penalised for slowness, patients prefer to respond quicker at the expense of accuracy.     
   It may be that conducting effective evidence accumulation and responding quickly in parallel are 
too cognitively demanding for patients with OCD, and therefore they default to using one or the other 
depending on aforementioned task constraints. In the current task, quick error-prone responding may 
be strategic as responding within the time window confers a chance of receiving a reward whereas 
spending too long mulling over a decision will lead to the current trial ending with no possibility of 





by patients in Stage 2 but not Stage 1 of the task. This may be due to outcome probabilities associated 
with Stage 1 stimuli being stable relative to the slowly changing reward pay-offs associated with the 
four possible options in Stage 2. Moreover, needing to take into account four different choice values 
in Stage 2, compared to only two choice values in Stage 1, alongside increased pay-off uncertainty 
and trial time constraints may have prompted adolescent patients to not attempt to gather evidence 
and instead turn to quick responding as a strategy. This is perhaps consistent with accounts of altered 
cognitive control in young people with OCD (Viard et al., 2005), as well as studies showing poor 
adaptation of response times following feedback (no post-error slowing or post-correct speeding up 
of responses in patients relative to controls) in adults and children with OCD (Liu, Gehring, 
Weissman, Taylor, & Fitzgerald, 2012; S. Morein-Zamir et al., 2013). 
4.5.3 Medication Effects 
   Although the OCD group as a whole showed increased exploration and lower boundary separation 
parameter values during Stage 2, further exploratory analysis revealed that these results were 
primarily driven by the adolescents with OCD who were receiving SSRI treatment. The reason for 
this is unclear as, as highlighted in earlier chapters, majority of pertinent research reports superior 
performance by child and adult patients medicated with SSRIs compared to medication-naïve 
patients across various cognitive constructs including planning, cognitive flexibility, and feedback 
learning (Andrés et al., 2008; Lochner, Chamberlain, Kidd, Fineberg, & Stein, 2016; Mataix-Cols, 
Alonso, Pifarré, Menchón, & Vallejo, 2002; Palminteri, Clair, Mallet, & Pessiglione, 2012). 
Nonetheless, Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-prep) recently found that adult medicated OCD patients were 
impaired at contingency learning before reversal on a probabilistic reversal learning task, while pre-
reversal learning was intact in unmedicated patients. This suggests that medication may impair 
instrumental responding and increase shifting behaviour, similar to the exploratory and erratic 
decision-making displayed by medicated adolescents with OCD in my study.  
  When conducting correlational analyses, a higher SSRI dosage was found associated with increased 
IQ, drift rate scaling values, reward rates, and model-based behaviour (measured via MB-IIRT). When 
controlling for IQ, reward rates still showed a significant relationship with SSRI dosage. These 
findings allude to high dose SSRIs facilitating increased reward sensitivity, and potentially improved 
IQ scores and model-based reasoning in adolescents with OCD. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, 
this may be consistent with research reporting that low doses of SSRIs disrupt probabilistic reversal 





   As posited in the previous chapter, medicated patients may have had a more severe form of the 
disorder to have necessitated medication treatment, which could account for their more abnormal 
decision-making. Nonetheless, this theory cannot account for why previous research has found that 
SSRIs improve cognitive performance in patients. More research into long-term effects of medication 
on learning and decision-making in OCD is necessary to derive solid conclusions. Also, as a caveat, 
there were only 9 unmedicated patients present in my current study and therefore caution must be 
exercised in interpreting these findings. The medication effects found in the studies presented in this 
thesis are probed further in the General Discussion chapter (Chapter 7).   
4.5.4 Limitations of sequential decision-making task 
   Despite my successful efforts in deriving holistic metrics of model-based reasoning by accounting 
for participant choices and response times using RL-DDM, there are still possible limitations to using 
the sequential decision-making paradigm in its current form to dissociate model-based from model-
free strategies. Recently, it has been discovered that people are highly prone to misunderstanding the 
task’s complex instructions leading to inaccurate models of decision-making being captured (Feher 
da Silva & Hare, 2020). Some common examples of misunderstandings highlighted by Feher da Silva 
and Hare include 1) subjects believing that one of the Stage 1 choices is ‘luckier’ than the alternative 
choice as well as 2) some subjects thinking Stage 2 outcomes after common transitions are more 
trustworthy or reliable compared to outcomes after rare transitions. These misunderstandings 
influenced the proportion of first-stage stay responses leading to statistical models labelling subjects 
as being both model-based and model-free decision makers (Feher da Silva & Hare, 2020). When 
instructions were improved to eliminate any misunderstandings, subjects actually used 
predominantly model-based strategies which casts doubt on previous studies reporting that healthy 
people use a mixture of strategies to solve the task (Daw et al., 2011; Decker et al., 2016; Voon, 
Derbyshire, et al., 2015). Equally, it is possible that results in my current study were influenced by 
participants misunderstanding the instructions. Participants with OCD may have been particularly 
susceptible to this as many patients experience ‘magical thinking’ or impaired causal reasoning 
between actions and outcomes (Vaghi et al., 2019). Hence, patients may have imbued their own 
meaning onto the different transition-types and stimuli used in the task.  
   Another limitation to this paradigm is that model-free behaviour defined in the task and 
computational models may not be compatible with actual habit-directed behaviour, despite literature 
suggesting they are equivalent. Habit-directed behaviour is traditionally defined by the strength of a 
response cued by a stimulus that is no longer predictive of a rewarding outcome. Hence, habitual 





purely by the presence of a stimulus that was associated with rewards in the past. This is distinct 
from model-free behaviour, which is defined in reinforcement learning models as still being sensitive 
values associated with choices and their possible outcomes. Recent computational work demonstrates 
the possibility of conceptualising a truly habit-directed model which is not based on choice values, 
but is only sensitive to the history of actions taken (Miller et al., 2019). This model may more 
accurately represent habitual-directed control often reported to be overactive or dominant in OCD 
(Gillan et al., 2014, 2011; Gillan & Robbins, 2014) compared to the current temporal-difference 
algorithm used to estimate model-free decision-making. 
4.5.5 Conclusions 
In this study, I demonstrate that adolescents with OCD can employ model-based control on a 
sequential decision-making task to a similar extent as healthy adolescents within the same age range. 
I infer that either impaired model-based reasoning only emerges in adulthood in individuals with 
OCD or that the disorder disrupts healthy maturation of model-based reasoning over time, which 
accounts for previous research showing deficits in model-based control in adult OCD patients. 
However, recent valid criticisms have emerged regarding the administration and modelling of the 
sequential decision-making task that must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Next, 
computational modelling of choice and response time data has revealed that adolescents with OCD 
favour speed over accuracy, and exploration over exploitation when making decisions in Stage 2 of 
the task. Possible explanations for this include adolescent patients having difficulty arbitrating 
between different strategies efficiently, deficits in attention and cognitive control, and oversensitivity 










Chapter 5: Meta-Cognition in Adolescent OCD: Are action 
and confidence dissociated? 
5.1 Introduction 
   Intrusions and compulsions displayed by individuals with OCD are ego-dystonic in nature, as they 
occur despite being at odds with the core beliefs of the sufferer. Patients continuously engage in 
maladaptive washing and checking behaviour, for instance, despite having awareness that they are 
excessive and irrational.  
   As highlighted in the General Introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1), adults with OCD do not use 
meta-cognitive information such as confidence to drive their actions. Cognitive research reports that 
adults with OCD continue to respond to devalued or degraded stimuli despite being aware that the 
stimuli they are responding to are no longer predictive of outcomes (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; 
Gillan et al., 2014; Vaghi et al., 2019).  This dissociation between patients’ actions and beliefs has 
been posited to be due to patients experiencing increased uncertainty surrounding state transitions 
(how events unfold as a result of specific actions) (Fradkin, Adams, Parr, Roiser, & Huppert, 2020). 
Patients mistrust or place less weight on prior evidence in their decision-making and hence carry out 
compulsive behaviours that are at odds with pre-existing information in order to cope with the 
uncertainty. There is even empirical evidence for this theory, as it was found that adults with high 
obsessive-compulsive traits assigned lower weights to past feedback information when making 
decisions on a probabilistic learning task, which led them to regard otherwise expected outcomes as 
‘surprising’ (Fradkin, Ludwig, et al., 2020).   
   Relevant to the current chapter, Vaghi, Luyckx et al. (2017) used a predictive-inference task to 
formally test the link between actions and confidence in OCD. Adult patients were tasked with 
predicting where a coin would land on a screen and rating how confident they were in their 
predictions being correct. The task was probabilistic in that the coin predominantly landed in the 
same location with occasional deviations. Bayesian computational modelling revealed that patients 
updated their confidence levels and predictions separately, confirming the presence of an action-
belief dissociation that is prominent in the literature. Confidence levels were correctly updated based 
on changes in the coin location, but actual predictions did not reflect this knowledge. Instead, 
patients’ predictions were driven by the most recent observation (where the coin landed most 
recently) instead of accumulated information (where the coin landed most frequently). The 





was found that adults with OCD did not update actions and confidence in parallel while healthy adults 
did. Authors concluded that those with OCD are capable of developing an accurate internal model of 
the task environment, but fail to use this knowledge to guide their actions. More recently, this 
confidence-action dissociation has been found to be strongly linked to traits of compulsivity in a 
large sample of adult subjects (Seow & Gillan, 2020).  
   Substantially less research has been conducted assessing whether beliefs and actions are also 
dissociated in youths with OCD. Nonetheless, evidence has emerged from information sampling 
studies revealing that paediatric patients have higher decision thresholds than typically developing 
children, which means that patients continue to sample information before making a decision even 
when sufficient information has already been acquired (Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser, Moutoussis, et 
al., 2017). This could be suggestive of a dissociation between actions and knowledge, as young 
patients continue to request information even when doing so no longer has value within the context 
of the task. Motivation towards acquiring information may instead be internally generated, i.e. to 
reduce any personal doubt/uncertainty being felt. However, as a caveat, adolescents with OCD were 
also found to respond similarly to controls during degraded trials on a contingency degradation task 
and also showed intact action-outcome knowledge (Gottwald, 2017, thesis), suggesting that beliefs 
and action are relatively interconnected in young patients. Although, this study did not formally 
assess whether confidence and action were unlinked using a regression model nor did it ascertain 
whether adolescent patients’ actions were being driven by most recent feedback, as was done in 
Vaghi, Luyckx et al.’s (2017) study in adult patients.  
   Thus, this study aimed to investigate the relationship between confidence and action in a sample 
of adolescents with OCD using the predictive-inference task originally employed by Vaghi et al. 
(2017). In typically developing children, meta-cognition begins to emerge in early adolescence and 
increases in accuracy with age (Moses-Payne, Habicht, Bowler, Steinbeis, & Hauser, 2020). Thus, it 
was hypothesised that adolescents with OCD would reveal significantly reduced coupling between 




Sixty-nine participants in total completed the Predictive-Inference task. Twenty-three participants 
formed the OCD group while the remaining 46 were in the CTL group. I stopped recruiting control 





OCD and CTL groups. Eleven patients from the OCD group were receiving SSRI treatment at the 
time of the study while 12 were medication-naïve. Eight patients were medicated with sertraline and 
4 were medicated with fluoxetine. Mean SSRI dosage was 97.27mg (std dev: 58.33mg) and the dose 
range was 20 – 200 mg. IQ data was missing from one OCD participant. Further demographic details 
are outlined in the Results section of this chapter.  
5.2.2 Predictive-Inference Task  
This paradigm was originally used by Vaghi, Luyckx, et al. (2017), to test for a dissociation between 
confidence and action in adult patients diagnosed with OCD. 
Participants were instructed to try to predict where ‘coins’ emitting from the center of a circular ring 
would land by positioning an orange ‘bucket’ on the same circular ring to catch them (see Figure 
5.1). After positioning the bucket, participants had to rate their confidence in their choice on a rating 
scale ranging from 1 to 100. Before the task began, participants were told that coins mostly flew to 
approximately the same location, but that location could change sometimes. There was no time limit 
in each trial, but participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.  
The location the coin would be released to in each trial was mostly determined by sampling a 
Gaussian distribution. Hence, coins landed in a similar location with small variations driven by noise. 
The mean of this distribution usually remained stable over a block of trials but changed at random 
intervals (change-points, see Figure 5.2) when it was resampled from a uniform distribution. The 
probability of a change-point occurring at any point in a block was set to 0.125. This meant that 
participants were required to form a new belief about the mean of the Gaussian distribution each time 
a change-point occurred. There were 360 possible locations for coins to fly to when a change point 
occurred.  
During the task, the bucket could be moved around the ring using a Griffin PowerMate USB rotary 
controller attached to the testing laptop. Participants confirmed their responses by pressing the 
spacebar on the laptop keyboard. After 150ms, a confidence bar ranging from 0 to 100 would appear 
below the ring for participants to indicate how confident they were the coin would land in their 
bucket. The confidence pointer would always start on a random score between 25 and 75 so 
participants would be required to change their confidence rating on every trial. After pressing the 
spacebar again to confirm their confidence rating, a coin was released for 150ms. If the coin landed 
within the boundaries of the bucket, participants were awarded 10 points, whereas if the coin landed 
outside the boundaries, they lost 10 points. During correct trials, the bucket would ‘flash’ by turning 





would be played simultaneously for 400ms. Alternatively, during incorrect trials the centre dot turned 
red for 800ms and a dissonant tone would play for 400ms (see Figure 5.1) 
Stimuli were presented to participants using Matlab R2017b and Psychtoolbox (version 3). 
Participants completed one practice block of 20 trials and 4 blocks of 75 trials each in the main task. 
They were allowed to rest in between each block. The duration of the task was 18-20 minutes. 
 
FIGURE 5.9: STIMULUS PRESENTATION OF PREDICTIVE-INFERENCE TASK. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF A TRIAL WHERE 






FIGURE 5.10: COIN LOCATIONS ARE DETERMINED USING A GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION ON MOST TRIALS. WHEN A 
CHANGE POINT OCCURS, THE COIN LOCATION CHANGES DRASTICALLY ACCORDING TO A UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION. 
THE PROBABILITY OF A CHANGE POINT OCCURRING AT ANY POINT DURING THE TASK WAS 0.125. BLACK BARS IN 
THE FIGURE ABOVE REPRESENT POSSIBLE TRIALS THAT A CHANGE POINT COULD OCCUR IN WITHIN ONE BLOCK. 
OTHERWISE, COINS ARE SAMPLED FROM A GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (WHITE BARS). FIGURE WAS ADAPTED WITH 
PERMISSION FROM VAGHI, LUYCKX ET AL. (2017).  
 
5.3 Statistical Analyses 
5.3.1 Learning Rate Analysis 
Data manipulation and statistical analyses were conducted in Matlab R2017b and RStudio 3.5.0. 
Analyses and statistical models described here were originally designed and conducted by Vaghi, 
Luyckx et al. (2017).  
For each participant, learning rates on every trial (αt) were computed to understand how evidence 
accumulated in the task’s noisy environment influenced participants’ actions (positioning of the 




                                                                                                Equation 5.1 






In Equation 5.1 and 5.2, bt and bt+1 are the chosen bucket positions at trial t and trial t+1 respectively. 
δt, the spatial prediction error, is the difference between the location of the particle (Xt) at trial t and 
the position of the bucket at trial t (bt). Trials where the estimated learning rate (α) exceeded the 95
th 
percentile (calculated separately for each group) or where spatial prediction error was equal to zero 
were excluded from the analysis. This type of filtering was employed as such extreme values are 
reported to be due to noisy processes other than error-driven learning (Nassar et al., 2016). It is worth 
noting that the exclusion threshold used was more stringent than what was employed in Vaghi et al. 
(2017), who excluded trials exceeding the 99th group percentile. After discussion with Dr. Matilde 
Vaghi, we decided it was necessary to decrease the cut-off threshold as several trials in our sample 
revealed extremely high learning rates (αt>1). A two-sample t-test was used to confirm that there was 
no significant difference in the proportion of trials removed between the OCD and CTL groups (see 
‘Data Checks’ in Results section). Difference in mean learning rates between groups was then 
analysed using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Additionally, raw confidence ratings were converted to z-
scores and a two-sample t-test was used to detect group differences. 
To test the effects of spatial prediction error (see Equation 2) on learning rates, the learning rates 
were divided into 3 quantiles based on magnitude of spatial prediction error (low, medium, and high) 
using the ‘quantile’ function in Matlab. For each spatial prediction error quantile, the mean learning 
rate was computed separately per group (OCD vs CTL). Due to violations of homogeneity of variance 
and normality, the Welch-James test from the ‘welchADF’ package in RStudio (Villacorta, 2017) 
was used to determine the effects of magnitude of spatial prediction error (low, medium, high) and 
subject group on learning rates. Post-hoc paired Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction were 
conducted following the main Welch-James test. Magnitude of an effect was determined via a 
Wilcoxon effect size (Wilcoxon r) calculated by dividing the test z-statistic by the square root of the 
sample size (Z/√N). The following interpretations of effect size values were used, small effect: 0.1 - 
< 0.3, moderate effect: 0.3 - < 0.5 and large effect: >= 0.5. 
5.3.2 Computational Model 
Next, to better understand factors influencing trial-by-trial confidence and action updates in 
participants, a quasi-optimal Bayesian model (previously implemented by Vaghi, Luyckx et al.) was 
fit to participant data. The model in question is termed a quasi-optimal Bayesian model as it attempts 
to approximate the behaviour of a full Bayesian learner which would infer future outcomes using 
information accumulated over all previous outcomes (Nassar et al., 2010), but using the less 
computationally complex delta rule. The delta rule (see Equation 5.3) involves updating a future 





(δt). The influence of the new outcome over beliefs (Bt) is controlled by a learning rate (αt). At αt =
0, the model’s belief is not changed following incoming outcome information at all, while at αt = 1 
the most recent outcome will completely influence the model’s beliefs. 
Bt+1 = Bt + αt x δt                                                                                           Equation 5.3 
The prediction error, δt  is defined as the difference between the current belief about the coin’s 
location, Bt, and the actual location of the coin, Xt:  
δt = Xt – Bt                                                                                                                     Equation 5.4 
In turn, the model’s learning rate, αt, is defined as: 
αt = Ωt + (1 - Ωt) (1 – vt)                                                                                     Equation 5.5 
α, in the above equation, was dynamic meaning it could change from trial-to-trial (as opposed to α 
parameters in other reinforcement learning studies which are kept constant). Ωt in Equation 5.5 
represents the change-point probability, indicating how likely the model thinks a change in location 
has occurred. αt increases when the model assumes a change-point is likely to have taken place. This 
change point probability, Ωt, is constructed as the relative likelihood that a new location will be drawn 
from the same Gaussian distribution (N) centred around the current belief, Bt of the model, or 




                                                                          Equation 5.6 
H in the equation above represents the hazard rate (the actual probability that the mean distribution 
has changed at any given trial). H was fixed at 0.125.  Ωt will be close to 1 when the probability of 
the sample coming from a uniform distribution is higher than the probability of it being drawn from 
a Gaussian distribution (indicating a surprising outcome).  
σ²t in Equation 5.6 is the estimated variance of the predictive distribution and is influenced by the 
variance of the generative Gaussian distribution σ²N (noise in the location of the sample before a 
change point has occurred) and model confidence, vt:  
σ²t = σ²N +
(1−𝑣t)σ²N
𝑣t





Lastly, model confidence, v, in Equation 5.5 is always computed for the subsequent trial, and takes 
into account uncertainty arising from imprecise estimation of the mean of the sample location: 
𝑣t+1 =
Ωtσ²N+(1− Ωt)(1−𝑣𝑡)σ²t+ Ωt(1− Ωt)(σ²t 𝑣𝑡)²
Ωtσ²N+(1− Ωt)(1−𝑣𝑡)σ²t+ Ωt(1− Ωt)(σ²t 𝑣𝑡)²+σ²N
                                                 Equation 5.8 
There are 3 terms included in the numerator (from left to right): 1) reflects the variance when a change 
point is thought to have occurred, 2) represents variance when no change point is assumed to have 
occurred, and finally 3) reflects a rise in uncertainty when the model is unsure about whether a change 
point has occurred or not. The 3 terms from the numerator are repeated in the denominator with an 
added variance term reflecting uncertainty arising from noise in the Gaussian distribution. When an 
unexpected change in the task environment occurs, model confidence will decrease, and as a result, 
the learning rate, αt in Equation 5.5 will increase.  
5.3.3 Influence of Model Parameters on Learning and Confidence 
Linear regressions were run to estimate how much participants updated their actions and confidence 
over time according to parameters from the Bayesian model. Each regression model contained 
parameters from the model as predictors, namely absolute prediction error, change point probability, 
and the inverse of model confidence (relative uncertainty), which reflects uncertainty arising from 
inaccurate estimation of the mean coin position. Relative uncertainty was inserted as (1- Ω)*(1-𝑣 ) in 
the regression models which is consistent with the term in Equation 5.5. Hit/miss was also inserted 
as a categorical variable to assess whether human action and confidence was influenced by immediate 
positive feedback.   
For the action regression model, the dependent variable, ‘action’ was constructed similar to the belief 
update formula of the Bayesian model (Equation 5.3), by multiplying the learning rate, αt, by the 
absolute prediction error, |δt|. If participant behaviour mimicked that of the Bayesian model, action 
would be suitably influenced by spatial prediction error, change point probability, and model 
confidence, but not by hit/miss feedback. Within the confidence regression model, z-scored reported 
confidence was included as the dependent variable. Since confidence rises as uncertainty decreases, 
negative regression slopes/beta coefficients were expected for the change-point probability and 
relative uncertainty parameters. The last trial of each block per participant was removed before 
conducting the regressions as learning rates could not be estimated from these trials. Goodness-of-fit 
of each model to participant data was assessed by extracting median R-squared values, which was 





To formally examine whether confidence and action are uncoupled in adolescent patients, a third 
linear regression model was conducted with absolute confidence update (absolute difference between 
z-scored confidence scores on trial t and t-1) as the independent variable and absolute action update 
(absolute difference between where bucket was positioned at trial t and t-1) as the dependent variable. 
If confidence and action were linked, increased adjusting of bucket position (action) would 
correspond to a similar magnitude of changes in confidence ratings.  
To ascertain the presence of group differences in performance, beta coefficients associated with each 
predictor across the three regressions were extracted and compared between patients and controls. 
Independent sample t-tests were employed for these comparison analyses. Wherever the 
homogeneity of variance assumption was violated the Welch’s independent t-test was used instead. 
Additionally, if the normality assumption was violated the Wilcoxon rank sum test was used. Cohen’s 
d was calculated as a measure of effect size whenever a significant effect of group was detected. The 
following interpretations of effect size values were used, small effect: <= 0.2 - <0.5, moderate effect: 
0.5 > - < 0.8 and large effect: >= 0.8. 
Correlations between task measures (learning rates, confidence scores, and regression beta values) 
and clinical and intelligence scores were quantified using Pearson’s correlation coefficient (Pearson’s 
r).   
 Finally, the analyses described above were re-run but this time comparing behaviour on the task 
between 3 independent groups, CTL, MED-, and MED+. These exploratory analyses were conducted 
to examine whether the proposed action-confidence dissociation displayed by patients with OCD was 
modulated by SSRIs. I first checked whether there was a difference in learning rates between the 
three groups using the data that was filtered using a 95% threshold for CTL and OCD separately. 
The analyses were then repeated using data that was filtered using a 95% threshold for CTL, MED-, 
and MED+ groups.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Analyses by Group (CTL vs OCD) 
Sixty-nine participants in total completed the Predictive-Inference task. Twenty-three participants 
formed the OCD group while the remaining 46 were in the CTL (healthy control) group. Table 5.1 
summarises the demographic and clinical characteristics for both groups. Groups were matched for 
gender, age, and IQ (intelligence quotient) scores. However, OCD had significantly elevated 






Table 5.1: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and measure. 
 
CTL (n = 46) OCD (n = 23)  STATISTIC 
GENDER(F:M)  28/18 14/9 χ2 (1)=0, p = 1 
AGE 16.59 ± 1.78  15.95 ± 1.67 t(67) = 1.44; p = .15 
WASI-II (IQ)a 107.61 ± 11.62 108.32 ± 13.80 t(66) = -0.22; p = .83 
BDI ** 46.46 ± 5.27 58.35 ± 8.95 t(29.84) = -5.88; p = 2.96e-06 
BAI ** 45.98 ± 7.66 66.30 ± 9.55 Z = -6.52; p = 6.85e-11 
OCI ** 8.13 ± 6.49 30.74 ±  14.08 Z = -5.93; p = 2.99e-09 
CY-BOCS N/A 23.45 ± 5.19 N/A 
Key: CTL: Control Group; OCD: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child Yale-Brown Obsessive-
Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; a missing data from one OCD participant. 
 
Learning Rate and Spatial Prediction Error 
There was a trend for OCD (0.87 ± 0.56) to show increased learning rates compared to CTL 
(0.61±0.25), Z = -1.92; p = .055 (see Figure 5.3). 
 
FIGURE 5.11: MEAN LEARNING RATES FOR CTL AND OCD. GROUPS DID NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM EACH 





Z-scored confidence ratings did not differ significantly between groups, t(67) = 1.30; p = .20.  
Next, after dividing the learning rates by magnitude of spatial prediction error (Low, Medium, High), 
I found a significant main effect of Error Magnitude Twj(2,28.80) = 66.76, p = 1.54e-1l; η2 = 0.037, 
wherein learning rates were higher at High (0.81±0.80) magnitudes compared to Medium 
(0.56±0.34) magnitudes, (Wilcoxon test: Z =-5.53; p = 3.15e-08; Wilcoxon’s r = 0.46). There were 
no significant differences in learning rates between Low (0.82±1.11) and Medium (p = .597) and 
Low and High magnitudes (p = .058).  
Importantly, a significant Group-by-Error Magnitude interaction was detected (see Figure 5.4), Twj 
(2,28.80) = 4.37, p = .022; η2 = 0.076. Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests revealed that OCD (1.41±1.68) 
displayed higher learning rates compared to CTL (0.53±0.46) in response to Low error magnitudes 
(Z =-2.52; p = .012; Wilcoxon’s r =0.30). There were no group differences in learning rates at 
Medium (CTL: 0.53±0.30; OCD: 0.63±0.41; p = .49) and High (CTL: 0.80±0.11; OCD: 0.82±0.13; 






The median r-squared values for the action regression model were CTL: 0.87 and OCD: 0.80, while 
the median r-squared values for the confidence regression model were CTL: 0.09 and OCD: 0.06. 
FIGURE 5.12: MEAN LEARNING RATE PER GROUP BINNED ACCORDING TO ERROR MAGNITUDE (SPATIAL 






These estimates of goodness-of-model fit were similar to the median r-squared values reported in 
Vaghi et al.’s study (action: CTL – 0.81, OCD – 0.85; confidence: CTL – 0.15, OCD – 0.11).  
The action and confidence regression results are summarised in Table 5.2 and 5.3 respectively as 
well as in Figure 5.5. In the confidence model, confidence scores were more influenced by prediction 
errors in CTL (Beta Coefficients: -0.086±0.13) compared to OCD (Beta Coefficients: -0.0067±0.15), 
t(67) = -2.26; p = .027; Cohen’s d = 0.58. There were no other group differences in parameter values 
in the confidence model. Additionally, there were no group differences in any of the beta values 
corresponding to parameters in the action model.  
 
Table 5.2: Summary of parameters for CTL and OCD obtained from Action regression model 




Analyses used Statistics 
PE CTL 0.43 0.30 Two-sample t-test t(67) = 0.50; p =.62  
 OCD 0.39 0.32   
CPP CTL 0.47 0.29 
 
Two-sample t-test t(67) = 0.017; p 
=.99  
 OCD 0.46 0.28   
RU CTL 0.71 0.67 
 
Two-sample t-test t(29.86) = -1.2, p = 
.24 
 OCD 1.02 1.13   
Hit/Missed CTL -0.74 0.24 Welch Two-
sample t-test 
t(67) = 0.40; p = 
.69 
 OCD -0.76 0.32   
Key- PE: prediction error, CPP: Change Point Probability, RU: Relative Uncertainty 
Table 5.3: Summary of parameters for CTL and OCD obtained from Confidence regression 
model 




Analyses used Statistics 
PE CTL -0.086 0.13 Two-sample t-
test 
t(67) = -2.26; p = 
.027; Cohen’s d = 
0.58 
 OCD -0.0067 0.14   
CPP CTL -0.118 0.21 Two-sample t-
test 
t(67) = 1.19; p = .24 
 OCD -0.186 0.25   
RU CTL -0.168 0.15 Two-sample t-
test 
t(67) = -0.40; p = .69 
 OCD -0.151 0.18   
Hit/Missed CTL 0.156 0.12 Two-sample t-
test 
t(67) = 1.61; p = .11 
 OCD 0.104 0.13   




























Next, the confidence-action regression model revealed no group differences in degree of action-
confidence coupling (CTL: 0.053 ± 0.064; OCD: 0.050 ± 0.084; t(34.99) = 0.11, p = .91) (see Figure 
5.6).  
* 
Confidence Model  
Action Model  
FIGURE 13.5: REGRESSION MODELS FOR CONFIDENCE (TOP) AND ACTION (BOTTOM). |PE|: ABSOLUTE PREDICTION ERROR; CPP: 
CHANGE POINT PROBABILITY; (1-CPP)*(1-MC): RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY; HIT: HIT/MISSED FEEDBACK. CTL SHOWED LOWER 






FIGURE 5.14: CONFIDENCE-ACTION DISSOCIATION REGRESSION BETAS. NO GROUP DIFFERENCES WERE 





















5.4.2 Medication Exploratory Analyses  
In this section, OCD were further grouped into MED+ (medicated) and MED- (unmedicated). The 
groups still displayed no significant differences in gender, age, and IQ (see Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and statistical test. 
 
CTL (n = 
46) 
MED- (n = 
12)  




GENDER(F:M)  28/18 8/4 6/5 χ2 (2)=0.35 , p = 0.84 - 
AGE 16.59 ± 1.78  15.87  ± 
1.60  
16.04 ± 1.81 
 
χ2 (2)=4.50 , p = 0.11 - 







F(2,65) = 0.19, p=0.83 - 
BDI ** 46.46 ± 5.27 56.67 ± 
9.52 
60.18 ± 8.33 F(2,66) = 42.1, p=1.64e-
12 
CTL < MED- & MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 
 
BAI ** 45.98 ± 7.66 66.08 ± 
9.53 
66.55 ± 10.03 χ2 (2)=42.57 , p = 5.7e-
10 
CTL < MED- & MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 
OCI ** 8.13 ± 6.49 32.33 ± 
14.74 
29.00 ± 13.82 
 
χ2 (2)=35.30 , p = 
2.159e-08 
CTL < MED- & MED+ 
MED- = MED+ 
 
CY-BOCS N/A 24.73 ± 
5.88 
22.18 ± 4.29 t(20) = 1.16; p=0.26 N/A 
Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Unmedicated patient group; MED+: Medicated patient group; WISC-IV: 
Wechsler’s Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory 
(t-scored); BAI: Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Child 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01; a missing data from one MED- participant. 
 
Post-hoc tests revealed that compared to CTL, MED+ and MED- groups had elevated depression 
(Pairwise t-tests, MED- vs CTL: t(66) = 4.72; p = .000038, MED+ vs CTL: t(66) = 6.13; p = 1.66e-
06), anxiety (Dunn’s test, MED- vs CTL: p = 5.60e-07, MED+ vs CTL:  p = 2.25e-06), and 
obsessive-compulsive scores (Dunn’s tests, MED- vs CTL:  p = 3.18e-06, MED+ vs CTL: p = 5.23e-
05). There were no differences on these measures between MED- and MED+ (all p > .05).  
First, I divided the learning rates (filtered by OCD and CTL) into CTL, MED-, and MED+ groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant effect of group on the learning rates, χ2 (2) = 8.03, p = 
.034, η2 = 0.072. Post-hoc Wilcoxon pairwise tests indicated that MED- (0.97±0.47) had 





= 0.36. Conversely, CTL and MED+ (0.78±0.66; p=1.00), as well as MED- and MED+ (p=.57) 
showed comparable learning rates to one another. 
Following this result, I then decided to filter out trials with learning rates that were greater than the 
95th percentile for each of the 3 groups, identical to what was done for the OCD vs CTL analysis. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test on these newly filtered learning rates still showed a significant group effect, χ2 
(2) = 9.16, p = .010; η2 = 011. Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests continued to reveal a difference in learning 
rates between MED- (1.07±0.49) and CTL (0.61±0.25), Z= -2.97; p=.03; Wilcoxon’s r = 0.41 (see 
Figure 5.7). Other pairwise comparisons were not significant (MED+ = MED-, p=.35; MED+ = CTL, 
p=1.00). Additionally, z-scored confidence ratings were comparable across the 3 groups (F(2,66) = 
.901; p = .41). 
 
FIGURE 5.15: LEARNING RATES BY GROUP. LEARNING RATES FOR MED- WERE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN 
CTL. MED+ = CTL AND MED- = MED+. 
 
Next, after dividing learning rates by spatial prediction error magnitudes, there was a significant 
effect of Group (Twj(2,14.92) = 4.68, p = .026), Error Magnitude (Twj(2,19.56)=58.96, p = 5.22e-09), 
and Group x Error Magnitude (Twj(4,17.14)=4.00 , p = .018) (see Figure 5.8). Post-hoc Wilcoxon 
tests indicated that MED- (1.93±1.41) had higher learning rates at Low error magnitudes compared 
to CTL (0.53±0.46), Z = -4.18, p = 2.98e-5, Wilcoxon’s r = 0.51. Learning rates at low error 
magnitudes were equivalent between MED+ (1.25±2.21) and CTL (p = 1.00), as well as between 







FIGURE 5.16: LEARNING RATES DIVIDED INTO LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH ERROR MAGNITUDES. MED- SHOWED 
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED LEARNING RATES COMPARED TO CTL DURING LOW ERROR MAGNITUDES. 
 
Next, the median r-squared values for the regression models were as follows: action regression, CTL 
= 0.87, MED+ = 0.76, MED- = 0.81; confidence regression, CTL =0.085, MED+ = 0.073, MED- = 
0.048.  
There were no significant group differences in beta values across all parameters included in the action 














Table 5.5: Summary of parameters for CTL MED- and MED+ obtained from Action 
regression model 




Analyses used Statistics 
PE CTL 0.43 0.30 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 0.052, p 
= .95 
 MED- 0.43 0.37   
 MED+ 0.40 0.31   
CPP CTL 0.47 0.29 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 1.11, p = 
.33  
 MED- 0.41 0.31   
 MED+ 0.48 0.26   
RU CTL 0.71 0.67 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 0.53 ; p = 
.59  
 MED- 0.93 1.33   
 MED+ 1.01 0.94   
Hit/Missed CTL -0.74 0.24 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 0.69; p = 
.51 
 MED- -0.85 0.28   
 MED+ -0.70 0.35   
Key- PE: prediction error, CPP: Change Point Probability, RU: Relative Uncertainty 
 
Table 5.6: Summary of parameters for CTL, MED-, and MED+ obtained from Confidence 
regression model 




Analyses used Statistics 
PE CTL -0.086 0.13 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 2.38, p = 
.10 
 MED- 0.013 0.16   
 MED+ -0.037 0.18   
CPP CTL -0.12 0.21 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 1.48, p = 
.24 
 MED- -0.15 0.26   
 MED+ -0.21 0.28   
RU CTL -0.17 0.15 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 0.53; p = 
.59 
 MED- -0.12 0.17   
 MED+ -0.18 0.20   
Hit/Missed CTL 0.16 0.12 One-Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,66) = 0.69; p = 
.51 
 MED- 0.088 0.13   
 MED+ 0.13 0.12   






Lastly, there were no group differences in beta values for the action-confidence coupling regression 
(CTL: 0.054 ± 0.065, MED-: 0.043 ± 0.090, MED+: 0.071 ± 0.076; F(2,66) = 0.442, p = 0.645), 
indicating that action and confidence were coupled to the same extent in all groups. 
5.4.3 Correlation Analysis 
Across all participants, lower IQ was associated with increased learning rates (r = 0.28, p = .020). 
However, this significant correlation was no longer present when doing separate group analyses 
(CTL: p = .13; OCD: p=.87).  
Within MED+, elevated depression scores were associated with lower learning rates (r = -0.74, p = 
.0087). Medication dosage correlated with IQ scores (r =0.61, p = .049). 
Next, within MED-, IQ showed a negative relationship with confidence scores (r =-0.68, p = .021), 
but the opposite relationship emerged in MED+ (r = 0.77, p = .0055).  
No other significant relationships between task measures and clinical/demographic/intelligence 
measures were detected. 
5.4.4 Overall Data Checks 
After filtering trials that exceeded the 95th percentile per group, I checked that there were no statistical 
differences in proportion of trials removed for the OCD and CTL groups, (mean proportion removed: 
CTL = 0.065±0.044; OCD = 0.064±0.052; F(1,67) = 0.0044, p = .95), as well as for CTL, MED-, 
and MED+ groups (mean proportion removed: CTL: 0.087±0.045, MED-: 0.066±0.081, MED+: 
0.045±0.029; F(2,66) =1.97, p = .15).  
Next, it was verified that CTL and OCD showed overall comparable performance on the task as there 
was no significant difference in mean number of points gained between groups, t(67) = 0.62, p= .54. 
There were also no performance differences between CTL, MED+, and MED- (F(2,66) = 0.96; p= 
.40).  
5.4.5 Summary of Main Results 
When dividing participants by OCD and CTL, OCD revealed a trend for increased learning rates 
overall. These elevated learning rates were most apparent in OCD when spatial prediction error 
magnitudes (difference between belief about location and actual location) were low. When analysing 
groups by medication status, increased learning rates at low error magnitudes were driven primarily 
by MED-. The regression analyses revealed no striking differences between groups aside from CTL 
making lower confidence ratings according to magnitude of spatial prediction errors compared to 





All participant groups showed similar levels of coupling between action and confidence as 
demonstrated in the action-confidence regression analyses.  
 
5.5 Discussion 
   This study sought to investigate the relationship between action and confidence in adolescents with 
OCD compared to typically developing adolescents. The paradigm used was previously implemented 
by Vaghi, Luyckx et al., (2017) who uncovered a novel dissociation between action and confidence 
in adults with OCD, in addition to increased action updating following recent feedback in this clinical 
population. Distinct from their adult counterparts, adolescents with OCD showed similar levels of 
action-confidence coupling to matched controls. Furthermore, overactive action updating in OCD 
was only prominent during low spatial prediction errors, which is in contrast to adult patients who 
had displayed abnormally enhanced updating at every magnitude of prediction error (Vaghi, Luyckx, 
et al., 2017). Increased learning rates following low prediction errors was driven primarily by the 
unmedicated patients. Lastly, the adolescent OCD group’s confidence ratings were less influenced 
by prediction errors compared to healthy controls.  
5.5.1 Increased learning rates in OCD 
   Heightened learning rates displayed by adult patients in Vaghi, Luyckx et al.’s study was posited 
to indicate patients’ choices were influenced largely by most recent outcomes rather than information 
accumulated over time. In contrast, healthy adults understood that the best strategy, before a change 
point occurred, was to position the bucket in the position with the highest likelihood for a coin to 
land. This finding is emphasised in that study’s regression analysis whereby adult patients’ actions 
were most affected by prediction errors and not change point probabilities.       
   By contrast, adolescents with OCD only updated actions excessively following low prediction 
errors, suggesting they are not as sensitive to recent negative feedback as adults with the disorder. In 
fact, the lack of group differences within the action regression model is likely attributed to patients 
updating their actions similarly to controls following other magnitudes of prediction error. Excessive 
updating at low prediction errors demonstrate that patients are ‘tracking’ the location of the coin by 
moving the bucket every time the coin makes a small deviation from its last location. One line of 
reasoning for this behaviour is that the OCD group are pre-occupied with ensuring the coin lands 
with high certainty in the middle of the bucket. As an anecdote, when I asked two participants with 
OCD about their experiences with the task, they reported that they were simply following the location 





perception (where a sufferer has internal feelings of incompleteness or that their environment is not 
as it should be) often present in OCD. In actual fact, 59% of paediatric OCD patients describe having 
not-just-right related obsessions (Nissen & Parner, 2018), and they are even present in biological 
parents of OCD patients (Sica, Bottesi, Caudek, Orsucci, & Ghisi, 2016). Trials where the coin just 
barely lands in the bucket may have triggered a not-just-right perception in the OCD group, leading 
to the urge to re-arrange the bucket. Indeed, ordering/symmetry-related compulsions, like what is 
seen here, are strongly associated with not-just-right perceptions (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & 
Rhéaume, 2003).  
   These frequent, albeit small, choice corrections done by adolescents with OCD, are consistent with 
numerous studies reporting increased error-related negativity (ERN) in paediatric OCD patients (see 
Chapter 1). Importantly, these error signals are generated in the absence of feedback and are instead 
triggered by a person’s own awareness that an error has indeed occurred (Potts et al., 2012). 
Heightened ERN in OCD could be likened to an internal ‘alarm bell’ that frequently sounds despite 
low volatility in the external environment. In line with this, Fradkin, Adams et al.’s (2020) 
computational model of OCD proposes that feeling excessively uncertain about the objectively stable 
environment leads to patients perceiving that their rituals are not performed adequately culminating 
in a tendency to repeat actions. Hence, uncertainty about the environment exacerbated by (or 
contributing to) abnormal ERN signals could be driving excessive action updating/correcting in the 
current task, even when there is nothing to correct.   
   Moreover, frequent choice updating in this task could be a form of increased information gathering, 
which has been observed prior in youths with OCD on information sampling (Hauser, Moutoussis, 
et al., 2017) and perceptual decision-making tasks (Erhan et al., 2017). In these studies, young 
patients accumulated more information than controls even when they had collected more than enough 
information to form a correct response. Patients in my study could be executing a similar type of 
behaviour where they are adjusting their choices to gather more information about the most optimal 
location. Increased perceptual uncertainty, as discussed earlier, could be driving this need to gather 
more information. Alternatively, patients may be taking a longer time than controls to learn the exact 
optimal location to place the bucket, which would be compatible with research suggesting that youths 
with OCD have a learning deficit (Gottwald et al., 2018; Vloet et al., 2010). Nonetheless, behaviour 
on this current task in OCD is only divergent from controls at low prediction errors suggesting that 
learning is otherwise equivalent between groups. Moreover, number of points garnered between 
groups across the task was comparable. Hence, it is more probable that uncertainty and/or not-just-





5.5.2 Blunted confidence updating in OCD 
   Next, confidence ratings in the adolescent OCD group were found to be insensitive to the influence 
of prediction errors, while controls decreased their confidence ratings when predictions errors were 
high. This finding is reminiscent of recent dimensional psychiatry work revealing a relationship 
between compulsive behaviour/intrusive thoughts and inflated confidence levels in healthy adults 
who completed a perceptual decision-making task (Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming, 2018), and an 
online version of the predictive-inference task (Seow & Gillan, 2020). Furthermore, in the latter study 
confidence updating in compulsive participants was less influenced by unexpected outcomes and 
feedback, similar to what was found in my study. 
   Blunted confidence updating in patients supports the proposal by Fradkin, Adams et al. (2020) that 
individuals with OCD do not use external evidence to inform their beliefs and actions. Beliefs may 
instead be influenced by an intrinsic sense of ‘wrongness’ (akin to the ‘alarm’ analogy used earlier). 
Indeed, patients with OCD on this task appear to be behaving in accordance with their own volition 
and not according to the task structure, by updating their choices when it is not necessary, and not 
updating their confidence levels when they are expected to do so.     
   By contrast, healthy controls updated their confidence according to prediction errors, which aligns 
with prior work demonstrating that healthy adolescents adjust their behaviour more following 
negative prediction errors compared to adults (Hauser, Iannaccone, Walitza, Brandeis, & Brem, 
2015). This demonstrates a pattern of emerging evidence where typically developing adolescents 
actually seem to be punishment averse, and not reward sensitive as was previously thought, on 
reinforcement learning paradigms compared to other age groups (Rosenbaum, Grassie, & Hartley, 
2020). Inversely, adolescents with OCD do not take into account external feedback when updating 
confidence, and thus appear less affected by negative feedback compared to healthy adolescents. 
5.5.3 No difference in confidence-action coupling between OCD and healthy adolescents 
   Despite numerous studies demonstrating a belief-action dissociation in adult OCD and even in 
healthy adults with compulsive tendencies (Hauser, Allen, et al., 2017; Rouault et al., 2018; Seow, 
O’Connell, & Gillan, 2020; Vaghi et al., 2019), I found no difference between adolescent patients 
and controls when formally testing the strength of association between action and confidence in my 
sample of participants. This null result was in spite of observing unusual patterns of action and 
confidence updating in the OCD group. Nonetheless, excessive action updating by patients was only 
seen in specific circumstances (following low prediction errors), which may the reason for not seeing 





   At first glance, it appears that adolescents with OCD more often than not update their confidence 
and actions in parallel, unlike adults with the disorder. This suggests that the two constructs 
(confidence and action) become unlinked over time, perhaps as disease duration increases and 
heavily impacts executive functioning. However, I propose an alternative explanation: meta-
cognition may still be developing in healthy adolescents resulting in a lack of noticeable differences 
between patients and controls. This is supported by research demonstrating that accurate meta-
cognition only begins to emerge in early adolescence but strengthens over time well into late 
adolescence before plateauing in adulthood (Fandakova et al., 2020; Moses-Payne, Habicht, Bowler, 
Steinbeis, & Hauser, 2020; Weil et al., 2013). Likewise, an impressive new piece of computational 
research by Jepma, Schaaf, Visser, & Huizenga (2020) has discovered that that healthy adolescents, 
compared to healthy adults, overestimated the importance of recent volatile feedback rather than take 
into account information accumulated across the task so far. Crucially, self-reported certainty did not 
differ between age agroups, highly indicative of a mismatch between confidence and behaviour. In 
short, adolescents in Jepma et al.’s study were behaving similar to adult OCD patients in Vaghi, 
Luyckx et al.’s (2017) predictive-inference study. In my current study, detecting an effect of OCD is 
difficult as the adolescent control group are likely to also update action and confidence 
independently. The adolescent controls will eventually develop into adults who can make more 
accurate judgements of their own performance in the face of environmental volatility, while 
adolescents with OCD will unfortunately continue to grapple with this deficit throughout their lives 
(as shown in Vaghi et al.’s study where the action-confidence dissociation was highly pronounced in 
the adults with OCD but not healthy adults). 
5.5.4 Medication effects 
   Nonetheless, the future may not be as bleak as was just implied for youths with OCD as I have 
found that excessive updating during low prediction errors was primarily driven by unmedicated 
patients with OCD, while patients medicated with SSRIs did not differ significantly from controls 
(which is at odds with findings from previous chapters in this thesis). This is in contrast to Vaghi, 
Luyckx et al.’s findings where medication dosage in their OCD sample did not predict increased 
learning rates, although Vaghi, Luyckx et al. did not have enough non-medicated subjects in their 
OCD sample to conduct a group analysis. One interpretation could be that symptoms of OCD in 
younger people are more amenable to treatment compared to adults who likely also have longer 
disease durations. Indeed, it was found that juvenile patients respond faster to pharmacological and 
therapeutic treatment compared to adults (Mancebo et al., 2008). Thus, SSRIs seem to be 





   This also somewhat aligns with research suggesting that medicated adult patients show superior 
performance to medication-naïve patients on various learning and planning tasks (Lochner et al., 
2020; Palminteri et al., 2012). Importantly, SSRIs administered to adolescents and children with 
OCD have been found to lead to significant improvements on verbal memory, processing speed, 
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility compared to baseline (Andrés et al., 2008). However, these 
results contrast with previous chapters of this thesis that show more abnormal decision-making in 
medicated adolescent patients. Medication effects are discussed further in Chapter 7.      
5.5.5 Limitations and Further Research    
   As has become a running theme in this thesis, it is important to highlight that the OCD group’s 
sample size, particularly after further separating the group by medication status, is still quite limited 
and caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. 
   Next, I did not consider other models when fitting behaviour aside from the quasi-optimal Bayesian 
learning model that had been previously used and validated by Vaghi, Luyckx et al. (2017) for this 
task. While the model in question was found to be the best-fitting one for adult behaviour, it may be 
less suitable for capturing and disentangling adolescent behaviour. Jepma et al. (2020) found that 
distinct reinforcement learning models best fit their adult and adolescent subgroups, where a model 
with dynamic learning rates was more suitable for the adult data and a model with a single learning 
rate across the entire task better fit the adolescent data. Different families of models for this task may 
be considered in the future.  
   Lastly, it is important to note that although I find it plausible that healthy adolescents showed age-
related action-confidence discoupling (which is why we see no differences on this compared to 
adolescent patients) this was not formally tested. Moreover, no association between age and action-
confidence coupling strength was found in this sample. Hence, in an upcoming study I aim to 
combine my dataset with Vaghi, Luyckx et al.’s (2017) adult dataset to investigate whether the 
presence of OCD and age interact to influence action-confidence coupling.  
5.5.6 Conclusion 
Inspired by previous work detailing a novel action-outcome dissociation in adults with OCD, I 
demonstrated that adolescents with OCD do not show such a marked dissociation compared to 
healthy matched controls. This finding may be driven by meta-cognition not being fully developed 
in the healthy adolescent group, and I hope to formally probe the possibility for these processes being 
age-dependent in a future study. Instead, patients with OCD deviated most from healthy adolescent 





unnecessary updates of the bucket location. Furthermore, patients’ confidence ratings were not as 
influenced by prediction errors as those of control participants. I posit that youths with OCD update 
their actions and beliefs according to their own internal sensations of uncertainty rather than 
following observable changes in the task environment. This is consistent with an amalgamation of 
prior research reporting uncertainty-driven information sampling and checking, error-related 
negativity, and blunted confidence updating in obsessive-compulsive individuals. I also provide 
preliminary evidence for aberrant action-updating to be remediated by SSRI treatment in youths with 
OCD, emphasising the importance of early intervention in improving disorder related decision-


















Chapter 6: Probabilistic Reversal Learning in Adolescents 
with OCD 
6.1 Introduction 
   As described in Chapter 1 of this thesis, reversal learning involves the adaptation of behaviour 
according to changes in stimulus-reward contingencies (Rolls, 1999). Probabilistic reversal learning 
has an added layer of complexity as the feedback given is probabilistic, meaning one has to 
distinguish between veridical (true) and spurious (false) feedback in order to make optimal choices 
(Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Swainson et al., 2000). The paradigm is commonly used to 
assess domains of cognitive flexibility and feedback learning. Deficits in probabilistic reversal 
learning have been found in a variety of psychiatric groups including schizophrenia, Parkinson’s 
disease, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and OCD (Dickstein et al., 2010; Peterson et 
al., 2009; Remijnse et al., 2009; Remijnse et al., 2006; Robinson, Cools, Carlisi, Sahakian, & Drevets, 
2012; Tavares et al., 2008; Waltz & Gold, 2007). Due to this lack of specificity, research is 
increasingly employing computational methods to understand latent cognitive processes unique to 
populations with different psychiatric conditions. Findings from such methods in the context of OCD 
are described later in this section. 
  First, the majority of studies have sought to understand probabilistic reversal learning in patients 
with OCD using a combination of standard statistical methods and neuroimaging, although such 
studies report varied results. One study by Remijnse et al. (2006) reported that adults with OCD 
displayed more spontaneous errors and fewer correct responses overall compared to matched 
controls. Moreover, differential brain activity to punishment and reward processing was found; 
patients under-recruited the right medial and lateral OFC, and right caudate nucleus during reward 
processing and showed decreased activity in the left posterior OFC, bilateral insula, bilateral anterior 
PFC, and bilateral dlPFC during punishment processing. Additionally, Morein-Zamir et al., (2014) 
found that adult OCD patients with hoarding tendencies showed impaired performance on the task 
following reversal. Likewise, a more recent study by Tezcan, Tumkaya, & Bora (2017) showed that 
adults with OCD and their unaffected first-degree relatives make more reversal errors compared to 
controls. In addition, adults with OCD also reportedly show a bias towards avoidance learning as 
they are more likely to avoid stimuli associated with negative outcomes compared to preferring 
stimuli associated with positive outcomes (Endrass et al., 2011). Moreover, a meta-analysis probing 
measures of flexibility across various cognitive tasks including the probabilistic reversal learning 





make more errors before reversals compared to control subjects (Fradkin et al., 2018). On the whole, 
these results indicate impaired reversal learning and oversensitivity to punishing feedback in adults 
with OCD.  
   However, a proportion of the samples in Reminjnse et al.’s (2006) and Endrass et al.,’s (2011) 
studies had comorbid depressive disorder alongside OCD which may have influenced the results. In 
fact, Reminjse et al. (2009) attempted to replicate the original Remijnse et al. (2006) study with 
participants who only had a diagnosis of OCD and found no behavioural deficits on probabilistic 
reversal learning. Other studies also report a lack of OCD-related behavioural impairments on the 
task (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, et al., 2007; Ersche et al., 2011; Valerius et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, altered brain activity in adults with OCD in response to the task seems to be a robust 
finding, as Reminjse et al. (2009) found right medial OFC underactivation linked to reward 
processing similar to the original 2006 study.  
  Incidentally, research has also uncovered possible influences of serotonin on probabilistic reversal 
learning, which is of relevance to OCD as patients are normally medicated with SSRIs. On the one 
hand, depletion of tryptophan (a protein that promotes serotonin synthesis) for acute periods in 
healthy subjects leads to slower response times during probabilistic reversal learning (Murphy et al., 
2002). Inversely, tryptophan depletion has also been demonstrated to impair deterministic reversal 
learning (Kanen, Apergis-Schoute, et al., 2020) but not probabilistic reversal learning (Kanen, Arntz, 
et al., 2020). Contrasting with these findings, acute SSRIs (which should increase serotonin 
availability in the brain) administered to healthy adults was found to impair probabilistic reversal 
learning (Chamberlain, Müller, et al., 2006; Skandali et al., 2018). More recently, Apergis-Schoute 
et al. (in-prep) demonstrated that adults with OCD medicated with SSRIs were especially impaired 
at acquisition (pre-reversal) learning on the probabilistic reversal learning task, while unmedicated 
adult patients were impaired at deterministic reversal learning under punishment conditions. While 
these findings are highly varied, they overall suggest dissociable effects of serotonin on probabilistic 
and deterministic reversal learning. In the context of adult OCD, it appears that serotonergic 
medication promotes learning deficits during probabilistic reversal learning.   
   Presently, studies are utilising computational modelling to disentangle behavioural strategies on 
the task as findings obtained from standard analyses are highly heterogeneous. Hitherto, three studies 
fitting reinforcement learning models to task data have found reduced choice perseveration and 
increased exploratory decision-making on the task in patients with OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-





perseveration may reflect a form of checking behaviour wherein patients feel the need to check the 
non-optimal stimulus to ascertain that it is indeed delivering the predicted feedback. This explanation 
fits a framework of OCD postulated by Fradkin, Adams et al. (2020) where patients with OCD are 
unable to rely on prior accumulated information (feedback acquired throughout the duration of the 
task) to reduce their uncertainty about the value associated with each stimulus, and turn to 
exploratory/checking behaviour as a consequence. Reduced perseveration and increased exploration 
appear to be characteristics specific to OCD as computational modelling of data from populations 
with anxiety and depression reveal altered feedback processing but no abnormalities in exploration 
or perseveration (Brolsma et al., 2020; Lighthall, Gorlick, Schoeke, Frank, & Mather, 2013; Mather 
& Lighthall, 2012; Ting et al., 2020). 
   No research yet has conducted computational modelling of the probabilistic reversal learning task 
data extracted from a large sample of adolescents with OCD. Hauser et al. (2017)’s sample included 
both adolescents (n=22) and adults (n=10) with OCD, and the authors conducted comparative 
analyses between the two age-groups and initially found that adolescent patients displayed a lower 
perseveration parameter value than adult patients. However, this difference ceased to be significant 
after controlling for age and intelligence. Hauser et al.’s study provides preliminary evidence that 
adolescents with OCD display somewhat equivalent behaviour to their adult counterparts but larger 
sample sizes in each group are necessary to draw firm conclusions. Other decision-making studies 
have indeed produced results suggestive of lower perseveration in young patients, for example on 
the Iowa Gambling task, children with OCD make more disadvantageous choices and spend more 
time exploring non-optimal decks than healthy children (Kodaira et al., 2012; Norman et al., 2018).  
   To disentangle mechanisms underlying learning and decision-making in adolescent OCD, a 
probabilistic reversal learning task was administered to a large sample of adolescent participants (50 
patients and 53 controls). I used a Bayesian hierarchical modelling approach to assess trial-by-trial 
task data. Five models with different combinations of parameters were fitted to the data and 
compared. It was predicted that adolescents with OCD would show reduced perseveration and more 
exploratory decision-making compared to controls matched for age, gender, and IQ, which aligns 
with research studying adults with the disorder. As non-modelling results of probabilistic reversal 
learning in OCD vary between studies, no specific hypotheses were formulated for the frequentist 
statistical analyses portion of this current study. Nonetheless, I chose task measures that enabled 
testing of competing cognitive theories of OCD, namely related to feedback sensitivity and 
perseveration. In addition, as past research has identified possible effects of serotonergic medication 







6.2.1 Sample  
Initially, 20 adolescents with OCD and 21 healthy controls completed the probabilistic reversal 
learning task outlined in this chapter. However, it was later discovered that the same task had been 
administered to 32 adolescents with OCD and 32 healthy adolescents in an earlier PhD project 
completed by Dr. Julia Gottwald in 2017. After obtaining Dr. Gottwald’s permission, I was able to 
combine our datasets. It should also be noted that Dr. Gottwald had not yet published this data, and 
the data were analysed in her PhD in a very different way from the analysis conducted in this current 
chapter (i.e. computational modelling had not been conducted on this dataset until now). In addition, 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria Dr. Gottwald used to recruit participants were identical to the 
criteria I have used for my data collection, allowing for our datasets to be easily amalgamated. After 
removing 2 subjects with OCD from Dr. Gottwald’s dataset, as they had also been recruited for my 
study, I achieved a final sample size of 50 adolescents with OCD and 53 control subjects. Thirty 
adolescents with OCD were receiving SSRI medication at the time of completing the task while 20 
were medication-naïve. Out of the 30 patients receiving medication, 20 were medicated with 
sertraline and 10 were medicated with fluoxetine. The mean dosage was 96.17mg (std dev: 62.75mg) 
and the dose ranged from 20mg to 200 mg. Digit span and IQ data is missing from one OCD 
participant from my original sample of 20 adolescents with OCD. Also, Dr. Gottwald did not 
administer the digit span test to her sample of participants. Hence, digit span data is only available 
for 19 OCD patients and 21 controls. Further demographic details are outlined in the Results section 
of this chapter. 
6.2.2 Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task  
The paradigm used here is identical to the task originally used by Murphy, Smith, Cowen, Robbins, 
& Sahakian (2002). Participants were shown two stimuli, composed of four red and four green lines, 
on screen (see Figure 6.1). They were instructed to choose either stimuli on every trial by touching 
it on a laptop screen. The following written instructions were provided before the task began:  
“On the screen there are two patterns, one red and one green. On each go, you must choose one of 
these colours and the computer will tell you whether your choice is correct or wrong. Each colour 
will sometimes be correct and sometimes be wrong, but one of the colours will tend to be correct 
more often than the other. What you have to do is find out which colour is usually correct, choose 





change so that the other colour is usually correct, in which case you should choose that one every 
time.” 
The task consisted of 80 trials in total and was split into Acquisition and Reversal phases, each 
consisting of 40 trials. The Acquisition phase required participants to discriminate between the 
optimal and non-optimal stimuli. The optimal stimulus was programmed to provide positive feedback 
(‘Correct’) on 80% of trials and negative feedback (‘Incorrect’) on 20% of trials. The non-optimal 
stimulus was programmed to provide negative feedback on 80% of trials and positive feedback on 
20% of trials. The stimulus chosen by participants on the first trial was assigned as the optimal 
stimulus for the rest of the Acquisition phase. Subsequently during the Reversal phase, the positive 
to negative feedback ratio associated with each stimulus was reversed. In other words, the stimulus 
that was previously optimal became non-optimal and vice versa – see Figure 6.2 for a schematic of 
the feedback contingencies associated with each stimulus. Participants were not cued when the 
reversal occurred.  
On correct trials, the word ‘Correct’ would be displayed in green alongside a consonant tone, whereas 
on incorrect trials, the word ‘Incorrect’ would be displayed in red alongside a dissonant tone. There 












FIGURE 6.2: FEEDBACK CONTINGENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH EACH STIMULUS IN THE ACQUISITION AND REVERSAL 
PHASES.  
 
6.3 Statistical Analyses 
6.3.1 Standard analyses  
Data cleaning and statistical analyses were conducted in Matlab R2017b and RStudio 3.5.0. 
The following 5 outcome measures were analysed: proportion of perseverative errors (number of 
perseverative responses made in a row immediately following reversal), probability of correct 
responses, probability of switching following spurious negative feedback (SNF), probability of 
staying following veridical positive feedback (VPF) (identical measures were used in Skandali et al. 
(2018) and Kanen, Arntz, et al. (2020)), and mean reaction time. Probabilities of switching following 
SNF and staying following VPF were calculated by counting the number of times each participant 
switched following SNF and stayed following VPF, and dividing these values by the number of times 
participants had the opportunity to carry out these switching and staying behaviours. Mixed-level 
regressions were conducted using the lmer function from the lme4 R package (Bates et al., 2014) to 
assess the effects of Group (OCD vs CTL) and Phase (pre-reversal vs post-reversal) on the outcome 
measures. The model for the proportion of perseverative errors did not include Phase as an 
independent variable as the measure only looked at perseverative responses in the reversal phase. 
The regression analyses were repeated but this time Z-scored ages, IQ scores, and gender were added 





Through inspecting the data and generating QQplots of residuals, it was found that many model 
residuals were not normally distributed as a result of outliers in the data. To rectify this, robust mixed 
regressions were implemented for some models instead using the rlmer function from the 
“robustlmm” R package (Koller, 2016). The robust mixed regression is similar in principle to a mixed 
linear regression, except it reduces the weights of outlier values enabling robust coefficient estimates 
to be obtained. P-values to assess significance were calculated using Satterthwaite approximations 
of degrees of freedom and robust standard errors, a method which has been conducted in other studies 
(Geniole et al., 2019; Luke, 2017). To control for multiple comparisons, p-values were adjusted 
according to the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) using the ‘p.adjust’ 
function in base R.  
The analyses were then re-run, this time exploring the effects of medication on dependent measures. 
The OCD group was divided into MED- and MED+. To analyse task measures, mixed-linear and 
mixed-robust regressions were implemented once more. Pairwise comparisons for Group-by-Phase 
interactions were performed using post-hoc Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction. Magnitude 
of an effect was determined via a Wilcoxon effect size (Wilcoxon r) calculated by dividing the test 
z-statistic by the square root of the sample size (Z/√N). The following interpretations of effect size 
values were used, small effect: 0.10 - < 0.3, moderate effect: 0.30 - < 0.5 and large effect: >= 0.5. 
Pearson correlations were conducted to quantify the relationships between task measures and 
demographic-intelligence-clinical measures (age, IQ, digit span, OCI, BDI, and BAI scores).  
6.3.2 Computational Modelling 
To understand latent processes underlying learning and decision-making on this task, a family of 
reinforcement learning (RL) models were fitted to data using hierarchical Bayesian methods. Model 
code was adapted from Kanen et al. (2019). In total, five hierarchical RL models were fitted to data. 
Model 1 
Model 1 served to discern whether a simple RL model with two parameters best described the data 
and accounted for differences between groups. The model comprised a learning rate parameter (α) 
and a reinforcement sensitivity parameter (τ). A value function (Qt) was assigned to each task 
stimulus denoting the expected rewards associated with them. On every trial (t), the value of free 
learning rate parameter α determined the extent to which Qt assigned to stimulus k on trial t is updated 
following an outcome (R) received after choosing a stimulus. Concretely, this was done according to 





Qk,t+1 = Qk,t + α(Rt – Qk,t) – Equation 6.1 
R would equal 1 following rewarded outcomes, and 0 following unrewarded outcomes. The term Rt 
– Qk,t represents the prediction error. Values of α closer to 1 indicate faster adaptations of Qk,t 
according to the prediction error term, while lower values of α indicate slower adaptations.  
τ (reinforcement sensitivity) is essentially an inverse temperature parameter associated with the value 
functions assigned to each stimuli. This parameter was plugged into a softmax rule which was used 





 ∑  𝑘𝑖=1 exp(τQi,t
 )
 – Equation 6.2 
τ determined the extent to which participants’ actions were driven by the value functions associated 
with the chosen stimulus. A high τ leads to more exploitative behaviour whereby a participant 
chooses to mostly maximise their rewards. A low τ enables more exploratory behaviour. 
Model 2 
Model 2 was as Model 1 except separate α were implemented to account for rewarding and punishing 
outcomes: 
Qk,t+1 = Qk,t + αrew(Rt – Qk,t) – if R = 1 – Equation 6.3 
Qk,t+1 = Qk,t + αpun(Rt – Qk,t) – if R = 0 – Equation 6.4 
This was done to examine differences in learning from reward and from punishment and to test the 
theory that patients with OCD are more sensitive to punishment. Hence, this model contained 3 free 
parameters, αrew, αpun, and τ. 
Model 3 
Model 3 was similar to Model 2 but with the addition of τstim (stimulus stickiness), which is an inverse 
temperature parameter that reflects the tendency of a participant to respond to the same stimulus 
chosen in a previous trial. High values of τstim denote increased tendency to ‘stick’ to a choice while 
low values denote a tendency to switch away from the choice. The aim of including this parameter 
was to test the presence of repetitive responding in adolescents with OCD. This parameter was added 










 ∑  𝑘𝑖=1 exp(τQi,t
 +τstim 
 si,t−1)
 – Equation 6.5 
S represents whether one of the stimuli (in this case stimulus 1) was chosen or not (S = 1 if chosen; 
S = 0 if not). Thus, this model contained 4 parameters in total αrew, αpun, τ, and τstim. 
Model 4 
Model 4 was as Model 3 but with 3 parameters (α, τ, τstim) as it contained a single learning rate 
controlling the adaptation of the value functions.  
Model 5 
Model 5 was distinct from the aforementioned models. It was an experience-weighted attraction 
(EWA) model previously used by den Ouden et al. (2013). It contains 3 free parameters: φ (phi), ρ 
(rho), and β (beta).    
The model served to decouple acquisition (pre-reversal) and reversal via the experience decay factor 
parameter ρ that enables the balance between past experience and new information to increasingly 
tip in favour of past experiences. The ‘experience weight’ of a current choice (nc,t), which reflects 
how often a stimulus has been chosen, is updated according to ρ: 
nc,t ← nc,t–1 ρ + 1 – Equation 6.6 
The intuition behind ρ is that over time experience accumulated during acquisition could make 
reversal more difficult leading to perseveration. ρ was allowed to range between 0 and 1. When ρ = 
0, predictions are always driven by most recent outcomes, whereas when ρ = 1 all trials are weighted 
equally leading to more sluggish reversal.  
The value of a choice on every trial, vc,t, is updated according to the outcome, λ, and the pay-off decay 
factor φ, which is equivalent to the learning rate in the Rescorla-Wagner model.  
vc,t ← (vc,t–1 φ nc,t–1 + λt–1) / nc,t  – Equation 6.7 
When ρ = 0, nc,t on every trial becomes 1 as per Equation 6.6, and therefore Equation 6.7 reduces to 
a standard Rescorla-Wagner model.  
Similar to models described earlier, probability of choices, P, is determined by a softmax process  
𝑃(𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑖) =
𝑒𝛽𝑉(𝑐=𝑖,𝑡+1)
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑉(𝑐=𝑗,𝑡+1)𝑗





Where the inverse temperature parameter, β, is allowed to vary.  
Priors 
Each model parameter was drawn from a group level distribution separate for OCD and CTL. Inter-
subject variability for each parameter was sampled from half-normal prior distributions, enabling 
estimates to be constrained to be positive. Individual subject parameters were sampled from normal 
distributions whose means were the group level parameter values and whose variances were from the 
inter-subject variability parameter values. 
Group-level parameters were sampled from the following prior distributions: 
αgroup, αgroup,rew, αgroup,pun, φgroup, ρgroup ~ Beta (1.2,1.2) 
τgroup, βgroup ~ Gamma (4.82,0.88) 
τgroup,stim ~ Normal(0,1) 
Prior distributions over the inter-subject variability, σ, in the model parameters were as follows: 
σα, σα-rew, σα-pun, στ-stim, σφ, σρ ~ half-Normal(0,0.05) 
στ, σβ~ half-Normal(0,1) 
Where half-Normal is the normal distribution constrained to positive values.  
Subject specific parameter values were generated from group-level parameters and inter-subject 
variability parameters, for example, in the case of αrew: 
αrew,subject = αrew,group(subject) + σαrew(subject) – Equation 6.9 
Model Fitting and Comparison 
All models were fitted to data using MCMC sampling implemented in Stan v. 2.21.1. Eight 
randomly-initialised MCMC chains were used. Convergence was checked using the potential scale 
reduction statistic R̂. A cut-off R̂ value of 1.2 (also used in Kanen et al., 2019) was used to check that 
the chains were well-mixed for each parameter . 
Models were compared using a bridge sampling estimate of the marginal likelihood via the 





likelihood and penalises the number of free parameters in a model, which helps guard against 
overfitting. 
Parameter Recovery 
Parameter recovery was conducted to verify the validity of the winning model and that parameter 
values were meaningful (and not occurring by chance) (Wilson & Collins, 2019). The winning model 
was first used to simulate synthetic data from 100 ‘participants’. The free parameters were replaced 
with the mean fitted parameter values per group estimated from the actual human data. I then 
ascertained whether the true parameter values could be recovered by fitting the winning model to the 
simulated data, and checking whether the true and generated parameter values fell within their 
corresponding 95% HDI. This same method for parameter recovery was conducted by Apergis-
Schoute et al. (in-prep). 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Standard Analyses (CTL vs OCD) 
Demographic, intelligence, and clinical scores for CTL and OCD are summarised in Table 6.1. The 
groups were well-matched for age, gender, IQ, and digit span scores. However, OCD showed 
significantly increased depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive ratings.  
 
Table 6.1: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and statistical tests.   
 
CTL (n = 53) OCD (n = 50)  STATISTIC 
GENDER 
(F:M) 
30/23 29/21 χ2 (1)=0.02; p=.89 
AGE 16.38 ± 2.05 16.57 ± 1.75 Z =-0.28; p=.78 
WASI-II 
(IQ)a 
109.11 ± 10.79 106.57 ± 12.10 t(100) = 1.22, p=.27 
BDI** 46.81 ± 6.43 59.32 ± 10.76 t(79.14) =-7.11; p=4.59e-10 
BAI** 48.04 ± 7.09 62.82 ± 11.29  t(81.59) = -7.91; p=1.10e-11 
OCI** 9.25 ± 6.56 29.16 ± 12.83 Z =-7.56; p=4.10e-14 












8.33 ± 2.15 8.05 ± 1.87 t(38)= 0.44; p=.66 
 
Key- CTL: Control Group; OCD: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WASI-II: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 
Intelligence Scale – IV; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Children’s Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01, a missing data from one OCD participant; b only included 21 
CTL and 19 OCD.  
Summary statistics and results of task measures from the probabilistic reversal learning task are 
summarised in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.3. In brief, there was a significant Group (OCD, CTL)-by-
Phase (Acquisition, Reversal) interaction for the proportion correct (Coefficient estimate = -0.13, 
t(101) = -4.52, p = .000068) and proportion staying following VPF (Coefficient estimate = -0.075, 
t(101) = -3.24, p = .0032) measures. This indicates that during reversal, OCD made less correct 
responses overall and also stayed less following veracious positive feedback. No group effects for all 
other measures were detected. There was a significant effect of Phase over proportion correct 
(Coefficient estimate = -0.11, t(101) = -5.69, p = 4.80e-6), wherein participants tended to make fewer  
















Table 6.2: Summary statistics and results from mixed linear regressions and robust mixed regressions. Mean and 
standard deviations per group (CTL, OCD) and per phase (Acquisition, Reversal) are reported. Wald’s 95% 
confidence intervals were calculated. p(perseverative errors) has a separate section as different tests (robust 
linear regression and robust F-test) were used to analyse this measure. Significant variables and corresponding 
p-values are in bold.     
 
Key- CTL: Control group; OCD: Patient group; M: mean; SD: standard deviation; df: degrees of freedom; BH: 
Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression standard error; p(Correct): proportion 
correct choices; mean RT: reaction time; p(Switching following SNF): proportion of switching in response to 
spurious (false) negative feedback; p(Staying following VPF): proportion of staying in response to veracious 
(true) positive feedback; p(Perseverative Error): proportion of perseverative errors (only during reversal phase).   
 
The analyses were then repeated controlling for age, gender, and IQ. These results are summarised 
in Table 6.3. The Group-by-Phase interaction for proportion of correct responses and proportion of 
staying to VPF remained significant after controlling for these variables. IQ had a significant effect 
over proportion correct (Coefficient estimate = 0.0023, t(97) = 3.53, p = .0027), proportion of 
switching following SNF (Coefficient estimate = -0.002, t(97) = -2.57, p = .020), and proportion of 
staying following VPF (Coefficient estimate = -0.0016, t(97) = -3.22, p = .0045). In other words, 
participants with higher IQ made more correct responses, and repeated choices more following both 








Table 6.3: Summary statistics and results from mixed linear regressions and robust mixed regressions. Age, IQ, 
and gender were added to the models as nuisance regressors. Mean and standard deviations per group (CTL, 
OCD) and per phase (Acquisition, Reversal) are reported. Wald’s 95% confidence intervals were calculated. 
p(perseverative errors) has a separate section as different tests (robust linear regression and robust F-test) were 
used to analyse this measure. Significant variables and corresponding p-values are in bold.    
Key- df: degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression 
standard error; p(Correct): proportion correct choices; RT: mean reaction time; p(Switching following SNF): 
proportion of switching in response to spurious (false) negative feedback; p(Staying following VPF): proportion 
of staying in response to veracious (true) positive feedback; p(Perseverative Error): proportion of perseverative 






FIGURE 6.17: GROUP DIFFERENCE RESULTS ON MEASURES FROM PROBABILISTIC REVERSAL LEARNING TASK. OCD 
DISPLAYED LESS CORRECT RESULTS AND STAYED LESS FOLLOWING VERACIOUS POSITIVE FEEDBACK. NO 













6.4.2 Standard Analyses of Effects of Medication  
I proceeded to check for effects of medication status on participant behaviour on the probabilistic 
reversal learning task. Demographic, intelligence, and clinical scores per group after dividing OCD 
into MED+ and MED- are summarised in Table 6.4. No differences in gender, age, and IQ emerged 
between groups.  
Table 6.4: Mean scores and standard deviations per group and statistical tests.   
 










30:23 15:5 14:16 χ2 (2)=3.96; p=.14 - 















F(2,99) = .92; p= .40 - 






χ2 (2)=36.20; p= 
1.38e-08 
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>CTL 
MED- = MED+ 








MED- & MED+ 
>CTL 
MED- = MED+ 






χ2 (2)=57.31; p= 
3.59e-13 
MED- & MED+ 
>CTL 
MED- = MED+ 





















7.63 ± 2.20 8.36 ± 1.63 F(2,37)=0.40; p=.67  
 
- 
Key: CTL: Control Group; MED-: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder group; WISC-IV: Wecshler’s Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence – II; IQ: Intelligence Quotient; BDI: Beck’s Depression Inventory (t-scored); BAI: Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory (t-scored); OCI: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory; CY-BOCS: Children’s Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale. *p<.05; **p<.01, a missing data from one MED- participant; b data only available 





Post-hoc Dunn tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that MED+ and MED- had enhanced 
depression (MED- > CTL, p = .00099; MED+ > CTL, p = .000000033; MED+ = MED-, p = .63), 
anxiety (MED- > CTL, p = .00019; MED+ > CTL, p = .0000000021; MED+ = MED-, p = .68), and 
obsessive-compulsivity scores (MED- > CTL, p = .000000010; MED+ > CTL, p = .00000000064; 
MED+ = MED-, p = 1.00) compared to CTL. There were no differences in these ratings between 
MED+ and MED- (all p > .05).  
Summary statistics and regression results for the task measures are summarised in Table 6.5 and 6.6 
(also see Figure 6.4 for visualisation). MED- and MED+ were considered as separate variables 
compared to CTL in the regression models. For proportion correct, there were significant MED- -by-
Phase (Coefficient Estimate = -0.17, t(100) = -4.56, p = .00006)  and MED+-by-Phase (Coefficient 
Estimate =-0.093 , t(100) = -2.90, p = .018) interactions. Next, there was a significant interaction 
between MED- and Phase when considering proportion of stays following VPF (Coefficient Estimate 
=-0.12, t(100) = -4.11, p = .00017).  
 
Table 6.5: Summary statistics (Mean ± Standard Deviation) for PRL task measures during acquisition and reversal 
phases. 
 
Key- CTL: control group; MED-: unmedicated patient group; MED+: medicated patient group; p(Correct): 
proportion correct choices; RT: mean reaction time; p(Switching following SNF): proportion of switching in 
response to spurious (false) negative feedback; p(Staying following VPF): proportion of staying in response to 
veracious (true) positive feedback; p(Perseverative Error): proportion of perseverative errors (only during 





Table 6.6: Summary statistics and results from mixed linear regressions and robust mixed regressions. Mean and 
standard deviations per group (CTL, MED-, MED+) and per phase (Acquisition, Reversal) are reported. Wald’s 
95% confidence intervals were calculated. p(perseverative errors) has a separate section as different tests (robust 
linear regression and robust F-test) were used to analyse this measure. Significant variables and corresponding 
p-values are in bold.  
Key- MED-: unmedicated patient group; MED+: medicated patient group; M: mean; SD: standard deviation; df: 
degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression standard 
error; p(Correct): proportion correct choices; RT: mean reaction time; p(Switching following SNF): proportion 
of switching in response to spurious (false) negative feedback; p(Staying following VPF): proportion of staying 
in response to veracious (true) positive feedback; p(Perseverative Error): proportion of perseverative errors 
(only during reversal phase).   
 
The analyses were repeated controlling for age, gender, and IQ. The results still indicated significant 
MED--by-Phase (Coefficient Estimate = -0.15, t(96) = -3.56, p = .0015) and MED+-by-Phase  
(Coefficient Estimate = -0.13, t(96) = -3.63, p = .0014) interactions for proportion of correct 
responses. However, there was now a significant MED+-by-Phase interaction (Coefficient Estimate 
= -0.058, t(96) = -2.29, p = .0048), as well as a significant MED--by-Phase interaction (Coefficient 








Table 6.6: Summary statistics and results from mixed linear regressions and robust mixed regressions 
(separating OCD into MED- and MED+). Age, gender, and IQ were controlled for. Wald’s 95% confidence 
intervals were calculated. p(perseverative errors) has a separate section as different tests (robust linear 
regression and robust F-test) were used to analyse this measure. Significant variables and corresponding p-
values are in bold.  
Key- MED-: unmedicated patient group; MED+: medicated patient group; M: mean; SD: standard deviation; df: 
degrees of freedom; BH: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction; CI: confidence interval; SE: regression standard 
error; p(Correct): proportion correct choices; RT: mean reaction time; p(Switching following SNF): proportion 
of switching in response to spurious (false) negative feedback; p(Staying following VPF): proportion of staying 
in response to veracious (true) positive feedback; p(Perseverative Error): proportion of perseverative errors 
(only during reversal phase).   
 
As a result of the significant interactions, further post-hoc Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction 
were conducted to make pairwise comparisons between CTL, MED-, and MED+.  These analyses 
revealed that during the reversal phase, MED- and MED+ made less correct responses than CTL 
(MED- < CTL: Z = 3.61, p = .00031, Wilcoxon’s r = 0.46; MED+ < CTL: Z = 3.61, p = .00030, 
Wilcoxon’s r = 0.29; MED- = MED+: p = 1.00). Furthermore, MED- and MED+ stayed less 
following VPF compared to CTL (MED- < CTL: Z = 3.29, p = .00099; Wilcoxon’s r = 0.42; MED+ 







FIGURE 6.18: EFFECTS OF MEDICATION STATUS ON BEHAVIOUR ON THE PROBABILISTIC REVERSAL LEARNING 
TASK. MED- AND MED+ COMMITTED MORE ERRORS AND STAYED LESS FOLLOWING VPF DURING THE REVERSAL 
PHASE. NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS EMERGED ON OTHER MEASURES.  N.S.: NON-SIGNIFICANT 
 
6.4.3 Computational Modelling Results 
The winning model included the following parameters, reward rates, punishment rate, reinforcement 
sensitivity, and stimulus stickiness. A summary of the performances of each model is included in 











Table 6.7: Comparison of model performance  
Rank Model Parameters Log Marginal 
Likelihood 
Log Posterior P (model)  
4 1 αreinf, τreinf -1966.29 -42.92 
2 2 αrew, αpun, τreinf -1925.94 -2.57 
1 3 αrew, αpun, τreinf, τstim -1923.45 -0.080 
3 4 αreinf, τreinf, τstim -1955.42 -32.05 
5 5 ρ, φ, β -1975.44 -52.07 
Notes: The log marginal likelihood and log posterior P (model) are comparison metrics used to determine the 
best model. A numerically larger, i.e. less negative, log marginal likelihood is better. Model 3 was the best 
performing model here. Key – α: learning rate; rew: reward; pun: punishment; τstim: stimulus stickiness; τreinf: 
reinforcement rate (inverse temperature); ρ: rho; φ: phi; β: beta (inverse temperature).    
 
Strikingly, OCD differed from CTL on all parameters considered. OCD displayed increased reward 







FIGURE 6.19: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. 
ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF GROUP 
DIFFERENCES (OCD-CTL) IN GROUP MEAN PARAMETER VALUES. "RED" INDICATES THAT THE 95% HDI 
EXCLUDES 0 THUS INDICATING GROUPS DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER.  
After dividing participants by medication status (CTL, MED-, and MED+), the same winning model 
was fit to data. It was found that MED- and MED+ differed from CTL on all parameters (see Figure 
6.6). Similar to the CTL vs. OCD group analysis, both medication groups displayed increased reward 
rates, as well as decreased punishment rates, reinforcement sensitivity, and stimulus stickiness 




FIGURE 20.6: SUMMARY OF GROUP DIFFERENCES (PATIENTS WERE GROUPED ACCORDING TO MEDICATION STATUS) 
PER PARAMETER FROM THE BEST-FIT COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. ERROR BARS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DENSITY 
INTERVALS (HDI) OF THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF GROUP DIFFERENCES (OCD-CTL) IN GROUP MEAN 
PARAMETER VALUES. "RED" INDICATES THAT THE 95% HDI EXCLUDES 0 THUS INDICATING GROUPS DIFFER FROM 






Previously-fitted parameters used to generate the simulated data and their corresponding recovered 
values are presented in Table 6.8 for OCD vs CTL. All generative parameter values fell strictly within 
their corresponding recovered 95% highest posterior density intervals (HDI) and all 8 randomly 
initialised sampling chains were well-mixed, as indicated by the convergence diagnostic Rˆ ≈ 1 for 
every model parameter.  
Table 6.8: Parameter recovery analysis with simulated data generated by best-fit computational model (CTL vs 
OCD) 
 
Key- CTL: control group, OCD: patient group, HDI: Highest density interval.  
 
6.4.4 Correlations 
Correlations between OCD/anxiety/depression severity and task/model measures 
When considering all participants, those with higher anxiety scores (BAI) and obsessive-compulsive 
severity (OCI) made less correct responses on the task (BAI: r = -0.25, p = .010; OCI: r = -0.23, p = 
.017). Within CTL, higher anxiety scores were associated with less shifting following SNF (r =0.30, 
p = .042). Within MED+, higher OCI scores were associated with more stimulus stickiness (r =0.37, 
p =.047). There were no correlations between clinical questionnaires and task/model measures when 





Correlations between age/IQ/working memory and task/model measures 
When considering all participants, those with higher IQ and working memory (digit span backwards) 
scores made more correct responses (IQ: r = 0.27, p = .0052, digit span backwards: r = 0.33, p = 
.037), and shifted less following SNF (IQ: r = -0.27, p = .042, digit span backwards: r = -0.49, p = 
.0023). Better working memory was also associated with more stays following VPF (r = 0.47, p = 
.0021). When exploring relationships between demographic/clinical scores and model parameter 
values, I found higher IQ scores predicted increased punishment rate (r=0.21 p=.038), reinforcement 
sensitivity (r= 0.26, p= .008), and stimulus stickiness (r=0.24, p=.017). Additionally, age was 
correlated with reward rate, wherein older participants had increased reward rate values (r = 0.24; p 
= .016). 
Next, when considering only OCD participants, IQ was found to be significantly correlated with 
punishment rate (r =0.33, p =.020), stimulus stickiness (r =0.32, p = .025), and proportion of correct 
responses (r =0.37, p =.0097).  
Within CTL, better working memory was associated with less shifting following SNF (r =-0.61, p 
=.0032), more staying to VPF (r =0.59, p =.0046), more correct responses (r =0.62, p =.0025), and 
faster reaction times (r= -0.52, p = .016). Older participants had increased reward rates (r =0.30, p 
=.032), less shifting following SNF (r =-0.28, p =.035), more staying following VPF (r =0.28, p 
=.041), and increased correct responses (r =0.34, p =.013).  
Within MED-, older participants had higher reward rates (r =0.51, p =.021).   
No significant correlations between age/IQ/working memory and task/model measures were detected 
when considering only MED+. 
Correlations with medication dosage 
Medication dosage significantly correlated with IQ scores (r = 0.43; p = .017). Dosage did not show 
any significant relationships with task measures or model parameter values. 
Correlations between standard task measures and computational model parameters 
Lastly, to verify that, and understand how, model parameter values map onto task behaviour, further 
Pearson correlations between model parameter values (reward rate, punishment rate, reinforcement 
sensitivity, and stimulus stickiness) and standard task measures (proportion correct, proportion 
shifting following SNF, proportion staying following VPF, proportion perseverative errors, and mean 





then considering OCD, CTL, MED-, and MED+ separately. The results of this are included in Table 
6.9.   
Table 6.9: Correlations between standard task measures and model parameters for all participants, OCD only, 
CTL only, MED- only, and MED+ only.  






p(Perseveration) Mean RT 
Reward rate r = 0.22 
p = .029 
n.s r = 0.41 
p <.0001 
n.s n.s 
Punishment rate r = 0.66 
p <.0001 
n.s r =0.29 
p =.0034 
r = -0.48 
p <.0001 
n.s 
Reinf. Sensitivity r = 0.36 
p = .00020 
r = -0.75  
p <.0001 
r = 0.83 
p <.0001 
r = 0.31 
p = .0015 
r =-0.30 
p =.0020 
Stim. Stickiness n.s r = -0.56 
p <.0001 
r = 0.40 
p < .0001 
n.s r = -0.21 
p = .030 






p(Perseveration) Mean RT 
Reward rate n.s n.s n.s n.s n.s 
Punishment rate r = 0.81 
p <.0001 
n.s 
r = 0.37 
p = .0073 
r = -0.45 
p = .00096 
n.s 
Reinf. Sensitivity r =0.31 
p = .031 
r = -0.82 
p <.0001 
r = 0.88 
p < .0001 
r = 0.377 
p = .0070 
r = -0.37 
p  = .0088 
Stim. Stickiness 
n.s 
r = -0.59 
p <.0001 
r = 0.52 
p = .00010 
n.s 
r = -0.38 
p  = .0059 






p(Perseveration) Mean RT 
Reward rate r = 0.58 
p<.0001 
r = -0.68 
p<.0001 
r = 0.83 
p <.0001 
n.s n.s 
Punishment rate r = 0.50  
p = .00014 
n.s n.s r = -0.66 






Reinf. Sensitivity r = 0.56  
p <.0001 
r = -0.73 
p < .0001 
r = 0.79 
p <.0001 
n.s n.s 
Stim. Stickiness n.s r = -0.57 
p < .0001 
n.s n.s n.s 






p(Perseveration) Mean RT 
Reward rate n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Punishment rate r = 0.66 
p = .00015 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Reinf. Sensitivity n.s. r = -0.74 
p = .00021 
r = 0.90 
p < .0001 
r = 0.49 
p = .030 
r = -0.50 
p = .024 
Stim. Stickiness n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. r = -0.59 
p = .0065 






p(Perseveration) Mean RT 
Reward rate n.s n.s. n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Punishment rate r  = 0.88 
p < .0001 
n.s. r  = 0.41 
p = .023 
r  = -0.49 
p = .0060 
n.s. 
Reinf. Sensitivity r  = 0.37 
p = .042 
r  = -0.72 
p < .0001 
r  = 0.88 




Stim. Stickiness n.s. r  = -0.72 
p < .0001 
r  = 0.59 
p = .00057 
n.s. n.s. 
Key: r – Pearson’s r statistic, p – significance value; n.s – not significant; OCD – patient group; CTL – control 
group   
 
6.4.5 Summary of Main Results 
When conducting standard behavioural analysis, OCD were found to display less correct responses 
and less staying to VPF during the reversal phase compared to CTL. The same pattern of results was 





responses and less staying following VPF after reversal compared to CTL, but there were no 
significant differences when comparing MED- and MED+ to each other. Group differences remained 
significant even when controlling for age, gender, and IQ.  
Modelling analyses indicated that compared to CTL, OCD (as well as MED+ and MED-) had 
increased reward learning rate parameters, and decreased punishment learning rate, reinforcement 
sensitivity, and stimulus stickiness parameters.  
6.5 Discussion 
   This study aimed to disentangle the cognitive processes contributing to behaviour on a well-known 
probabilistic reversal learning paradigm in adolescents with OCD. Standard analysis of task 
behaviour revealed a reversal deficit in adolescents with OCD, wherein patients made significantly 
more incorrect responses and repeated choices less following veridical positive feedback. 
Nonetheless, patients and controls showed equivalent acquisition learning of the task. Next, I fit a 
Bayesian hierarchical reinforcement learning model to data and results indicated substantial 
distinctions in the performance profiles of patients and controls. Adolescents with OCD displayed 
increased reward learning rates and heightened choice exploration, alongside lower punishment 
learning rates and lower stimulus stickiness (perseveration) compared to healthy adolescents. 
6.5.1 Standard behavioural findings 
   My standard behavioural results indicate intact probabilistic learning but impaired reversal learning 
in adolescents with OCD. Impaired performance following reversal implies a behavioural flexibility 
deficit in adolescent patients, where they are not able to update their decisions as efficiently as healthy 
adolescents when there are changes in contingencies. The majority of previous work probing 
cognitive flexibility in children with OCD (see Chapters 1 and 2) has failed to detect a flexibility 
deficit, likely due to studies administering tasks with deterministic pay-offs such as the Intra-Extra 
Dimensional Shift task and Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. My standard results suggest that 
behavioural flexibility is heavily compromised in adolescents with OCD on tasks with probabilistic 
structures.  
   Next, when assessing behaviour in response to feedback, I found that adolescent patients showed 
a significant tendency to shift away from responding to the optimal stimulus after receiving positive 
feedback. This is consistent with previous work by Hauser et al. (2017) who reported a trend for their 
OCD sample (which included 22 adolescents and 10 adults) to switch choices more frequently 
following rewards on a probabilistic reversal learning task. Moreover, Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-





following both negative and positive feedback on the exact same version of the task I have 
administered. One explanation for this increased shifting behaviour regardless of feedback is that it 
indicates an overall tendency for adults and adolescents with OCD to keep returning to the stimulus 
that was once optimal. This could be a form of perseveration/inflexibility whereby responding to the 
previously optimal stimulus is now ingrained behaviour and interferes with patients’ ability to re-
learn the appropriate contingencies in the reversal phase, and may be analogous to unwanted 
intrusions experienced by patients in daily life. 
6.5.2 Modelling Results 
   Intriguingly, modelling results suggest an alternative portrayal of behaviour on the task, as 
adolescents with OCD actually showed increased reward learning rates and lower punishment 
learning rates despite standard analyses showing increased shifting from veridical positive feedback. 
Moreover, instead of being more perseverative, modelling revealed that adolescents with OCD made 
more exploratory choices and had lower stimulus stickiness.  Hence, it is now necessary to explain 
this apparently discrepant and paradoxical set of conclusions obtained from the two means of 
analysing the data, i.e. via conventional and computational methods.   
  Learning rates in the model quantify how quickly one learns from most recent feedback compared 
to information accumulated over time. In the current task, the learning rates were used to estimate 
the extent to which values associated with a choice changed according to immediate positive and 
negative feedback, in other words, the extent to which positive and negative feedback respectively 
increased and decreased the value of a choice. Alongside the learning rates, the reinforcement 
sensitivity parameter represented whether participants’ actual decisions reflected the values assigned 
to each choice. Concretely, a participant with a high reinforcement sensitivity parameter would more 
likely maximise their rewards by always choosing the choice perceived to have a higher value. In 
contrast, a participant with a low reinforcement sensitivity parameter would make more inconsistent 
decisions which are not in accordance with choice values.  
   Increased reward learning rates and lower punishment learning rates in adolescents with OCD 
indicate they are likely to update choice values more rapidly following recent positive feedback, 
compared to negative feedback. Despite higher reward rates compared with controls, patients do not 
seem to be using these updated values to guide their choices, as evident from their low reinforcement 
sensitivity values. Further evidence for this can be found in the correlational results, where reward 
learning rates correlate strongly with staying to veridical positive feedback in healthy adolescents 





behaviour following positive feedback while the same increased reward rates did not translate to 
more reward-driven behaviour on the task in adolescents with OCD. Instead, in the OCD group, 
appropriate staying to optimal choices and proportion correct responses correlated with the 
punishment rate and reinforcement sensitivity parameter values. This suggests that incorrect 
responses and maladaptive switching to rewards displayed by patients are better explained by 
reduced punishment learning rates and a propensity for choice exploration compared to heightened 
reward rates.  
   Next, in contrast to the interpretation put forward for the standard behavioural results, decreased 
stickiness (reflecting the tendency for a choice to be repeated from trial to trial) and higher 
exploration in OCD from the modelling results suggest that adolescent patients are not perseverative 
on this task, and that their tendency to keep returning to the previously optimal stimulus in the 
reversal phase is the result of lower value-driven responding and not a form of perseveration as was 
previously considered.  
   Trial-by-trial modelling results and their relationships to standard task measures enable richer 
interpretation of and detailed insight into behavioural performance. Other computational papers have 
also highlighted differences in results obtained from modelling and standard analyses, for instance 
Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-prep) found increased shifting from punishment and rewards in their adult 
OCD population but reported no differences in model learning rates between patients and controls. 
Moreover, other studies found no behavioural deficits associated with OCD when employing 
standard analyses but uncovered decreased stimulus stickiness in patients when conducting 
computational modelling (Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019). Including my current study, all 
studies that have conducted computational modelling of probabilistic reversal learning data have 
found that OCD patients show decreased stimulus stickiness, or decreased stimulus stickiness and 
increased exploration, despite different results garnered via standard analyses. This challenges 
findings from past papers that have employed the probabilistic reversal learning task to patients with 
OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2008; Endrass et al., 2011; Tezcan, Tumkaya, & Bora, 2017; Viswanath 
et al., 2009) and the interpretations authors have made based solely on results from standard 
frequentist analyses.  
6.5.3 Exploration and reduced stickiness 
   The next sections will discuss the implications of the modelling findings in the context of juvenile-
OCD. First, increased exploration indicates that adolescents with OCD maximise their rewards less 





more frequently between choices. The characteristics appear to be stable across the lifespan as they 
are also present in adult patients (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 
2019), and may therefore be important features underpinning cognition in OCD. A few explanations 
for these findings are presented here but more in-depth analysis and discussion of exploration in 
OCD is available in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
   How living things accumulate evidence and make decisions using exploratory or exploitative 
strategies has long been researched and debated. Literature discussing the explore-exploit dilemma 
establishes that some exploration can be advantageous to learning: while exploitation maximises 
rewards in the near-term, information obtained during exploration (by sampling novel choices) can 
be used to maximise rewards in the long-term (Barack and Gold, 2016). Moreover, in a dynamic 
environment, where values of all potential options are uncertain, it is considered conducive for an 
individual to be able to adapt their behaviour by flexibly alternating between exploratory and 
exploitative strategies (Addicott, Pearson, Sweitzer, Barack, & Platt, 2017). In addition, empirical 
research has highlighted the existence of different forms of exploration. First, directed exploration 
involves weighing known choice values and choosing a novel option to improve pre-existing 
knowledge of all options present in an environment. Inversely, random exploration is not based on 
known values and is equivalent to flipping a coin to decide on an option to choose. It has been found 
that healthy adults engage in both forms of exploration to maximise their long term rewards 
(Gershman, 2018; Wilson, Geana, White, Ludvig, & Cohen, 2014).  
   In the current study, exploration displayed by adolescents with OCD does not appear to be directed, 
or for the purpose of long-term maximisation, as their performance on the task is inferior to that of 
healthy adolescents who explore less. Hence, perhaps adolescents with OCD are engaging in random 
exploration which does not take into account values associated with competing choices. As a result 
of being value-independent, random exploration is a far less cognitively demanding strategy than 
directed exploration but it comes at the cost of suboptimal choices, and has been found to be 
conducted primarily by children and young adolescents whose frontal lobes and higher order thinking 
skills are still in the process of developing (Dubois et al., 2020). Some past studies offer support for 
poor goal-directed control and planning in children and adolescents with OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018; 
Huyser et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2018; Ornstein et al., 2010), suggesting that it may have been easier 
for adolescents with OCD in my study to rely on the random exploration heuristic over engaging in 
more cognitively complex directed exploration. Nonetheless, this interpretation is speculative for 






   Another explanation for increased exploration seen here is that adolescents with OCD switch 
choices more as they feel increased subjective uncertainty regarding choice values. Indeed, it has 
been found that patients with OCD report more subjective uncertainty than healthy people (Stern et 
al., 2013). Moreover, past studies demonstrate that increasing task uncertainty promotes more 
exploratory behaviour in healthy people (Parr & Friston, 2017; Stojic et al., 2020). More 
convincingly, increased information seeking behaviour or exploration has been detected in adults 
and children with OCD on tasks where uncertainty is enhanced or when pay-offs are probabilistic 
(Banca et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser et al., 2017; Mandali, Weidacker, Kim, & Voon, 
2019), but not in tasks with deterministic structures (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep, see Chamberlain 
et al., 2020 and Marzuki et al., 2020 for reviews). A computational model of OCD developed by 
Fradkin et al. (2020) posits that individuals with OCD are unable to predict how different actions 
result in specific outcomes depending on certain states, resulting in increased sensations of 
uncertainty. Patients seek to reduce this uncertainty by engaging in compulsions such as repeated 
checking. Relevant to the current task, Hauser et al. (2017) suggest decreased choice consistency 
displayed by adolescents with OCD may be analogous to checking behaviour, wherein patients 
frequently check the non-optimal stimulus to ensure it is delivering the predicted feedback.  
   Alternatively, instead of exploring, patients with OCD may be making less valuable decisions 
simply because they are not aware of values associated with each choice or are unable to distinguish 
between choices with high and low values. Evidence for this can be found in research administering 
perceptual decision-making tasks to patients and modelling the data using drift-diffusion models. 
These models have been described in depth in Chapter 4, but in brief they involve modelling response 
times to describe how subjects accumulate evidence and whether speed or accuracy is favoured in 
decision-making. Research into OCD utilising these models demonstrate that patients are impaired 
at evidence accumulation; they are slower to make decisions (suggesting increased evidence 
accumulation) but despite this, they have difficulty discriminating between different choice values 
(Banca et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2015; Mandali et al., 2019). In other words, all choices presented 
appear equally rewarding to patients, resulting in more random responding and more mistakes. In 
addition, adult OCD patients, and even healthy adults with compulsive tendencies, have been found 
to be impaired at using accumulated evidence to drive decisions and instead rely on highly salient 
recent feedback (Vaghi et al., 2017; Seow et al., 2020). This indicates that the disorder impairs the 
ability to synthesise information learnt over time, making it more difficult to construct accurate 
representations of values associated with all possible decisions. Recently, computational studies have 





probabilistic learning tasks, as this amalgamated model offers rich insight into value-driven decision-
making beyond just classing people as being either exploitative or exploratory (Fontanesi et al., 2019; 
Pedersen et al., 2017; Wiehler & Peters, 2020). I had also fitted a version of this model to data from 
a sequential decision-making task in Chapter 4. Future work into probabilistic reversal learning in 
OCD should utilise such models to truly understand whether value-less decision-making is due to 
exploration or poor representation of choice values.      
   What appears to be random exploration may also be the result of attentional lapses. Poor attention 
may be 1) impacting learning of values associated with choices or 2) resulting in patients not using 
learnt value-knowledge to make decisions. Attentional deficits are present in adult patients with 
OCD, as reported by a meta-analysis revealing attentional control in patients to be impaired in across 
several studies, with moderate effect sizes (Abramovitch et al., 2013). However, evidence is less 
consistent in child-OCD studies, as so far only two studies have detected attentional impairments in 
child patients (Baykal et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2007) while two other studies did not find deficits 
(Okazaki et al., 2018; M. S. Shin et al., 2008). Alternatively, difficulty learning choice values as well 
as keeping different choice values in memory may be causing random responding in adolescent 
patients, consistent with research suggesting learning and memory impairments are associated with 
juvenile-OCD (Gottwald et al., 2018).   
   There is also neural evidence for abnormal exploration associated with OCD that is alluded to in 
Chapter 4 and discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
   All in all, there are various viable reasons introduced for reduced choice consistency in adolescents 
with OCD, namely a bias for random exploration due to reduced cognitive control, poor 
representation of choice values, as a means to reduce subjective uncertainty, and attentional or 
learning deficits. Future studies employing more sophisticated models of exploration and evidence 
accumulation, specific tasks designed to probe different types of exploration under different 
circumstances (e.g. manipulating task uncertainty), and neuroimaging methods are necessary to truly 
understand how and why exploration is aberrant in OCD.    
6.5.4 Reward and Punishment Rates 
   Next, modelling results indicate that adolescents with OCD and healthy adolescents learn from 
feedback differently, with patients updating choice values more following rewarding feedback and 
controls updating choice values more following punishing feedback. This is a novel finding in the 
context of OCD as majority of pertinent studies do not find differences in learning rates between 





evidence to suggest that adults with OCD exhibit increased learning rates following negative 
prediction errors (Vaghi et al., 2017) and even evidence for adult patients to display reduced learning 
rates on a probabilistic learning task (Murray et al., 2018). However, these two studies did not utilise 
separate learning rates for reward and punishment in their respective models, and also did not employ 
probabilistic reversal learning paradigms, so it is difficult to draw parallels to my findings.  
   Also in contrast to my findings, some neural evidence highlights blunted reward processing but 
elevated punishment processing in adults with OCD: presentation of rewarding feedback during 
learning tasks was associated with reduced activation in frontal regions (medial OFC, medial and 
superior frontal cortex, and cingulate cortex) while presentation of punishment was associated with 
overactivation in the same regions in patients (Kaufmann et al., 2013; Remijnse et al., 2009). 
However, there is also evidence for enhanced reward processing in OCD, as one study has described 
increased activity in frontostriatal regions during reward anticipation in medication-naïve adult OCD 
patients (Jung et al., 2011). Within paediatric OCD, decreased activation associated with wins 
(putamen/caudate) and losses (medial prefrontal cortex) has been found in child patients compared 
to controls (Norman et al., 2018), suggesting young patients have overall dampened feedback 
processing. Accumulatively, these findings suggest that feedback processing as a whole is atypical 
in adult- and child-OCD regardless of feedback valence. My study did not employ neuroimaging 
methods so I am unable to extrapolate how reward and punishment rates are represented in the brain 
circuitry of the current adolescent patient sample, but this should be considered in future research.  
   Adolescents with OCD perhaps only appear more reward sensitive because they are compared to 
healthy adolescents who are especially affected by punishing feedback. Emerging research reveals 
that healthy younger people are significantly more punishment sensitive than healthy adults (Hauser 
et al., 2015; Rodriguez Buritica et al., 2019; Rosenbaum, Grassie, & Hartley, 2020; van den Bos et 
al., 2012). Indeed, in my current study, reward learning rates increased with age in the healthy control 
group confirming that reward seeking behaviour emerges with development. I propose that 
adolescents with OCD, in contrast to healthy adolescents, are not particularly sensitive to either kind 
of feedback given that they favour exploratory over value-driven decision-making and show 
attenuated frontostriatal activation to both positive and negative feedback (Norman et al., 2018). This 
account is compatible with the clinical presentation of OCD, where patients’ worries and rituals are 






It is unclear in this study whether abnormal choice exploration and feedback sensitivity are driven 
by the symptoms of OCD or vice versa, as disease severity did not correlate with any model measures, 
in comparison to Apergis-Schoute et al.’s study in adults where OCD severity correlated with 
reduced stimulus stickiness. In addition, serotonergic medication does not seem to improve 
performance as medicated and unmedicated patients in this study showed similar patterns of 
behaviour on the task. This implies that abnormal performance on this task is a stable trait of OCD, 
unperturbed by treatment or severity of symptoms. Moreover, it may be a stable trait across the 
lifespan as impairments are expressed by both juvenile and adult patient populations.  
   It is also important to highlight that even though adolescents with OCD in this study had elevated 
anxiety and depression scores compared to healthy controls, these features do not appear to be driving 
abnormal performance as anxiety and depression did not correlate with any model parameter values. 
In addition, exploration and reduced perseveration displayed here by adolescents with OCD are 
generally different from behaviour displayed by populations with anxiety or depression (Brolsma et 
al., 2020; Lighthall, Gorlick, Schoeke, Frank, & Mather, 2013; Mather & Lighthall, 2012; Ting et 
al., 2020). Nonetheless, the possible roles of anxiety and depression on decision-making are 
discussed further in Chapter 7.   
 Instead, IQ and working memory scores were predictive of better task performance and less extreme 
model parameter values in both patients and controls, which has also been detected in previous 
chapters. Thus, higher order cognition may be a protective factor against impaired decision-making 
in adolescent-OCD, which has implications for the importance of education and cognitive training in 
ameliorating cognitive deficits associated with the disorder. Although, evidence for the benefits of 
cognitive training, particularly in the context of OCD, is quite limited (Buhlmann et al., 2006). This 
is also discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.5.6 Conclusions 
Using computational methods, I demonstrate that adolescent-OCD is associated with altered 
feedback sensitivity, reduced perseveration, and enhanced exploration leading to significantly 
impaired performance on a probabilistic reversal learning paradigm. These findings are mostly 
compatible with the adult literature, demonstrating that deficits in decision-making on this task are 
stable across the lifespan in OCD. However, findings related to reward and punishment rates are 
divergent from studies employing adult patients. Further research comparing adult- and adolescent-





feedback sensitivity is altered in OCD and with age. Overall, the current findings align with recent 
theoretical accounts highlighting disadvantageous decision-making and maladaptive information 

























Chapter 7: General Discussion 
   The experimental chapters in this thesis sought to understand latent cognitive processes 
contributing to complex learning and decision-making in adolescents with OCD. Some chapters also 
attempted to establish whether cognitive mechanisms found to be reliably impaired in adults with 
OCD are similarly disrupted in juvenile-OCD, namely model-based reasoning, cognitive flexibility, 
meta-cognition, and punishment sensitivity. Overall, I aspired to further current knowledge of the 
neurocognitive profile of adolescent-OCD as well as gain insight into the cognitive differences 
between adult and adolescent OCD subtypes. 
7.1 Summary of findings 
   Past studies assessing cognitive flexibility in youths with OCD have reported varied results. 
Consequently, I aimed to understand whether adolescents with OCD showed divergent latent 
decision-making processes from healthy adolescents on the well-known Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task in Chapter 2. Overall I found no significant differences between patient and control groups on 
any task measures when controlling for age, gender, and IQ. Additionally, there were no group 
differences detected when conducting computational modelling analyses. Significant group 
differences only emerged when separating the OCD group by medication status (medicated vs 
unmedicated). Those medicated with SSRIs were found to make more unique errors on the task than 
other groups, indicating that they were more likely to select the deck that did not correspond with 
any rule on the test card. Medicated patients also showed overall increased response times compared 
to control participants. These findings were interpreted as medicated patients having less recognition 
of rules present in the task, potentially as a result of difficulties with attending to multiple rules at 
once. Moreover, increased response times were inferred to be due to patients being more uncertain 
about the rules and perhaps needing more time to reach a decision, consistent with research reporting 
more careful evidence accumulation in adolescents with OCD (Hauser et al., 2017). Nonetheless, 
despite the tendency for committing more unique errors, performance was overall unimpaired in both 
medicated and unmedicated patient groups. Crucially, those with OCD did not make more 
perseverative errors than controls did on the task, confirming that adolescents with OCD have intact 
cognitive flexibility which is divergent from findings in adult patients.     
   In Chapter 3, I probed instrumental and Pavlovian processing in adolescents with OCD using an 
aversive Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer task. I hypothesised that adolescents with OCD would 
show poor performance on the Instrumental and Pavlovian learning phases of the task, in line with 





2018; Vloet et al., 2010). Next, specific and general transfer during the PIT phase of the task are 
thought to correspond to model-based and model-free learning respectively (Dolan & Dayan, 2013), 
and I hypothesised that my patient group would show reduced specific transfer and intact general 
transfer, which corresponds to research showing poor model-based decision-making in adult OCD 
(Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015), and is consistent with altered OFC functioning in OCD 
(Chamberlain et al., 2008; Remijnse et al., 2006; 2009). Lastly, I predicted increased avoidance 
responding in the Instrumental and PIT phases by adolescents with OCD consistent with accounts of 
increased harm avoidance reported by children with OCD (Bey et al., 2017; Cervin et al., 2020; Ecker 
& Gönner, 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008). Contrary to these hypotheses, adolescents with OCD showed 
equivalent performance to healthy controls across all phases of the PIT task, indicating 1) intact 
Pavlovian and instrumental learning, 2) intact model-based ability to transfer top-down information 
garnered during instrumental and Pavlovian phases to conduct successful specific PIT, and 3) no 
evidence of excessive harm avoidance. I reason that the aversive context of the task may have 
motivated adolescents with OCD to correctly learn US-response and CS-US pairings and retain this 
information throughout the task, consistent with new research showing superior safety learning in 
people with compulsive and anxious traits (Wise & Dolan, 2020). The only differences found 
between groups in this chapter were that adolescents with OCD reported reduced confidence in their 
explicit CS-US associations during the Pavlovian phase. This finding was most prominent in patients 
medicated with SSRIs. I proposed that this was due to a meta-memory deficit in adolescents with 
OCD, which is often reported in adult OCD patients (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans et al., 
2008; MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod, & Richter, 1997; Tolin et al., 2001). However, findings from 
Chapter 5 (see below) challenge this meta-cognitive theory. I concluded that avoidance learning and 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer are unimpaired in adolescents with OCD.  
   As chapters thus far which used deterministic tasks overall showed no major deficits in OCD, the 
last 3 experimental chapters employed probabilistic tasks, in line with emerging research revealing 
that OCD patients display disadvantageous decision-making when choice pay-offs are stochastic 
(Norman et al., 2018; Pushkarskaya et al., 2015). Following on from the last chapter that indirectly 
probed model-based/model-free behaviour, I formally investigated whether model-based reasoning 
was reduced in adolescent OCD using a equential decision-making task in Chapter 4. To derive 
holistic measures of model-based behaviour, I took into account choices and response times of 
participants when conducting standard statistical analysis. Moreover, I fitted a reinforcement learning 
drift diffusion model (RL-DDM, Shahar et al., 2019) to data to determine latent processes 





adult OCD (Voon, Derbyshire, et al., 2015), adolescents with OCD did not significantly differ from 
healthy controls on any of the model-based measures investigated. I inferred that either impaired 
model-based reasoning only emerges in adulthood in individuals with OCD or that the disorder 
disrupts healthy maturation of model-based reasoning over time. Next, results from the RL-DDM 
revealed that patients made more exploratory (or less value-guided) decisions, as well as faster and 
less accurate decisions, during Stage 2 of the task. These findings were most prominent in medicated 
patients. Increased exploration seen here is congruent with past research showing reduced choice 
consistency in OCD patients on probabilistic tasks (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Norman et al., 
2017), and is thought to be driven by higher subjective uncertainty leading to frequent checking of 
sub-optimal options. Past papers also report that OCD patients over-recruit brain regions including 
vmPFC and dACC important for exploratory strategies (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Carrasco, 
Harbin, et al., 2013; Stern et al., 2013), suggesting heavy reliance on this heuristic and inability to 
switch between exploitative and exploratory strategies effectively. Favouring speed over accuracy 
was thought to be due to trials in this task terminating if subjects took too long to answer, consistent 
with a study showing OCD patients make faster responses and accumulate less evidence when 
penalised for slowness (Banca, Vestergaard, et al., 2015). Thus, I concluded that while model-based 
reasoning overall is normal in adolescents with OCD, their decision-making appears atypical from 
that displayed by healthy adolescents.  
  Influenced by research that revealed a novel confidence-action dissociation in adults with OCD 
(Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 2017), I administered a predictive-inference task to adolescents with OCD to 
assess whether action and confidence are equally decoupled in this patient age-group. On this task, I 
predicted intact confidence estimates but excessive updating of choices following prediction errors 
in the adolescent OCD group, in line with findings in adult OCD patients. Unexpectedly, I found that 
adolescent patients only updated choices excessively when prediction errors were low. In other 
words, even when the coin did not deviate far from the last position, patients still updated the location 
of the bucket used for catching the coin. I speculated that these unnecessary updates were being 
driven by possible ‘not-just-right’ perceptions experienced by adolescent patients wherein they 
wanted to ensure the coin landed with high certainty into the bucket. Unlike past experimental 
chapters of this thesis showing abnormal performance by the medicated OCD group, I found that 
excessive updating following low prediction error magnitudes was mainly displayed by medication-
naïve patients. This suggests that ‘not-just-right’ perceptions are perhaps remediated by SSRIs. 
Another significant finding from this chapter was that adolescents with OCD did not update their 





research showing confidence ratings are not reduced following negative feedback in individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive traits (Rouault et al., 2018; Seow & Gillan, 2020). This suggests, overall, that 
actions and confidence are not influenced by negative prediction errors. I speculate that perhaps 
adolescent patients update their actions and beliefs according to an internal sense of 'incompleteness' 
or 'feelings of wrongness', in line with heightened error-related negativity and not-just-right 
perceptions in this population. Despite these abnormal results when assessing action and confidence 
separately, the formal regression analysis assessing the strength of action-confidence coupling 
revealed no differences between patients and controls. This could be due to patients’ excessive action 
updating only being present when prediction errors were small, and not throughout the task. Hence, 
currently there is no clear evidence to support an action-confidence dissociation in adolescents with 
OCD.  
   In the final experimental chapter (Chapter 6), I aimed to assess probabilistic reversal learning in 
adolescents with OCD and investigate latent processes underlying learning and decision-making on 
this task. The experiment reported in this chapter employed the largest sample of participants out of 
all chapters, namely 50 adolescents with OCD and 53 healthy controls. Group difference results on 
this task were striking: adolescents with OCD displayed significant underperformance following 
reversal but intact acquisition learning. Intriguingly, computational modelling revealed that 
adolescents with OCD displayed heightened exploration (similar to findings from Chapter 4), 
reduced perseveration, increased reward learning rates, and reduced punishment learning rates 
compared to healthy controls. Reduced choice consistency here is in line with contemporary 
computational research reporting similar findings in adults and adolescents with OCD (Apergis-
Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019). As in Chapter 4, increased exploration 
is once again speculated to be driven by patients’ heightened feelings of uncertainty, reduced ability 
to arbitrate between exploitative and exploratory strategies, and possibly even impaired 
representation of choice values, leading to more sampling of alternative choices to accumulate 
evidence. Adolescent patients showing differential feedback learning (updating choice values more 
following rewards and less from punishment) is a novel finding, and supports the notion from Chapter 
3’s PIT data that adolescents with OCD are in fact not abnormally sensitive to punishment. In fact, 
here they appear to be significantly less driven by punishing feedback, which is in line with their 
blunted confidence updating to prediction errors from Chapter 5. In addition, this is the only 
experiment not to show an effect of medication status, suggesting that deficits are stable in 
adolescent-OCD regardless of treatment administration. The results in this chapter are indicative of 





7.2 Why do adolescents with OCD show apparently abnormal 
exploration? 
   Collectively from these findings, I infer that adolescents with OCD show a bias for exploratory 
decision-making when tasks are probabilistic, i.e. in Chapters 4 and 6. On deterministic tasks, such 
as the WCST in Chapter 2, decision consistency is equivalent between groups. This suggests that the 
extent to which value-guided decision-making is employed by adolescents with OCD depends on 
whether choice outcomes are stochastic or deterministic. This is convergent with research that reports 
that decision-making under uncertainty is abnormal in adults with OCD (Pushkarskaya et al., 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2015). In addition, Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-prep) administered deterministic and 
probabilistic reversal tasks to adults with OCD and found more habitual responding on the former 
but increased exploration on the latter. Hence, outcome stochasticity appears to modulate the extent 
to which exploratory heuristics are employed by adults and adolescents with OCD. However, it is 
ambiguous whether exploratory decision-making is truly associated with the disorder as OCD 
severity did not correlate with a tendency for exploration in Chapter 6. Symptom severity, on the 
other hand, was associated with exploration on the sequential decision-making task in Chapter 4, but 
only when considering all participants and not when observing only participants with OCD. Hence, 
the relevance of exploration to the clinical manifestation of OCD in adolescence is tentative at best, 
although there is more evidence for reduced perseveration to be linked to symptom severity in adult 
patients (Apergis-Schoute et al., in-prep; Kanen et al., 2019).    
   As mentioned briefly in the discussion section of Chapter 6, research into the explore-exploit 
dilemma has identified two forms of exploration. First, directed exploration involves weighing 
known choice values and choosing a novel option to improve pre-existing knowledge of all options 
present in an environment. Picture a scenario where you are deciding on which new restaurant to 
have dinner at. Directed exploration would entail thoroughly weighing the pros and cons of each 
possible restaurant before making an informed decision. Inversely, random exploration is not based 
on known choice values and reflects behaviour variability in decision-making. In the restaurant 
scenario, a random explorer would decide on a restaurant by tossing a coin. 
   Directed strategies are optimal in that they ensure the greatest amount of reward in the long-term, 
but they are cognitively taxing to execute. Random strategies, on the other hand, can perform ‘well-
enough’ at the fraction of computational cost, as they still enable exploration of novel choices that 
may turn out to be rewarding (Wilson et al., 2014). Healthy adults have been found to engage in both 





Palminteri, & Wyart, 2019; Gershman, 2018; Wilson, Bonawitz, Costa, & Ebitz, 2020; Wilson et al., 
2014), but children and young adolescents prefer to utilise random exploration (Dubois et al., 2020) 
likely due to the strategy being the simpler of the two.     
   It is uncertain in this current thesis whether the exploratory tendencies observed in adolescents with 
OCD are directed or random, or perhaps driven by some other unmodelled process. Other studies 
have just begun to understand how exploratory strategies differ as a function of psychiatric condition. 
For instance, patients with psychosis have been found to use directed strategies less than healthy 
controls but showed normal levels of random exploration (Waltz, Wilson, Albrecht, Frank, & Gold, 
2020), whereas ADHD traits in healthy children is reportedly associated with increased random 
exploration (Dubois et al., 2020). Authors of these studies have attempted to draw conclusions from 
these findings, namely that reduced directed exploration is a reflection of poor goal-directed control 
in patients with psychosis, while random exploration in ADHD is thought to be linked to impaired 
attention and increased impulsivity. It is important that future studies also consider 1) the type of 
exploration patients with OCD engage in (e.g. more random exploration?), and 2) the factors driving 
this behaviour. The cognitive tasks presented in this thesis were unfortunately not designed or 
optimised for testing competing explanations for exploration, so these important questions remain 
unanswered for now. Nevertheless, the remainder of this section will attempt to underscore some 
possible mechanisms contributing to the supposed exploration bias displayed by adolescents with 
OCD.   
 
7.2.1 The Bayesian brain theory: weak reliance on prior evidence 
   A popular computational framework to describe the machinations of the human brain is known as 
the Bayesian brain theory (Knill & Pouget, 2004). In this framework, the brain is posited to always 
be making inferences about hidden or latent causes of data being picked up by human senses (for 
example, hearing a sudden unusual loud noise). It does this by combining prior beliefs about the 
world using past experiences (‘this sounds similar to something else I’ve heard before’) and current 
sensory evidence accumulated in real-time (‘which direction is it coming from?’, ‘how loud is it?’), 
to generate possible reasons for a current experience (‘it is probably the sound of a truck backing up 
outside’). Based on this, a recent theoretical model of OCD suggests that intrusive worries and 
compulsions are a consequence of an inability to rely on prior experiences and outcomes as credible 
sources of information, leading to more reliance on sensory information (Fradkin, Adams, et al., 





brain, patients have difficulty predicting how different actions lead to different outcomes. Hence, 
they live in a constant state of uncertainty and conduct repetitive rituals in a futile effort to quell their 
feelings of doubt (e.g. repeatedly checking locks and switches). Furthermore, an inability to 
synthesise prior experiences means patients cannot rely on information gathered from past checking 
episodes to reduce uncertainty. Instead, an overreliance on sensory feedback, such as feelings of 
worry, doubt, and incompleteness, makes patients constantly feel that their actions were performed 
incorrectly. Concretely, a computational study recently revealed promising evidence for this model, 
wherein subjects with obsessive-compulsive traits displayed more uncertainty regarding actions and 
outcomes and had increased difficulty in relying on learnt contingencies which impaired their ability 
to predict future feedback (Fradkin, Ludwig, et al., 2020).     
   A combination of weak prior evidence and overreliance on sensory information can account for 
some of the exploration findings in my thesis. First, an inability to accurately formulate how actions 
form outcomes from previous experience, mistrust of gathered pay-off information, and heightened 
uncertainty, may have driven decisions that are not consistent with choice values, culminating in 
what appears to be exploration in Chapters 4 and 6. Moreover it may even account for other findings. 
In Chapter 5, adolescents with OCD may have revealed constant action updating despite low 
prediction errors as well as blunted confidence updating because they do not take into account 
external information provided by the predictive-inference task. Instead, they may be making choice 
updates based on internal sensations of 'wrongness', consistent with abnormally heightened ERN 
signals in this population. Further evidence that confidence in OCD is not dependent on external 
evidence can be found in Chapter 3, where the OCD group reported lower confidence ratings in 
memory of CS-US associations but were able to conduct specific and general transfer to the same 
extent as controls on the PIT task.   
   The model can also account for past studies revealing that paediatric patients spend too long 
accumulating evidence in decision-making tasks (Erhan et al., 2017; Hauser, Moutoussis, et al., 
2017), supposedly due to their inefficiency in synthesising evidence throughout the duration of the 
task. Moreover, the model also suggests that young OCD patients display slow and impaired planning 
(Huyser et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2018; Negreiros et al., 2019) as a result of sensory feedback reporting 
that actions were not performed ‘correctly’ and an inability to synthesise prior information to plan 
for future actions.  
   Nonetheless, there are some findings I have reported in this thesis that Fradkin, Adams et al.’s 





patients with OCD prefer to use habit-directed over goal-directed policies, particularly when 
outcomes are more stable, because their uncertainty surrounding actions and outcomes makes it 
harder to predict outcomes from goal-directed strategies. Hence, Fradkin, Adams et al. suggest that 
it is easier for patients to rely on habit-based policies that have worked well in the past and are 
supposedly more reliable. This can account for findings of habitual responding in adults with OCD 
on tasks that are deterministic (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Gillan et al., 2015, 2014, 2011), but the 
adolescents with OCD in my thesis displayed no evidence of habitual responding on the WCST in 
Chapter 2. Instead, the only impairment uncovered on the task was slower responding and increased 
unique errors by medicated patients, which may correspond more to disrupted attention in this group. 
Findings from the PIT task in Chapter 3 and the sequential decision-making task in Chapter 4 also 
suggest that model-free/habitual policies are not employed more by adolescent patients compared to 
controls. However, the model is able to account for why the adolescent patients are impaired on 
probabilistic compared to deterministic tasks such as the WCST, as the former contains more action-
outcome uncertainty which makes learning reward contingencies over time more difficult for 
adolescent patients.  
   Next, Fradkin, Adams et al. (2020) also suggest that patients with OCD are unable to efficiently 
synthesise prior information. Instead, their actions are driven more by recently acquired feedback on 
cognitive tasks. This is indeed the case in adults with OCD (Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 2017), yet in this 
thesis adolescents with OCD showed no evidence for heightened feedback sensitivity on any tasks 
employed with the exception of increased reward rates in Chapter 6, although this was coupled with 
decreased punishment rates. Additionally, in Chapter 5, increases in prediction error magnitude 
(equivalent to increasing the magnitude of punishing feedback) on the predictive-inference task, did 
not incur more action updating in adolescents with OCD, whom only showed excessive updating 
compared to controls following low prediction errors. As mentioned above it may be that adolescents 
with OCD are simply responding based purely on internal sensations (discomfort, incompleteness, 
doubt, etc), perhaps to a greater extent than adults with OCD whose choices are still influenced by 
external recent feedback.      
   Therefore, this framework can account for a large proportion of findings reported in this thesis, in 
particular findings pertaining to reduced choice consistency/exploration, but not all.  
7.2.2 Choice value sensitivity and evidence accumulation 
   Literature into the explore-exploit dilemma posit that an exploratory strategy is beneficial when 





rewards in the long-term (as opposed to exploitation which only enables short-term reward 
maximisation) (Addicott et al., 2017). However, adolescents with OCD do not appear to be using 
exploration as a cognitive strategy as they show both increased exploration and impaired 
performance on the probabilistic reversal learning task (Chapter 6). Thus, perhaps their exploratory 
behaviour can be reformulated as an impairment in value-guided decision-making. Indeed, it has 
been hypothesised that frequent choosing of inferior options may be the result of noisy or inaccurate 
representations of choice values instead of exploration (Pedersen et al., 2017). All published studies 
showing exploration/reduced perseveration in patients with OCD (e.g. Kanen et al., 2019; Hauser et 
al., 2017) do not use models, such as RL-DDM, that tap into the extent to which subjects can 
discriminate between competing choices based on their values. Based on findings from studies 
showing action-outcome representations are faulty in people with compulsive traits (Fradkin, 
Ludwig, et al., 2020; Seow et al., 2020), it may very well be the case that patients with OCD have 
faulty knowledge of choice values in reinforcement learning tasks. Hitherto, OCD research has 
mostly fit drift-diffusion models to data from perceptual decision-making tasks such as the Dot 
Motion Discrimination task that requires participants to report whether a large group of dots on screen 
are mostly moving to the left or right on screen. In general, these drift-diffusion studies report that 
patients with OCD have lower drift rates, meaning they make slower and less accurate decisions as 
they are unable to discriminate effectively between the two competing options (Banca, Vestergaard, 
et al., 2015; Erhan et al., 2017; Mandali et al., 2019). However, these studies do not utilise 
reinforcement learning models alongside drift-diffusion models which means they cannot investigate 
crucial learning mechanisms, such as feedback sensitivity, that are captured in RL models.   
   In this thesis, I was able to probe this poor choice value representation theory in Chapter 4 where I 
fit an RL-DDM to data from a sequential decision-making task. Contrary to what was expected, there 
were no significant group differences in the drift rate scaling parameter used, but patients did make 
more exploratory responses and also displayed lower boundary separation parameter values 
indicating they favoured speed over accuracy. The lack of difference in drift rate scaling values 
suggest patients with OCD are aware of choice values to the same extent as control subjects, but they 
seemed to ignore these values when making decisions. In the discussion of Chapter 4, I speculated 
that patients made more erratic choices because the task trials were timed, and adult patients with 
OCD have been found respond fast and gather less evidence when penalised for slowness (Banca et 
al., 2015). As a result of this erratic responding, it may have been difficult to determine whether 
patients could actually differentiate between choice values or not. Adding to this, exploration in OCD 





indicating that exploration displayed by adolescents with OCD is associated with lower 
discrimination between choice values. To study the relationship between drift rates and exploration 
further, it may be crucial to fit the RL-DDM to data from tasks that are self-paced in future studies. 
7.2.3 Role of learning and memory  
   Reduced value-guided decision-making in adolescents with OCD could be attributed to an 
impairment in learning values associated with choices in the first place, or perhaps a deficit in storing 
representations of multiple choice values in memory. This would be consistent with findings from 
Gottwald et al. (2018) who reported that adolescents with OCD displayed marked deficits on various 
learning and memory tasks. However, adolescents with OCD in my thesis did not show as 
pronounced a learning deficit as was reported in Gottwald et al.’s study. For instance, adolescent 
patients in my experiments were able to perform with the same accuracy as control subjects on the 
WCST (Chapter 2), learn US-response and CS-US associations sufficiently to conduct specific and 
general transfer on the PIT task (Chapter 3), muster model-based control to the same extent as healthy 
adolescents (Chapter 4), and respond similarly to controls on the predictive-inference task when 
prediction error magnitudes were not low (Chapter 5). Some evidence of a learning impairment in 
adolescents with OCD was found on the probabilistic reversal learning task in Chapter 6 where 
patients’ performance worsened post-reversal. Albeit, pre-reversal learning was intact in my sample 
of adolescents with OCD which contrasts with Gottwald et al.’s adolescent OCD participants 
displaying poor rule learning on the ID/ED task and poor instrumental learning on an outcome 
devaluation task. Results from Chapter 6 suggest that patients’ learning only becomes disrupted when 
there are changes in outcome contingencies, which points to an issue in coping with environmental 
volatility (Pushkarskaya et al., 2015) and not a pure learning problem.   
   Concerning a potential memory deficit, a recent study employing a modified Dot Motion 
Discrimination task where subjects had to make decisions and then repeat their decisions later on, 
found that adults with obsessive-compulsive (OC) traits had impaired implicit memory for first 
decisions which led to reduced drift rates (less efficient evidence integration/reduced choice value 
sensitivity) when repeating decisions (Solway, Lin, & Vinaik, 2020). Those authors suggest that 
impaired implicit memory for past actions leads to poor repetition of these actions in the future, which 
may account for reduced choice consistency in adolescents and adults with OCD. However, they also 
found that drift rates were already significantly decreased when high OC subjects made their initial 
decisions, and this deficit cannot be explained by impairments in implicit memory. Hence, some 





   In this thesis, I had no measure of implicit memory but I used the digit span assessment as a test of 
both verbal memory (forwards digit span) and working memory (backwards digit span), and found 
no differences between OCD and control participants on these measures. Memory was not formally 
tested on any of the cognitive tasks in this thesis, with the exception of the PIT task in Chapter 3 
which probed whether participants were able to remember associations learnt from the Instrumental 
and Pavlovian learning phases during the PIT phase. Medicated patients showed a tendency to 
misremember CS-US pairs during the Pavlovian phase and also reported reduced memory 
confidence, but this did not impact their ability to conduct specific and general PIT later on. 
Nonetheless, these results are unsurprising as it has already been established in the literature that 
patients with OCD are not impaired on digit span tasks (see Chapter 1). Instead, memory impairments 
may be most prominent on non-verbal, visuospatial tasks, for example adolescent patients have been 
found to be impaired on the Paired Associates Learning task (Sahakian et al., 1988) administered in 
Gottwald et al.’s (2018) study. Although, other studies probing visuospatial non-verbal memory in 
youths with OCD report no impairment (Beers et al., 1999; Chang et al., 2007; Geller et al., 2018; 
Hybel et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Shin et al., 2008) – see Chapter 1. Hence, poor memory 
representation of choice values (which taps into non-verbal memory) may still be present in 
adolescents with OCD, leading to more inaccurate responding, but this must be directly probed in 
further studies.  
   In summary, findings from this thesis do not support the hypothesis that learning or working 
memory are significantly impaired in adolescents with OCD. Instead, patients appear to show 
disrupted behavioural performance following changes in contingencies indicating an issue coping 
with uncertainty or environmental volatility. However, there is the possibility that implicit and/or 
non-verbal memory deficits resulted in poor choice value representation, which collectively led to 
reduced decision accuracy, but this notion needs to be researched in future work. 
7.2.4 Anxiety and Stress 
   Group differences reported in this thesis might even be the result of factors not directly linked to 
OCD. Despite having no comorbid diagnoses, adolescents with OCD still showed elevated anxiety 
and depression scores than healthy controls. First, regarding anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty is 
also a characteristic of individuals with anxiety disorders (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; 
Meyer, 2017). Additionally, heightened ERN is a shared trait of anxiety and obsessive-compulsive 
disorders (Riesel, 2019). Therefore, the anxiety or stress participants feel when outcome 
contingencies change could be contributing to their less accurate and more random responding in 





learning and decision-making (Porcelli & Delgado, 2017; Wemm & Wulfert, 2017) while youths 
with clinical anxiety are reported to make less correct responses post-reversal during a probabilistic 
reversal learning task (Dickstein et al., 2010).  
   Computational modelling research has also uncovered findings in individuals who are stressed or 
anxious that parallel how adolescents with OCD update choice values from feedback in Chapter 6. 
Inducing acute stress reportedly improves learning from positive outcomes but impairs learning from 
negative outcomes (Lighthall et al., 2013; Mather & Lighthall, 2012; Ting et al., 2020). Stress 
perhaps biases individuals to be reward sensitive, possibly because they are motivated to seek outlets 
that can reduce stress (Mather & Lighthall, 2012; Sinha et al., 2009). Indeed, adolescents with OCD 
in Chapter 6 also revealed heightened reward learning rates and reduced punishment rates compared 
to healthy controls.  
   Nonetheless, the reinforcement learning literature involving stress/anxiety is highly varied as stress 
has also been found to reduce reward processing while increasing punishment processing (Berghorst, 
Bogdan, Frank, & Pizzagalli, 2013; Mkrtchian, Aylward, Dayan, Roiser, & Robinson, 2017). 
Another study, conversely, reported no evidence of atypical reward or punishment learning in 
anxious individuals but found evidence for poor learning overall (LaFreniere & Newman, 2019). 
Hence, it is difficult to determine whether decision-making displayed by adolescents with OCD in 
this thesis truly mirrors that of stressed or anxious individuals. In addition, none of the studies cited 
here reported increased exploration or reduced perseveration in the anxious sample, suggesting that 
these key behaviours are unique to OCD.  
   When conducting correlation analyses per chapter in this thesis, it was found that anxiety scores 
combined with OCI scores predicted fewer correct responses on the probabilistic reversal learning 
task in Chapter 6 and more exploration on the sequential decision-making task in Chapter 4, 
suggesting a possible influence of anxiety on task behaviour. However, these correlations ceased to 
be significant when conducting the analyses within OCD and control groups, suggesting that anxiety 
is not driving this abnormal decision-making in adolescents with OCD. Adding to this, anxiety scores 
were unrelated to task measures reported in Chapters 2,3, and 5.  
7.2.5 Depression and Anhedonia 
  Instead of anxiety, adolescent patients’ elevated depression symptoms may have influenced their 
decision-making instead. A characteristic of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is anhedonia which 
describes a loss of interest, pleasure, and motivation in tasks or activities. Significant anhedonia is 





Hence, depressive feelings and anhedonia experienced by adolescents with OCD could have 
potentially reduced their motivation to make value-guided decisions on the probabilistic tasks. 
However, many studies investigating reinforcement learning in populations with MDD find no 
significant impairments when employing both frequentist analyses and computational modelling 
(Brolsma et al., 2020; Chase et al., 2010; Dickstein et al., 2010; Remijnse et al., 2009). To my 
knowledge, only one study has revealed that patients with MDD showed reduced reward learning 
rates compared to healthy controls (Mukherjee, Filipowicz, Vo, Satterthwaite, & Kable, 2020), while 
my adolescent patients showed the opposite result in Chapter 6.  
   Next, regarding exploration, one study reported that MDD patients do not make more exploratory 
choices compared to healthy controls (Cella, Dymond, & Cooper, 2010), which is once again at odds 
with my findings in adolescents with OCD. Although, one study has found that healthy young adults 
with depressive traits made more exploratory choices on a two-armed bandit task (Blanco, Otto, 
Maddox, Beevers, & Love, 2013). However, this study did not account for anxious or obsessive-
compulsive symptoms in the group with depressive traits. Overall, it is not certain whether 
exploration displayed by adolescents with OCD can be attributed to their depressive symptoms.  
   Correlational analyses per chapter in this thesis revealed that depression scores intriguingly 
predicted improved performance in participants, namely less perseverative errors on the WCST in 
Chapter 2, increased drift rate scaling values within controls in Chapter 4, and decreased learning 
rates on the predictive-inference task in Chapter 5. This indicates that atypical decision-making 
displayed by adolescents with OCD are unlikely to be driven by symptoms of depression.  
   Recently, dimensional research has revealed that impaired decision-making performance is 
strongly associated with obsessive-compulsive traits but not anxious or depressive traits, and that this 
impaired performance is mediated by a tendency for more exploratory decisions (Suzuki, Yamashita, 
& Katahira, 2019). This offers firm evidence for abnormal exploration being a characteristic of OCD 
and not anxiety or depression.   
7.2.6 Motor Disinhibition and Impulsivity  
   An alternative explanation for choice randomness seen in Chapters 2 (as increased unique errors 
on the WCST may be attributed to random responding), excessive exploration in Chapters 4 and 6, 
as well as unnecessary action updating in Chapter 5 is that adolescents with OCD are impaired at 
inhibiting inappropriate motor actions, which may be analogous to impulsivity. Evidence for this 
stems from research reporting that brain regions linked to motor actions, including the supplementary 





et al., 2019; Yücel et al., 2007). In addition, adults with OCD reportedly display increased readiness 
potential signals (Morand-Beaulieu, Aardema, O’Connor, & Lavoie, 2020), which is the brain signal 
representing motor preparedness and the decision to initiate movement (Kornhuber & Deecke, 2016). 
These heightened signals are likely to influence adult OCD patients’ inability to inhibit pre-potent 
responses on motor inhibition tasks (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Menzies, et al., 2007; Chamberlain, 
Müller, et al., 2006; Menzies et al., 2007; Penadés et al., 2007). In the context of the current findings, 
motor disinhibition may be driving random choices and frequent action updating displayed by 
adolescents with OCD. More convincingly, activation in the pre-SMA is associated with more 
exploratory decision-making (Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2015) suggesting a neural basis for patients’ 
over-exploration.  
   Similarly, adolescent patients’ choice randomness could be attributed to impulsivity, which 
describes the tendency to display behaviour with little forethought or consideration of consequences. 
Supporting this, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and OCD are often comorbid in 
childhood (Brem, Grünblatt, Drechsler, Riederer, & Walitza, 2014) and children with ADHD and 
OCD share similar patterns of abnormal frontal cortex activity during decision-making (Christina O. 
Carlisi et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2018; Norman et al., 2017). In addition, the ERN which is found 
to be reliably increased in youths with OCD is also reported to be a marker for impulsivity in 
adolescence (Taylor, Visser, Fueggle, Bellgrove, & Fox, 2018). Furthermore, random exploration 
(Dubois et al., 2020) and reduced inhibition (Wodka et al., 2007) are reported to be associated with 
ADHD traits. Hence, there is a possibility for impulsivity/ADHD traits to be driving decision-making 
in the current OCD sample, but no impulsivity questionnaires were administered in the experiments 
of this thesis so this cannot be confirmed at present.  
   However, children with OCD largely show no deficits on behavioural inhibition tasks as 
highlighted in Chapter 1 (Andrés et al., 2007; Beers et al., 1999; Chang et al., 2007; Garcia-Delgar 
et al., 2018; Geller et al., 2018; Gooskens et al., 2018; Gruner et al., 2012; Ota et al., 2013). In 
addition, there is a lack of evidence for increased SMA and pre-SMA activity in paediatric OCD 
patients compared to the literature in adult OCD. In fact, one study actually reported reduced pre-
SMA activity in paediatric OCD patients compared to healthy children (Rubia, Cubillo, Woolley, 
Brammer, & Smith, 2011). Thus, there is not enough evidence to ascertain whether motor inhibitory 






7.2.7 Neural Basis for Abnormal Exploration 
   As alluded to in Chapters 4 and 6, neuroimaging evidence also offers insight into abnormal 
exploration or reduced value-guided decision-making in OCD. In healthy people, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is thought to show differential activation for exploitative (Daw et al., 
2006; Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2015) and exploratory actions (Domenech et al., 2020; Trudel et al., 
2020), indicating the importance of the vmPFC in arbitrating between the different strategies. In 
parallel, the dACC has been found to be active only during exploratory choices (Kolling, Behrens, 
Mars, & Rushworth, 2012; Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2015; Trudel et al., 2020). The dACC is thought 
to be implicated in behavioural monitoring and adaptation, and to trigger the search for better 
alternatives when making decisions (Kolling et al., 2012; Kolling, Scholl, Chekroud, Trier, & 
Rushworth, 2018). More recently, dACC activity was associated with decisions that deviated from 
choice values, indicating the importance of the area in value-independent decision-making (Findling 
et al., 2019). The vmPFC  (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2018; Fitzgerald et al., 2018, 2010; Huyser et al., 
2011; Stern et al., 2011, 2013) and dACC (see Riesel et al., 2019 and Marzuki 2020 for reviews) are 
consistently reported to be overactive in OCD, suggesting abnormalities present in the OCD brain 
system responsible for arbitrating between exploratory and exploitative decision-making. In 
particular, overactive vmPFC activation is associated with poor safety learning and increased 
uncertainty in adults with OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Stern et al., 2013), while a plethora of 
research has identified elevated ACC signals associated with errors in both children and adults with 
OCD (e.g Carrasco et al., 2013; Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009; Riesel, Endrass, Kaufmann, & 
Kathmann, 2011; Riesel, Kathmann, & Endrass, 2014). Heightened activity in these regions under 
specific contexts imply patients constantly feel they are under threat or are underperforming, and 
perhaps feel the need to change their behaviour in order to cope. Nonetheless, research has yet to 
determine whether abnormal vmPFC and ACC activation are directly associated with increased 
exploration in OCD. Future work should focus on understanding brain systems underlying 
maladaptive exploration in OCD, which is recently emerging as a major cognitive feature of the 
disorder.  
Summary 
In this section I have highlighted that exploration or reduced value-guided decision-making during 
tasks with probabilistic choice pay-offs is a prominent feature of adolescent OCD. I discuss evidence 
for and against various factors potentially contributing to these results, namely weak reliance on 
information accumulated over time and stronger reliance on internal sensations when making 





remembering choice values, enhanced depressive and/or anxious traits, motor impulsivity, and lastly 
a deficit in disengaging from exploratory decision-making supported by work reporting abnormal 
vmPFC and ACC activity in OCD. These explanations are speculative for now and future research 
employing well-designed tasks that can probe exploratory behaviour under different conditions 
alongside neuroimaging techniques is necessary to uncover why exploration is abnormal in OCD. 
Promisingly, several studies have already successfully teased apart random, noise-driven exploration 
from information-seeking exploration in healthy subjects using specific paradigms and sophisticated 
models (Dubois et al., 2020; Findling et al., 2019; Wilson et al., 2020, 2014). Perhaps such models 
and tasks can be employed to thoroughly investigate exploration in populations with OCD.  
 
7.3 Neurocognitive distinctions between adolescent-OCD and adult-
OCD 
   In each experimental chapter of this thesis, most hypotheses were formulated based on adult OCD 
research, as the child/adolescent-OCD cognitive literature is sparse. Through this, I was able to obtain 
insight into how learning and decision-making in adolescent OCD compares to adult OCD. The main 
similarity uncovered was that adolescents with OCD display exploratory decision-making and 
reduced perseveration during probabilistic tasks which is also reported in adults with OCD (Apergis-
Schoute et al., in-prep; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019), suggesting that these features are 
stable across the lifespan in OCD. However, adolescents with OCD also expressed attributes that are 
distinct from typical findings in adults with OCD which will be discussed in detail here. 
   The most conspicuous departure from the adult OCD literature is that adolescents with OCD 
showed no evidence of a cognitive flexibility deficit (Chapter 2), and furthermore showed equivalent 
model-based/goal-directed reasoning to participants without OCD (Chapters 3 and 4). First, the lack 
of cognitive flexibility deficit found in Chapter 2 as well as in past paediatric OCD studies is striking 
as cognitive inflexibility is considered a potential endophenotype of OCD (Chamberlain & Menzies, 
2009) as adults with OCD and unaffected first-degree relatives also display this behaviour (Cavedini 
et al., 2010; Chamberlain, Fineberg, Menzies, et al., 2007; Menzies et al., 2007). Moreover, cognitive 
inflexibility corresponds well to patients’ tendency for producing persistent and repetitive obsessions 
and compulsions. In fact, a recent meta-analysis found that cognitive inflexibility on the ID/ED task 
is a robust trait of adult OCD (Chamberlain et al., manuscript submitted), although these findings are 





this population are broad and not limited to inflexibility and habitual responding (Fradkin et al., 
2018).   
   Next, comparable model-based reasoning between adolescents with OCD and healthy adolescents 
indicates an absence of maladaptive habit formation as well as intact goal-directed control in 
adolescent-OCD which is inconsistent with findings in adult OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; 
Gillan et al., 2014, 2011). Moreover, this conflicts with Gottwald et al.’s (2018) findings showing 
that adolescents with OCD display reduced goal-directed control on outcome devaluation tasks. 
These findings run counter to the ‘habit hypothesis’ (which postulates that a bias for habit formation 
over goal-directed behaviour drives compulsive tendencies) as a possible cognitive model of 
compulsivity. After all, if an overreliance on habits is absent in young patients, it is unlikely to be 
the reason for compulsions in both adolescent- and adult-OCD. Moreover, a longitudinal study 
showed that compulsive tendencies are predictive of reduced model-based reasoning in healthy 
adolescents (Vaghi et al., 2020), suggesting disrupted goal-directed faculties to be a consequence 
rather than a cause of compulsions in OCD.    
   Next, adolescents with OCD revealed no significant action-confidence dissociation compared to 
healthy adolescents in Chapter 5, despite robust evidence for adults with OCD and adults with 
obsessive-compulsive traits presenting a disconnect between actions and beliefs (Rouault et al., 2018; 
Seow & Gillan, 2020; Vaghi et al., 2019; Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 2017). Intact action-belief association 
strength in adolescents with OCD has also been reported in a past study (Gottwald, 2017, thesis), 
implying that the two constructs perhaps become unlinked with age or as disorder duration increases. 
Similar to the habit hypothesis, a disconnect between action and meta-cognition has been labelled a 
promising neuropsychological mechanism underlying compulsive behaviour (Vaghi, Luyckx, et al., 
2017) due to the ego-dystonic nature of the disorder. Gottwald’s and my findings indicate that this 
model may not be compatible with juvenile-OCD. Nonetheless, findings from my thesis provide 
evidence for abnormalities in meta-cognition alone in adolescents with OCD, namely reduced 
confidence updating following prediction errors in Chapter 5, and decreased memory confidence in 
CS-US associations in Chapter 3. This suggests that changes in meta-cognition displayed by 
adolescents with OCD are domain dependent by which confidence in decision-making is resistant to 
unexpected outcomes while confidence in memory is generally reduced. The distinction between 
meta-decision-making and meta-memory is consistent with research in adult OCD (Boschen & 
Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans et al., 2008; MacDonald et al., 1997; Rouault et al., 2018; Seow & 
Gillan, 2020; Tolin et al., 2001). These findings suggest that meta-cognition is not a unitary 





decision-making versus memory (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014). I speculate that 
individuals with OCD are relatively confident in their decisions as they are being made in real-time, 
since tasks that probe meta-decision-making require that subjects rate their confidence trial-by-trial. 
In contrast, paradigms probing meta-memory often ask that subjects rate how confident they are in 
their memories after completing a task. Patients with OCD perhaps express more doubt in their 
abilities after completion of a task or ritual but not during. Perhaps as a result of difficulty in 
accumulating and synthesising past information (Fradkin, Adams, et al., 2020) patients with OCD 
distrust their memories of rituals completed in the past leading to increased repetition of rituals in 
the present.  
  Lastly, my findings contradict the harm avoidance model of OCD which proposes that compulsions 
are conducted to prevent incoming danger, harm, or unpleasant thoughts (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1990, 
1992), as there was no evidence of excessive punishment sensitivity or harm avoidance in adolescents 
with OCD across all studies conducted in this thesis. Concretely, adolescent patients revealed 
reduced punishment learning rates during probabilistic reversal learning, even though studies 
employing adult OCD samples do not report abnormalities in learning rates (Apergis-Schoute et al., 
in-preparation; Hauser et al., 2017; Kanen et al., 2019). In addition, adolescents with OCD did not 
display significantly increased avoidance responses under extinction during the PIT task in Chapter 
3, even though adults with OCD have been found to be highly harm avoidant on aversive 
deterministic learning paradigms, where they display excessive avoidance responses to devalued 
stimuli (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Gillan et al., 2014).  
 
7.3.1 Possible explanations for differences between adults and adolescents with OCD 
   There are several factors that may contribute to the distinctions in findings between adults and 
adolescents with OCD. One obvious factor may be that cognition perhaps declines as disease duration 
prolongs, suggesting that most cognitive impairments associated with OCD are not causally linked 
to the disorder. Additionally, other factors such as the heterogeneity in treatments received over the 
years, negative life experiences due to the disorder, and comorbid psychiatric disorders developed 
over the lifetime may also shape cognition in adults with OCD. This demonstrates the importance of 
studying paediatric samples of OCD as it allows for a relatively untampered window into the early 
cognitive characteristics associated with the disorder.  
   Despite these cognitive distinctions, several reviews have concluded equivalent altered brain 





2008; Marzuki et al., 2020; Norman et al., 2016), specifically in regions within the cortico-striato-
thalamo-cortico loops including the OFC, ACC, PFC, and basal ganglia. Perhaps dysfunction starts 
off predominantly neural in adolescent patients but eventually culminates in cognitive impairment 
later in life, for instance reduced ACC volume predicts future performance monitoring abnormalities 
and the development of OCD in young children (Gilbert et al., 2018). These findings imply that 
mechanisms contributing to OCD are more neurobiological than cognitive, which accounts for neural 
markers, such as ERN, being reliably abnormal in child and adult patients, but not cognitive markers. 
   Nonetheless, there is also evidence for brain differences between child and adult patients that may 
be contributing to these separate cognitive profiles. For instance, as described in Chapter 1, brain 
regions underlying habit-directed behaviour are overactive following symptom provocation in adults 
with OCD (Banca, Voon, et al., 2015), but underactive in children with OCD (Gilbert et al., 2009) 
which may explain the lack of excessive habitual responding in my sample of adolescents with OCD.  
Moreover, a review by Huyser et al. (2009) reported that differences between children and adults 
with OCD are more pronounced using structural compared to functional neuroimaging methods, 
suggesting that caution should be exercised when interpreting brain findings obtained from different 
neuroimaging modalities. Huyser et al. posited that paediatric OCD patients show more structural 
abnormalities in the globus pallidus and thalamus compared to adults who typically show structural 
OFC and caudate abnormalities. In particular, structural paediatric studies report that children with 
OCD show larger grey matter density in the OFC compared to age-matched controls (Szeszko et al., 
2008) while adult studies often report bilateral reductions in OFC volumes in OCD patients (Atmaca, 
Yildirim, Ozdemir, Tezcan, & Kursad Poyraz, 2007; Atmaca et al., 2006; Hoexter et al., 2012; Rotge 
et al., 2009; Szeszko et al., 1999). Moreover, reduced caudate volume is seen in adults with OCD 
(Bartha et al., 1998; Ebert et al., 1997; Luxenberg et al., 1988; Robinson et al., 1995) but not in child 
patients (Maia et al., 2008; Rosenberg et al., 1997; Szeszko et al., 2004). Paediatric patients showing 
normal volumes in these areas may enable protection against certain types of cognitive deficit in, as 
the OFC is implicated in response inhibition (Elliott & Deakin, 2005; Hooker & Knight, 2010), while 
the caudate is reported to be one of the regions linked to cognitive flexibility in OCD (Vaghi, Vértes, 
et al., 2017). Conversely, a more recent meta-analysis has uncovered that adults and youth with OCD, 
in fact, have similar grey matter volumes in the striatum (enlarged) and PFC (reduced), but adult 
patients displayed smaller grey matter volumes in the ACC and greater grey matter volumes in the 
cerebellum compared to child patients (Hu et al., 2017). I speculate that perhaps paediatric brains 
develop to become similar to adult patients’ brains over time, suggesting that disorder duration 





exploring how brain structure changes over the course of development in OCD patients, as well as 
neuroimaging research directly comparing child and adult patients. As a result, it is impossible at 
present to know whether these structural impairments are a consequence of OCD or vice versa, and 
whether child patients eventually acquire brain profiles matching those of adult patients with age. 
One cross-sectional resting state study has reported that children with OCD showed reduced 
connectivity from the dorsal striatum and thalamus to the rostral and dorsal ACC (Fitzgerald et al., 
2011), which was absent in older adolescent and adult patients, providing some insight into how the 
brain develops with age in OCD. However, patient sample sizes in this study were small, with only 
11 children and 18 adolescents compared to 31 adults. Neuroimaging research studying adults with 
early- onset vs late-onset OCD also show mixed results and utilise small subject samples (see Taylor 
et al., 2011 for review). In addition, there is an issue with interpretation of these resting-state and 
structural brain results, as it is uncertain how atypical functional and structural findings in OCD are 
directly associated with cognitive functioning.  
   As alluded to in several chapters, healthy adolescents may be showing age-related reduced 
performance across various domains as their neural and cognitive faculties are still developing 
(Giedd et al., 1999; Luna et al., 2001), which accounts for the lack of pronounced differences between 
adolescents with OCD and controls. Indeed, when compared to adults, healthy children and 
adolescents have been found to show reduced goal-directed/model-based reasoning (Decker et al., 
2016), inaccurate meta-cognition (Fandakova et al., 2020; Moses-Payne, Habicht, Bowler, Steinbeis, 
& Hauser, 2020; Weil et al., 2013), and increased punishment sensitivity (Hauser et al., 2015; 
Rodriguez Buritica et al., 2019; Rosenbaum, Grassie, & Hartley, 2020; van den Bos et al., 2012). 
Although healthy older children and adolescents are thought to show similar performance to adults 
on cognitive flexibility tasks such as the WCST (Chelune & Baer, 1986). Thus, some impairments 
which are pronounced in adult OCD may arise due to disrupted development of cognitive functions 
as cognitive characteristics present in childhood do not fully mature with age. Empirical evidence for 
this was established in a longitudinal study showing that compulsions impair otherwise normal 
development of model-based control in healthy adolescents (Vaghi et al., 2020). Intriguingly, the 
same line of reasoning may apply to clinical symptoms of OCD as research suggests that ritualistic, 
compulsive behaviour is actually typical in young healthy children (Evans, Lewis, & Iobst, 2004). 
Childhood behaviours that are similar to symptoms of obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders 
include rigid routines, strong preferences, rigid food habits, acute perceptions of minute flaws in toys 
or clothes, and perceptions of subtle changes in the environment. While maturation of 





region) leads to these behaviours being phased out over time in healthy development (Evans et al., 
2004), the same behaviours instead are entrenched in OCD.  
   There is also the possibility that adult- and adolescent-OCD are different subtypes or even separate 
disorders altogether, which would account for the distinctions in clinical, cognitive, and neural 
presentation. One piece of evidence for this is that candidate endophenotypes of OCD including 
impaired cognitive flexibility and response inhibition, are present in adults with OCD and their 
probands but not in adolescents and children with OCD. As endophenotypes are meant to signal 
genetic risk for the disorder, it is unusual that they would not be present in young people with OCD. 
A few studies have pointed towards genetic differences between developmental subtypes, namely, 
higher heritability estimates are associated with paediatric OCD, and early-onset OCD is more likely 
than late-onset OCD to occur in first-degree relatives (Taylor, 2011; Van Grootheest et al., 2005). At 
the genetic level, differences in the serotonin transporter gene (SCL6A4) between adults and 
children/adolescents with OCD have been uncovered (Grünblatt et al., 2018). However, genetics 
cannot account for why adults with early onset OCD also show phenotypic differences from children 
and adolescents with OCD (Butwicka & Gmitrowicz, 2010; Sobin, Blundell, & Karayiorgou, 2000) 
as one would assume that both groups have the same genetic makeup. Moreover, most human genetic 
studies have been unable to quantify genes that are significantly linked to increased susceptibility for 
OCD (Pauls, 2008), suggesting more of an influence of environmental factors or an environment-by-
gene interaction. Hence, it is likely that some combination of environmental factors, such as age of 
onset and disorder duration, and genetic factors interact to inform the highly heterogeneous clinical 
and cognitive presentation of OCD.   
   Nonetheless, there are some characteristics that fulfil endophenotype criteria for both children and 
adults with OCD, namely slower and impaired planning linked to reduced dlPFC activation (Lochner 
et al., 2020; Negreiros et al., 2019; Vaghi, Hampshire, et al., 2017), and increased ERN and 
performance monitoring (Riesel, 2019). This indicates some genetic and familial overlap between 
subtypes. Additionally, this suggests that these characteristics are stronger candidate endophenotypes 
of OCD than cognitive flexibility and response inhibition as they are present regardless of age-of-
onset and disorder duration. Relevant to major findings in this thesis, future research should attempt 
to establish whether increased shifting/exploration on probabilistic reversal tasks qualifies as an 
endophenotype as we now know this characteristic is present in both adult and adolescent OCD 







Results of my thesis indicate that adolescents with OCD are similar to adult patients in that they show 
abnormal exploration and reduced perseveration on probabilistic learning tasks, and additionally 
show altered meta-cognition. This supplements past findings showing other similarities between 
subtypes (see Table 7.1 for summary). However, adolescent patients are also distinct from adult 
patients on other cognitive domains (see Table 7.1). Proposed reasons for these distinctions include 
prolonged disorder duration in adults with OCD, neural abnormalities preceding cognitive decline, 
structural and functional brain differences between paediatric and adult subtypes, and that OCD may 
be a disorder associated with disrupted maturation of cognitive functions present in childhood. There 
is also the possibility that child-OCD and adult-OCD are different subtypes of the disorder supported 





















Table 7.1: Summary of similarities and distinctions between adult and adolescent subtypes based on previous 





Cognitive inflexibility ✔ ✖ 
Poor response inhibition ✔ ✖ 
Slow and disrupted planning ✔ ✔ 
Increased ERN and performance 
monitoring 
✔ ✔ 
Non-verbal and visuospatial 
memory 
✔ Possibly 
Reduced perseveration and more 
exploration on probabilistic 
tasks 
✔ ✔ 
Abnormalities in meta-cognition ✔ ✔ 
Action-Belief dissociation ✔ Uncertain 
Reduced goal-directed control ✔ ✖ 
Heightened punishment 
sensitivity 





7.4 Effects of Medication 
   Most studies presented in this thesis report effects of medication, and the majority of these studies 
reveal significant atypical performance expressed by adolescent patients medicated with SSRIs, 
despite both medicated and unmedicated patients showing comparable ages, IQ scores, OCD 
severity, and anxiety and depression scores. Medicated patients 1) committed more unique errors and 
were slower on the WCST in Chapter 1, 2) made more errors when pairing USs with CSs and showed 





3, and 3) favoured speed over accuracy and showed more exploration on the sequential decision-
making task in Chapter 4. Conversely, unmedicated subjects showed abnormal performance on the 
predictive-inference task in Chapter 5 wherein they updated actions significantly more than control 
subjects, particularly when prediction errors were low. However, there was no effect of medication 
on the probabilistic reversal learning task in Chapter 6, despite this study employing the largest 
sample of medicated (n=30) and unmedicated (n=20) patients. Instead, all subjects with OCD 
displayed abnormal performance on this task regardless of medication status. This calls into question 
the medication effects reported in Chapter 2-5 as the sample sizes per group (after splitting the OCD 
group into MED+ and MED-) in these chapters were much smaller, suggesting effects may have 
occurred by chance. Nonetheless, it is still important to speculate other possible reasons for the 
medication effects uncovered in these chapters. 
   SSRIs operate by blocking the action of the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) protein which is 
responsible for the reuptake of intra-synaptic 5-HT (serotonin), which in turn promotes an increase 
of 5-HT concentration in synapses. In animal models, SSRIs are found to enhance activity in the 
OFC and caudate nucleus (Bergqvist, Bouchard, & Blier, 1999; Mansari, Bouchard, & Blier, 1995), 
which are regions that show aberrant activation during reversal learning and cognitive flexibility in 
patients with OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2008; Vaghi, Vértes, et al., 2017). Behaviourally, SSRIs are 
thought to re-engage these regions involved in goal-directed fronto-striatal circuits, enabling greater 
resistance against obsessions and compulsions (Palminteri et al., 2012). Indeed, administration of 
SSRIs has led to improvements in executive functions such as reversal learning in animals (Barlow 
et al., 2015; Clarke et al., 2007), reward and punishment learning in adults with OCD (Palminteri et 
al., 2012), as well as memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility in child-patients with OCD 
(Andrés et al., 2008). Unmedicated, but not medicated, patients performing abnormally in Chapter 5 
is consistent with the demonstrated cognitive remediating effects of SSRIs in OCD, but it is curious 
that SSRIs appeared to promote more atypical performance in other chapters. My findings provide 
preliminary evidence for SSRIs to not be especially beneficial for cognition in adolescent-OCD. 
 As alluded to in Chapters 2-4, there is evidence for impaired learning and flexibility following acute 
low-dosage SSRIs administered to healthy volunteers  (Chamberlain, Müller, et al., 2006; Skandali 
et al., 2018). Similarly, adolescent patients in this thesis on lower doses of SSRIs displayed lower 
IQ, and reduced model-based decision-making and reward sensitivity on the sequential decision-
making task in Chapter 4. This indicates that administration of lower doses of SSRIs may impair 
cognitive performance to an extent, and indeed Bari et al. (2010) demonstrated that low SSRI doses 





human experiment has yet to be performed. An explanation for this is that low doses of SSRIs 
increase serotonin levels to the point where all serotonergic autoreceptors are ‘filled’, leading to an 
inhibition of serotonin discharge (Blier, Serrano, & Scatton, 1990). Higher doses hypothetically 
bypass this inhibitory mechanism, allowing for a net increase in prefrontal serotonin availability 
(Bymaster et al., 2002; Koch et al., 2002). This has been demonstrated empirically, wherein lower 
doses of SSRIs reduced serotonin concentration in the primate brain while higher doses increased 
serotonin concentraion (Nord, Finnema, Halldin, & Farde, 2013). 
    Alongside dosage, cognitive findings in the medicated patient group could be linked to duration 
of medication treatment, as a study has found that in the early stages of SSRI treatment, patients with 
OCD showed declines in cognitive and memory abilities compared to before they started treatment 
(Sayyah, Eslami, AlaiShehni, & Kouti, 2016). Patients on higher doses of SSRIs in my studies may 
have been receiving treatment for longer (as early stages of treatment often involve administration 
of smaller doses at first) and thus did not experience cognitive dysfunction associated with early 
stages of treatment. Unfortunately, I did not obtain information about treatment duration from my 
adolescent patients and hence am unable to explore this theory.  
   All things considered, it is inappropriate to conclude that low dose SSRIs were definitely driving 
abnormal behaviour in medicated patients as dosage did not correlate with task measures that were 
significantly different in medicated compared to control participants.  
   Random and erratic responding displayed by the medicated group is also expressed in healthy 
children with ADHD traits (Dubois et al., 2020), suggesting that the medicated patients are perhaps 
more impulsive than unmedicated and control groups. Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest 
that SSRIs increase impulsive tendencies in people, and moreover in some populations they appear 
to actually reduce impulsivity (Butler et al., 2010).    
   In contrast to the majority of research reporting that SSRIs enhance cognition, Gruner et al. (2012) 
found that children with OCD medicated with SSRIs displayed worse performance on the WCST 
while medication-naïve patients showed no impairment. More recently, Apergis-Schoute et al. (in-
prep) reported that SSRI-medicated patients performed worse compared to unmedicated patients 
during acquisition learning on a probabilistic reversal learning task. As mentioned in previous 
chapters, the medicated group in this thesis may have had a more severe form of the disorder to have 
necessitated being treated with psychotropic medication, even if medicated and unmedicated 
participants with OCD were equivalent in terms of symptom severity measured via clinical scales 





rated symptoms associated with the disorder, but disorder-related abnormalities in decision-making 
are perhaps more resistant to treatment. Relevant to this explanation, it may be that lower doses of 
SSRIs are not effective in improving cognition in this population compared to higher doses of SSRIs, 
which could account for the correlations found between SSRI dosage and IQ/decision-making 
reported in the chapters of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, further research is needed to truly understand the exact neural and behavioural 
mechanisms affected by SSRIs in OCD. 
7.5 Effects of Age, IQ, and Working Memory 
   Aside from illuminating the effects of OCD and medication on learning and decision-making, the 
studies conducted in this thesis have revealed significant influences of age, IQ, and working memory 
on task performance. First, regardless of OCD status, older participants outperformed younger 
participants across several tasks’ measures, and even displayed more exploitation and better choice 
value sensitivity (lower drift rates) on the sequential decision-making task in Chapter 4. This is 
consistent with research showing that random exploratory decision-making diminishes in favour of 
maximisation strategies as children and adolescents become older (Plate, Fulvio, Shutts, Green, & 
Pollak, 2018; Somerville et al., 2017). My findings demonstrate that important constructs of learning 
and decision-making are age-dependent, and that adolescents with OCD are still expressing 
maturation of these functions, albeit at a potentially reduced rate compared to healthy adolescents, 
as task performance remains atypical in this group even when controlling for age.  
   Next, IQ and working memory correlated with several performance measures including model-
based control, exploitation, and choice value sensitivity in Chapter 4 regardless of OCD status, 
suggesting that higher order cognitive abilities are potential protective factors against atypical 
decision-making in adolescent-OCD. This has implications for future work exploring cognitive 
training as a potential treatment for adolescents and children with OCD. However, evidence for the 
benefits of cognitive training, particularly working memory training, is contentious. On the one hand, 
working memory training has been found to elevate symptoms of anxiety and depression in 
adolescents (Beloe & Derakshan, 2020) and the use of computerised cognitive games has been found 
to improve processing speed, working memory, executive functioning, and verbal memory in older 
adults (Bonnechère, Langley, & Sahakian, 2020). In contrast, a meta-analysis synthesising findings 
from 23 studies reported that benefits of working memory training were short-term and did not 
generalise to other cognitive constructs (Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013). Very few studies have 





memory training improved memory abilities and reduced symptom severity in adults with OCD (Park 
et al., 2006) but another study found that patients with OCD showed improvements over time 
regardless of whether they were allocated to visuospatial memory training or waitlisted (Buhlmann 
et al., 2006). Other studies also report that teaching children and adults with OCD learning and 
memory strategies fails to improve their performance on certain tasks (Batistuzzo et al., 2015; 
Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006). Thus, evidence supporting 
therapeutic and functional benefits of cognitive training in OCD is limited, and there is in actuality 
more documentation of conventional treatments such as cognitive behavioural therapy and 
serotonergic medication (although findings in this thesis may suggest otherwise) improving cognitive 
abilities and symptoms in children with OCD (Andrés et al., 2008; Huyser et al., 2010). In fact, the 
best way to prevent cognitive decline in OCD is likely via early detection and long-term conventional 
treatment, as research shows that rates of remission following medication treatment are highest in 
younger patients with OCD (Mancebo et al., 2008).   
7.6 Implications for Education 
   Adolescents and children with OCD are significantly disadvantaged in educational settings 
(Negreiros et al., 2018; Piacentini et al., 2003) and as a result affected youths are less likely to 
complete secondary school and/or university (Pérez-Vigil et al., 2018). Conversely, findings from 
this thesis suggest that deficits in flexibility and goal-directed control (thought to be cognitive 
hallmarks of adult OCD) are not prominent in adolescents with OCD. Instead, adolescents with OCD 
express atypical decision-making specifically in the form of maladaptive exploration. 
   Being able to flexibly update between exploration and exploitation appropriately is an integral part 
of learning (Addicott et al., 2017). Particularly, in childhood, exploration and novelty-seeking are 
healthy behaviours that enable learning new skills and information about the world, and are thus 
crucial for development (Gopnik, 2020; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Although exploration is deemed to 
be healthy behaviour in children, adolescents with OCD seem to be especially impaired at 
disengaging from exploration leading to poor performance on tasks such as the probabilistic reversal 
learning task in Chapter 6. This inability to appropriately balance exploration with exploitation may 
be impacting their ability to learn information and master new skills, particularly in situations rife 
with uncertainty. School and university may present unique and unexpected challenges in the form 
of substantial workload and social pressure, of which youths with OCD may be unable to cope with 
as a result of their insufficient learning and decision-making abilities. This has implications for 





meetings with school counsellors to discuss potential stressors or uncertain elements of 
school/university may benefit affected students. In addition, extra time to complete assignments or 
examinations may help to reduce stress and improve performance in students with OCD. Such 
support should be directed in particular towards younger students and students with a history of low 
performance on intelligence tests, as I have found that adolescents with OCD who are younger and 
have lower IQ are more susceptible to cognitive impairment.  
   Nonetheless, it is unknown whether atypical decision-making/exploration on reinforcement 
learning tasks truly corresponds to reduced education attainment in youths with OCD. It may be that 
abnormal exploration is a consequence of other disrupted functions such as inefficient evidence 
accumulation and overreliance on sensory modalities, in line with the earlier discussed model of 
OCD proposed by Fradkin, Adams et al. (2020). It is also possible that other domains found to be 
impaired in OCD such as strategy implementation and goal-directed planning (Batistuzzo et al., 
2015; Negreiros et al., 2019) are driving poor performance in school. Alternatively, patients’ hyper-
focus on the contents of their obsessions may be affecting their concentration on school work. To 
derive solid conclusions, future research first needs to establish 1) why adolescents with OCD show 
abnormally active exploration, and 2) whether abnormal exploration directly impacts school 
performance. 
7.7 Limitations and future directions 
   As a result of national lockdown restrictions introduced to curb the spread of Covid-19, data 
collection was halted for several months and I was unable to collect data from as large a sample size 
as initially projected. Nonetheless, I have now resumed data collection for the purposes of publishing 
my findings and hope to achieve a sample size large enough for each task to enable more concrete 
and reliable inferences to be drawn.  
  Next, the experiments in this thesis were effective in highlighting maladaptive exploration during 
probabilistic decision-making in adolescent OCD, but paradigms used were unfortunately not 
optimised for understanding exact reasons contributing to over-exploration. I discussed various 
possible factors in an earlier section that could promote a bias for exploration in adolescents and 
adults with OCD, but these factors can only be confirmed in future work employing well-designed 
paradigms and more sophisticated computational models (e.g. a task and model that can dissociate 
information-seeking exploration from random exploration).  
  Future work should also attempt to ascertain the neurological basis for exploratory decision-making 





that have employed cognitive tasks unrelated to explore-exploit processes. In addition, it would be 
instrumental to understand how exploratory decision-making is linked to heightened ERN and 
conflict monitoring, which are robust neurocognitive markers of early- and late-onset OCD.    
  Although the work presented in this thesis contributes significantly to the admittedly sparse body 
of literature investigating cognition in child- and juvenile-OCD, it is difficult to draw inferences from 
my findings about how adolescents with OCD compare to adults with OCD. This is due to the studies 
in this thesis comparing adolescent patients to healthy adolescent patients who are still in the process 
of developing executive functions. Hence, upcoming research should directly compare decision-
making displayed by adults with OCD to that of adolescents with OCD while simultaneously taking 
into account possible effects of disorder duration and age of disorder onset. Longitudinal methods 
would be even more useful in determining how decision-making becomes atypical with age in OCD, 
and would also enable inferences related to causality, i.e. does OCD promote abnormal exploration 
or does a tendency for exploration drive compulsions? Large-scale cohort studies, such as the 
recently launched Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development study (Casey et al., 2018) based in the 
United States, have just begun to delve into how neurocognitive mechanisms interact with and 
promote symptoms of psychiatric disorders over time in children and adolescents. Findings from 
these ongoing longitudinal studies will be integral to unravelling the complex cognitive structure of 
OCD that appears to shapeshift across the lifespan.   
7.7.1 Accounting for cognitive and clinical heterogeneity: a personalised approach to 
diagnosis and treatment? 
   It is noteworthy that variance in performance across all tasks was high within the OCD group, 
which led to the use of non-parametric statistical analysis in all experimental chapters. This variance 
in decision-making performance may reflect the highly heterogeneous nature of the disorder, wherein 
symptom profiles differ strikingly from patient to patient (Bloch et al., 2008). This suggests issues 
with ‘one-size-fits-all’ diagnosis and treatment recommendations, and research thus far has attempted 
to assess treatment effectiveness based on symptom profiles. For instance, children with 
contamination symptoms of OCD reportedly display better responsiveness to CBT (Ginsburg, 
Kingery, Drake, & Grados, 2008), although a later study found that children with symmetry/hoarding 
symptoms show better responding to CBT (Højgaard et al., 2018). 
   Rather than accounting for only symptom profiles when assigning clinical labels and 
recommending treatment, it may be necessary to consider the cognitive characteristics of individual 





in paediatric OCD patients, and found that patients with poor performance on executive function 
tasks showed better responsiveness to CBT compared to patients with superior executive functioning 
(Hybel, Mortenson, Lambek, Højgaard, & Thomsen, 2017). Moreover, specific cognitive traits are 
found to be associated with certain symptom dimensions in adult OCD (i.e contamination symptoms 
were associated with better memory, checking symptoms were associated with poor inhibition, and 
symmetry/hoarding symptoms were associated with poor memory and inhibition) (Hashimoto et al., 
2008), although evidence for this is unclear in paediatric OCD samples (Hybel, Mortenson, Højgaard, 
Lambek, & Thomsen, 2017). 
   In future work, it would be valuable to assess whether the neurocognitive features reported in this 
thesis can aid in clinical diagnosis and tailored treatment for adolescents with OCD. For instance, 
youths with OCD who are more exploratory on a task may have a different form of OCD and different 
support needs from patients who display more perseverative behaviour. Findings from the tasks 
reported in this thesis are a promising starting point for investigating this notion. At present, the tasks 
were analysed independently from each other, but it would be instrumental to integrate findings 
across all experimental chapters to derive a holistic picture of learning and decision-making in 
adolescent OCD and understand how distinct cognitive profiles relate to different symptoms and 
severity levels. One concrete way to achieve this is by applying computational methods such as a 
partial least squares (PLS) regression (Helland, 1990). This method in particular is used to identify a 
set of independent components from various predictors (i.e linear combinations of task performance 
scores and parameter values) that show the strongest association with response variables of interest 
(i.e. symptom severity or symptom profiles). In future manuscripts, I plan to use this method to 
investigate how a combination of behavioural signatures across different tasks are associated with 
OCD severity, medication usage/dosage, and symptom profiles. This individualized approach to 
cognitive and clinical phenotyping, moving away from traditional clinical labels, may transform and 










   The work presented in this thesis contributes to the recent growing body of research investigating 
cognition and development in OCD. Establishing the neuropsychological profile of child/juvenile-
OCD has been difficult thus far, as paediatric patients appear generally unimpaired on several 
cognitive domains, even those considered potential endophenotypes of adult-OCD.   
   By employing a combination of well-validated and novel paradigms, I have demonstrated that 
atypical decision-making in adolescent OCD is most pronounced on tasks with stochastic choice 
outcomes compared to tasks with stable or deterministic pay-offs. These findings strongly imply that 
young people with OCD are affected by environmental volatility, consistent with reports of 
intolerance of uncertainty in this clinical population.   
   Computational methods used in this thesis have been instrumental in unravelling the dynamics of 
decision-making portrayed by patients, which would have been otherwise too subtle to be detected 
using standard frequentist analyses. In particular, fitting reinforcement learning models to data has 
revealed that adolescents with OCD show a bias for exploratory over exploitative decision-making. 
This indicates that young patients are making decisions inconsistent with how rewarding or valuable 
different possible choices are. Additionally, when compared to healthy adolescents, their choices and 
meta-cognition are less influenced by prediction errors, implying dampened feedback processing in 
this population. These behaviours are potentially analogous to real-life compulsions that persist 
despite being inconsistent with information present in the environment (e.g. continuously checking 
that a stove is off even though evidence overwhelmingly suggests that it is) and yielding no concrete 
benefits. Ultimately, my findings signify the importance of utilising computational methods to 
improve understanding of complex behavioural processes such as decision-making.    
   Experiments in this thesis have also revealed that adolescents with OCD show comparable 
cognitive flexibility, model-based behaviour, and action-confidence coupling to healthy adolescents. 
These findings are intriguing as deficits in these domains are thought to be intertwined with adult 
OCD symptomatology. Distinctions may be attributed to 1) certain cognitive functions only 
emerging in adulthood or as disorder duration prolongs, 2) being a consequence of developmental 
artefacts, wherein group differences are undetected due to healthy adolescents displaying age-related 
underperformance on several tasks, or 3) adolescent-OCD being a subtype of, or even a separate 
psychiatric disorder from, adult-OCD. Nonetheless, exploratory decision-making has been detected 





research should focus on understanding factors influencing frequent exploration in OCD, how it 
relates to clinical symptoms, and neurobiological mechanisms underlying such behaviour.   
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